Ashton v. Detroit City Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 28 December 1889 |
| Citation | 78 Mich. 587,44 N.W. 141 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | ASHTON v. DETROIT CITY RY. Co. |
Error to circuit court, Wayne county.
Brennan & Donnelly and Sidney T. Miller for plaintiff in error.
H. C. Wisner, for defendant in error.
Mrs Ashton, the plaintiff in this case, on the 10th of February 1887, lived on the south side of the Milwaukee Railroad, near Ferry avenue, in the city of Detroit, and was about 54 years of age. On the evening of that day, between 7 and 8 o'clock, she took a Russell-Street car, at the corner of Brush and Alfred streets, to go to her home, which was a short distance beyond the end of the line, on Ferry avenue. The barns on Ferry avenue were some distance from the end of the line, and when the car approached the barn, instead of carrying plaintiff on to the terminus of the line, the driver turned and drove the car into the barn a number of car-lengths, and when she left the car in the barn she was assailed by a man at the barn, who laid hold of her, and made indecent proposals to her, until she broke away from him, and ran to her home, thereby escaping from his further violence and insults. The plaintiff further claims in her declaration that, on the 23d of May next following, she was again a passenger on this same line of cars, between 6 and 7 o'clock in the evening, at which time it was light outside. This time, as before, she intended to ride to the end of the line, and again the car turned into the barn, as it had on the evening in February. She remembered her experience at that time, and rang the bell to stop the car. Finding that it did not stop, she waited a second, and then went out on the rear platform, and got off while the car was in motion, being thrown by so doing, and injuring her knee. It was at this time so light that she could see far into the barn. For the injury to the knee she brought suit, and (after a demurrer to the declaration had been overruled) on the trial recovered $500. When she rung the bell the driver looked back, but drove on, not heeding the bell, or making any effort to stop the car. The plea was the general issue. Defendant brings error.
Nine errors are assigned. The first is to the overruling of the demurrer. The defendant did not choose to stand on this, but pleaded issuably after it was overruled, and we cannot consider this further.
When Mrs. Ashton was on the stand as a witness she was asked, (referring to her experience on the 10th of February in the barn:) "Will you state to the jury what happened when you alighted from the car in the barn?" This was offered as a reason for justifying her leaving the car while in motion; to show that the place to which she was being taken by the company was one not only improper for ladies, but to the plaintiff it had proved to be dangerous. This is the second error assigned. The circuit judge was right in receiving the testimony. The fact that the driver did not respond to the ring of the bell was to the lady a suspicious circumstance, and to what extent she had cause to fear and did fear danger approaching as she neared the barn were proper subjects for the consideration of the jury, and were properly left to them. The third error assigned was to the plaintiff's testifying that she had fear of insult and injury if taken to the barn, and to the effect that the insult she received there before had upon her. I have no doubt of the competency and relevancy of this testimony as it was received.
The fourth error assigned relates to the statements of Dr. Gustin, who was called to treat the plaintiff for the injuries she received from her fall on leaving the car. He stated she complained of pain in the knee. He was then asked: "How did she describe the pain? and how did she act, if you can describe her actions, not telling what she said?" There could be no valid objection in showing her injury to make these inquiries. The physician could only inform the jury of her condition from what she told him and what he saw himself, and the conclusion he reached from the examination he made, and the questions called for no more than this, and the answers were entirely proper. I think the question here raised was substantially passed upon in Johnson v. McKee, 27 Mich. 471; Elliott v. Van Buren, 33 Mich. 49; Mayo v. Wright, 63 Mich. 42, 29 N.W. 832.
Mr Joseph Ashton, the husband of plaintiff, was sworn in the case, and examined in behalf of plaintiff. He testified that he called at the barn next morning after his wife was hurt, and saw the superintendent of the barn, and told him of the injury to his wife, and told him she would sue the company if she did not get better, and the superintendant said to him: "I don't care how quick she sues." He also testified that he called at the barn the night the accident occurred, after his wife had got home and told him of her injury, and saw some one come in the barn that he supposed to be the watchman, and asked him for the superintendent, and something as to the case there, and what cars had gone out, and told about his wife's being thrown from the car. This testimony was all objected to by counsel for the defendant, and is made the subject of de...
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