Ashton v. Ashton

• Citation: 733 P.2d 147
• Decision Date: 04 February 1987
• Docket Number: No. 19129,19129
• Parties: Woodruff ASHTON, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Wilford ASHTON and Virginia Ashton, Defendants and Appellants.
• Court: Supreme Court of Utah

Page 147

733 P.2d 147

Woodruff ASHTON, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Wilford ASHTON and Virginia Ashton, Defendants and Appellants.

No. 19129.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Feb. 4, 1987.

Alan D. Boyack, St. George, for defendants and appellants.

Phillip L. Foremaster, St. George, for plaintiff and respondent.

HALL, Chief Justice:

Plaintiff brought this quiet title action to settle a dispute over real property located in Hurricane, Utah.

I

A trial was had in this case on February 1, 2, and 3, 1983, before an advisory jury. The case was submitted on special interrogatories which the jury returned in favor of plaintiff. The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law which generally conformed to the pleadings and incorporated the substance of the jury's answers to the special interrogatories. Those findings provided, in pertinent part:

1. That the Plaintiff Woodruff Ashton and the Defendant Wilford Ashton are brothers, and the Defendant Virginia M. Ashton is the wife of the Defendant Wilford Ashton....

2. That the Plaintiff and the Defendant Wilford Ashton had a brother known under the name and style of Frank Ashton, which brother is now deceased, having passed away some fourteen years prior hereto.

3. That prior to the death of said Frank Ashton he was the owner of the following described real property and water rights located in and or about Hurricane, Washington County, State of Utah, to-wit:

[Description of property and two water shares stated.]

4. That prior to the death of said Frank Ashton, said Frank Ashton did approach his brother Wilford Ashton, ... and did advise said Wilford Ashton, that it was his desire to convey the above described property to Woodruff Ashton as to the East one-half, and to Wilford Ashton as to the West one-half, but that he was reluctant to make said conveyance to said Woodruff Ashton, ... as at the time said Woodruff Ashton was having marital difficulties with his then spouse Edith Ashton.

5. That because of the same, said Frank Ashton did advise ... Wilford Ashton that he would convey all of said property and water rights to ... Wilford Ashton provided, however, that as soon as the said marital problems of ... Woodruff Ashton were solved, that said Wilford Ashton and his wife Virginia M. Ashton would convey the East one-half of said property together with one share of said water right to ... Woodruff Ashton....

6. That said Wilford Ashton agreed to said arrangement, and in pursuance to said agreement, the said Frank Ashton did convey title to the above said real property and water rights to ... Wilford Ashton and to his wife Virginia M. Ashton as husband and wife and as joint tenants with full right of survivorship and not as tenants in common.

....

9. That because of the same, a confidential relationship and trust existed between Frank Ashton and Wilford Ashton and Virginia M. Ashton....

10. That subsequent thereto, ... Woodruff Ashton and ... Wilford Ashton did go upon said property, and did agree upon a division of the same, ... the intent of said brothers to split said property equally, one-half each.

10 [sic]. That subsequently and over the years, subsequent to the conveyance of said property, the said Plaintiff did make demand upon said Defendants for a conveyance to him of said real property, but defendants did refuse to make said conveyance, the said refusal being conditioned upon the failure of the said Plaintiff to solve his marital problems with said Edith Ashton....

11. That in October of 1980 the said Woodruff Ashton did complete divorce action from said Edith Ashton ..., thereupon solving his marital problems with said Edith Ashton....

12. That subsequent to said divorce, the said Woodruff Ashton did again make demand upon said Defendants that they convey to him the said property above described, and said Defendants did fail and refuse to do the same.

13. That because of said refusal to convey as aforesaid, said Defendants Wilford Ashton and Virginia M. Ashton, his wife did breach said confidential relationship existing between themselves and said Frank Ashton, and the Plaintiff Woodruff Ashton, and said Wilford Ashton and Virginia M. Ashton, his wife thereupon became unjustly enriched.

In accordance with these findings, the trial court entered judgment ordering defendants to convey the east one-half of the property, together with one water share, to plaintiff. When defendants failed to deed the property as ordered, the judgment was amended to reflect that plaintiff owned the east one-half of the property and one share of water.

II

In their first point on appeal, defendants challenge the weight and sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's imposition of a constructive trust. Such claims require a two-step examination, first of the findings of fact and second of the conclusions of law.

Review of findings of fact is controlled by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), which now provides, in pertinent part:

In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon.... Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. ¹

Defendants' attack on the evidence essentially consists of two claims: First, defendants contend that no promise to reconvey the property was ever made. In support of this contention, defendants rely on their own trial testimony wherein they denied ever having promised to convey any of the subject property to plaintiff or ever having made any statements to this effect. In this regard, defendants also rely on the fact that plaintiff's attorney, the scrivener of the deed, had no independent recollection of the conveyance by Frank to defendants. ² Second, defendants simply contend that there is no evidence that Frank required or solicited a promise from Wilford or detrimentally relied thereon as a condition of conveying the property.

The Court begins its analysis with the trial court's findings of fact, not with an appellant's view of the way he or she believes the facts should have been found. ³ Defendants have not even begun to seriously discuss the trial court's findings that dispute their version of the facts. In Scharf v. BMG Corp., ⁴ we explained the duty incumbent upon an appellant to mount a successful challenge to a trial court's findings of fact. An appellant must marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings. Only then can we consider whether those findings are "clearly erroneous." Because defendants have failed to make such a showing, the trial court's findings will not be disturbed.

We next turn to the lower court's conclusions of law. Conclusions of law are accorded no particular deference, but instead are reviewed simply for correctness. ⁵ The conclusions of law provided, in pertinent part:

1. That the Plaintiff Woodruff Ashton is entitled to an Order of this Court ordering and requiring the Defendants Wilford Ashton and Virginia M. Ashton, his wife[,] to convey the above described parcel of real property, together with said water right[,] to said Plaintiff free and clear of all liens and encumbrances placed thereon by Defendants above named.

As previously noted, the trial judge subsequently modified this ruling when defendants refused to convey the property. Since we have not disturbed the trial court's findings of fact, our duty is merely to determine whether those findings justify the trial court's conclusion of law.

A constructive trust is an equitable remedy which arises by operation of law to prevent unjust enrichment. ⁶ Accordingly parol evidence may be introduced to establish a constructive trust. ⁷ If the evidence is of a clear and convincing nature such that the remedy should be granted, the trial court may alter a deed which is regular in form and presumed to convey clear title.⁸

Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 45 (1957) provides, in pertinent part:

Effect of Failure of Oral Trust for a Third Person

(1) Where the owner of an interest in land transfers it inter vivos to another in trust for a third person, but no memorandum properly evidencing the intention to create a trust is signed, as required by the Statute of Frauds, and the transferee refuses to perform the trust, the transferee holds the interest upon a constructive trust for the third person, if, but only if,

....

(b) The transferee at the time of the transfer was in a confidential relation to the transferor.

In Parks v. Zions First National Bank, ⁹ the Court construed section 44, Restatement (Second) of Trusts, as being applicable only to those cases arising out of express trusts or attempts to create express trusts. ¹⁰ The reasoning stated therein is without doubt applicable to section 45, and dictum in that opinion so states. ¹¹

In Parks, we described an express trust as a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, arising as a result of a manifestation of intent to create it and subjecting the person in whom title is vested to equitable duties to deal with it for the benefit of others. ¹² After reviewing the findings of fact, we do not hesitate to hold that an oral express trust existed in this case and that section 45 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts is therefore controlling.

In Haws v. Jensen, ¹³ this Court applied section 45(1)(b) of the Restatement of Trusts to a fact situation analogous to the one before us. ¹⁴ In Haws, a mother deeded a home to her daughter. The deed was recorded, and the mother and daughter subsequently died. Thereafter, the property was distributed from the daughter's estate to the defendant, her husband, in fee simple. The plaintiffs initiated an action, claiming that the property had been distributed by the mother to the daughter in trust for the benefit of ...