Askvig v. Snap-On Logistics Co.

• Decision Date: 17 December 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20–0997,20–0997
• Citation: 967 N.W.2d 558
• Parties: Jennifer ASKVIG, Appellant, v. SNAP-ON LOGISTICS CO. a/k/a Snap-On Tools Corp., Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

967 N.W.2d 558

Jennifer ASKVIG, Appellant,

v.SNAP-ON LOGISTICS CO. a/k/a Snap-On Tools Corp., Appellee.

No. 20–0997

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Submitted November 17, 2021

Filed December 17, 2021

Mark S. Soldat of Mark S. Soldat, PLC, West Des Moines, for appellant.

Joni L. Ploeger of Dentons Davis Brown, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.

Mansfield, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices joined.

MANSFIELD, Justice

I. Introduction.

This case requires us to interpret a provision of our COVID-related supervisory orders. During the early months of the COVID pandemic, a workers' compensation attorney failed to file a petition for judicial review within thirty days of the date when the claimant's application for rehearing had been deemed denied. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(3) (2020). He did not realize his oversight until the employer's attorney sent a letter setting forth her understanding of what her client owed given that the deadline for judicial review passed. At this juncture, the claimant filed a petition for judicial review. When the employer moved to dismiss the petition as untimely, the claimant invoked our April 2 and May 8, 2020 supervisory orders tolling statutes of limitations, statutes of repose, and "similar deadline[s] for commencing an action in district court."¹

The district court granted the employer's motion to dismiss the petition. The court reasoned that the April 2 supervisory order did not apply to the thirty-day deadline for petitioning for judicial review set forth in Iowa Code section 17A.19(3). The claimant appealed.

On appeal, we agree with the district court. The section 17A.19(3) deadline is not a "statute of limitations, statute of repose, or similar deadline for commencing an action in district court." Apr. 2 Order at 9. It is fundamentally different. It is an appellate deadline. There are and were practical reasons during the COVID pandemic to treat appellate deadlines differently from original deadlines. An attorney tasked with filing an appeal does so on a record that is already complete. In many cases, as here, the attorney has a preexisting attorney–client relationship with the client. Thus, avoiding person-to-person contact—the fundamental concern that drove this court's early supervisory orders—is less of an issue for appeals. For these reasons, and others we discuss herein, we conclude the district court correctly dismissed the claimant's petition for judicial review.

II. Facts and Procedural History.

Jennifer Askvig worked for Snap-On Logistics Company d/b/a Snap-On Tools. In the middle of 2017, she realized she had sustained a work injury. This resulted in her undergoing right carpal tunnel surgery. With the assistance of her present counsel, Askvig pursued workers' compensation benefits.

In an appeal decision dated February 5, 2020, the workers' compensation commissioner ordered Snap-On to pay temporary total disability benefits to Askvig related to her right extremity injury for a seven-week period in 2017. The commissioner also ordered Snap-On to pay interest, medical expenses, and costs, including the costs of an independent medical examination. However, the commissioner rejected Askvig's claim that she had also sustained a right shoulder occupational injury.

On February 25, Askvig, through counsel, filed an application for rehearing. The commissioner did not act on the application. Therefore, on March 16, it was deemed denied. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 876—4.24 (providing that an application for rehearing is deemed denied if not acted upon within twenty days).

Thereafter, according to Iowa Code section 17A.19(3), Askvig had thirty days, or until April 15, to file a petition for judicial review. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(3) ("If a party files an application under section 17A.16, subsection 2, for rehearing with the agency, the petition for judicial review must be filed within thirty days after that application has been denied or deemed denied."). This time period coincided with the onset of the COVID pandemic in Iowa. Askvig's counsel later explained that during this time, he continued to work in the office, but his staff were working from remote locations. In any event, no petition for judicial review was filed.

On May 5, Snap-On's counsel wrote Askvig's counsel by email as follows:

By my calculations, the deadline to file an application for judicial review has expired for this matter. Can you please confirm you have not filed an application for judicial review? If so, I will move forward with asking my client to issue check(s) to pay out the award. My calculation of the award amounts are as follows. Please let me know if you agree.

Thirteen days later, on May 18, Askvig's counsel responded by email, claiming that this court's supervisory orders dated April 2 and May 8 had the effect of tolling the deadline for seeking judicial review. That same day, Askvig's counsel filed a petition for judicial review in the Polk County District Court.

Snap-On moved to dismiss the petition, asserting that it was untimely under Iowa Code section 17A.19(3). Askvig resisted the motion, supporting her resistance with an attorney affidavit and citations to our court's COVID-related supervisory orders of April 2 and May 8.

The district court held a hearing on Snap-On's motion to dismiss on July 7. Two days later, the court issued an order granting the motion. Askvig appealed, and we retained the appeal.

III. Standard of Review.

"We review the granting of a motion to dismiss for errors at law." Jacobs v. Iowa Dep't of Transp. , 887 N.W.2d 590, 593 (Iowa 2016) (quoting Cooksey v. Cargill Meat Sols. Corp. , 831 N.W.2d 94, 96 (Iowa 2013) ).

IV. Legal Analysis.

Iowa Code section 17A.19(3) governs the timing of petitions for judicial review. It states,

If a party files an application under section 17A.16, subsection 2, for rehearing with the agency, the petition for judicial review must be filed within thirty days after that application has been denied or deemed denied. If a party does not file an application under section 17A.16, subsection 2, for rehearing, the petition must be filed within thirty days after the issuance of the agency's final decision in that contested case.

Askvig concedes that her petition for judicial review is untimely under this section. However, she relies on two COVID-related supervisory orders of our court.

Our supervisory order of April 2, 2020, provided,

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

33. Tolled. Any statute of limitations, statute of repose, or similar deadline for commencing an action in district court is hereby tolled from March 17 to June 1 (76 days). Tolling means that amount of time [is added] to the statute of limitations or similar deadline. So, for example, if the statute would run on April 8, 2020, it now runs on June 23, 2020 (76 days later).

Apr. 2 Order at 9.

A follow-up order of May 8 reiterated,

FURTHER PROVISIONS RE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TOLLING

3. Statute of Limitations Tolling . As previously ordered on April 2, 2020, any statute of limitations, statute of repose, or similar deadline for commencing an action in district court is tolled from March 17 to June 1 (76 days). Tolling means that amount of time is added to the statute of limitations or similar deadline.

May 8 Order at 2.

Clearly, the deadline in Iowa Code section 17A.19(3) is not a statute of limitations or a statute of repose. The fighting issue on appeal is whether it is a "similar deadline for commencing an action in district court." We believe it is not for several reasons.

To begin with, the thirty-day deadline in Iowa Code section 17A.19(3) is different from a statute of limitations or a statute of repose in that it is an appellate deadline. "District courts exercise appellate jurisdiction over agency actions on petitions for judicial review." Christiansen v. Iowa Bd. of Educ. Exam'rs , 831 N.W.2d 179, 186 (Iowa 2013) ; see also Harrington Trucking, Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Transp. , 526 N.W.2d 528, 529 (Iowa 1995) ("The district court exercises appellate jurisdiction when reviewing the final administrative decision of a state agency."); Anderson v. W. Hodgeman & Sons, Inc. , 524 N.W.2d 418, 420 (Iowa 1994) ("Historically, we have distinguished cases involving a district court's appellate jurisdiction from those invoking its original jurisdiction. Where a party attempts to invoke the district court's appellate jurisdiction, compliance with statutory conditions is required for the court to acquire jurisdiction."); Black v. Univ. of Iowa , 362 N.W.2d 459, 462 (Iowa 1985) ("Fundamentally, in judicial review proceedings the district court exercises only appellate jurisdiction ...."). The party petitioning for judicial review is not "commencing an action in district court"; they are continuing the action.²

When a party is invoking appellate jurisdiction, as here, their claims have already had a full hearing. This helps explain why there is often less tolerance for equitable modification of appellate deadlines. Also, as the district court noted,

[T]here are practical distinctions between judicial review proceedings and original jurisdiction cases. The coronavirus crisis created real obstacles to filing and serving original actions. Attorneys had more difficulty meeting with clients and potential witnesses before filing an action. Service is complicated because process services may need to come into personal contact with defendants. These concerns do not apply to judicial review cases. The attorneys and clients have already been through a contested case hearing and intra-agency appeal. The facts and arguments have already been developed. The decision to take the next step to judicial review does not require the same level of personal contact. Service can be made by regular mail, so personal contact can be completely avoided.

We generally agree with these cogent observations. Filing a judicial review petition (like pursuing other types of appeals) would not normally present the same COVID-related difficulties that come...