Askew v. Hargrave

• Decision Date: 08 March 1971
• Docket Number: No. 573,573
• Citation: 401 U.S. 476,91 S.Ct. 856,28 L.Ed.2d 196
• Parties: Reubin ASKEW et al., Appellants, v. Robert H. HARGRAVE et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

401 U.S. 476

91 S.Ct. 856

28 L.Ed.2d 196

Reubin ASKEW et al., Appellants,

v Robert H. HARGRAVE et al.

No. 573.

Argued Feb. 23 and 24, 1971.

Decided March 8, 1971.

Charles E. Miner, Jr., Tallahassee, Fla., for appellants.

Hershel Shanks, Washington, D.C., for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

In 1968, Florida enacted a new law for the financing of public education through state appropriations and local ad valorem taxes assessed by each school district.A section of the new law, Fla.Stat.Ann. § 236.251(Supp.1970), known as the 'Millage Rollback Law,' provided that, to be eligible to receive state moneys, a local school district must limit ad valorem teaxes for school purposes to not more than 10 mills of assessed valuation, with certain exceptions.Appellees filed this class action in the District Court for the Middle District of Florida alleging that the Millage Rollback Law effected an invidious discrimination, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, against school children of property-poor counties in that 10 mills of ad valorem tax in school districts in such counties would produce less dollars per child for educational purposes than would 10 mills of ad valorem tax in other counties.A three-judge District Court entered a summary judgment in appellees' favor upon a declaration that the Millage Rollback Law was unconstitutional, and enjoined the appellants from withholding state funds from any school district by virtue of the provisions of that Act.Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F.Supp. 944(1970).We noted probable jurisdiction.400 U.S. 900, 91 S.Ct. 143, 27 L.Ed.2d 137(1970).We vacate and remand.

I

Subsequent to the filing of this suit, School Board of Broward County v. Christian, No. 69—932, was filed in the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Leon County, Florida.That action attacks the Millage Rollback Law primarily on state law grounds, as violative of provisions of the Florida Constitution.The District Court, however, rejected appellants' argument that the court'should abstain from considering the case in deference to (the)state court proceeding,'313 F.Supp., at 946—947, holding that under Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492(1961), andMcNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 83 S.Ct. 1433, 10 L.Ed.2d 622(1963), '(t)he fact that a state remedy is available is not a valid basis for federal court abstention.'313 F.Supp., at 947.The reliance upon Monroe v. Pape and McNeese was misplaced.Monroe v. Pape is not in point, for there 'the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in practice.'362 U.S., at 174, 81 S.Ct., at 477.McNeese held that 'assertion of a federal claim in a federal court(need not) await an attempt to vindicate the same claim in a state court.'373 U.S., at 672, 83 S.Ct., at 1436(emphasis added).See alsoWisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 91 S.Ct. 507, 27 L.Ed.2d 515(1971).Our understanding from the colloquy on oral argument with counsel for the parties is that the Christian case asserts, not the 'same claim,' that is, the federal claim of alleged denial of the federal right of equal protection, but primarily state law claims under the Florida Constitution, which claims, if sustained, will obviate the necessity of determining the Fourteenth Amendment question.In such case, the line of decisions of which Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 90 S.Ct. 788, 25 L.Ed.2d 68(1970), is a recent example, states the principles that should inform the exercise of the District Court's discretion as to whether to abstain.

II

Since the case must be remanded, we add another comment.The appellees' motion for...