Aslin v. Univ. of Rochester
| Decision Date | 28 August 2019 |
| Docket Number | 6:17-CV-06847 |
| Parties | RICHARD ASLIN, KETURAH BIXBY, JESSICA CANTLON, BENJAMIN HAYDEN, SARAH HEILBRONNER, CELESTE KIDD, BRADFORD MAHON, ELISSA NEWPORT and STEVEN PIANTADOSI, Plaintiffs, v. UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER, JOEL SELIGMAN, and ROBERT CLARK, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of New York |
On December 8, 2017, the plaintiffs filed this action, claiming that the defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"); violated N.Y. Exec. Law § 292 et seq. ("NYSHRL"); violated 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) et seq. ("Title IX"); breached a contract; and defamed them. Docket Item 1. On February 5, 2018, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Docket Item 13. In the alternative, the defendants asked this Court to strike all immaterial, impertinent, and scandalous allegations and to require the plaintiffs to re-plead any counts that are not dismissed in accordance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 10. Id. The plaintiffs responded on March 16, 2018, Docket Item 20, and the defendants replied on April 6, 2018, Docket Item 24. This Court heard oral argument on April 23, 2018, and permitted the parties to file supplemental briefs. Docket Item 26. They both did so. Docket Items 25, 28.
At its core, the parties' dispute involves the conduct of Dr. Florian Jaeger—an assistant professor, and later full professor, in the Brain and Cognitive Sciences Department ("BCS") at the University of Rochester (the "University" or "UR")—and the University's response to complaints about his conduct. At 192 pages, the complaint is exhaustive and includes a myriad of allegations about Jaeger's conduct and the inadequacy of the University's response. The Court assumes the parties' familiarity with the factual allegations and will summarize the story told in the complaint only briefly. This decision and order then will address each claim and refer to the allegations only as necessary to the Court's decision.
In sum and substance, the complaint tells the following story.1
Jaeger joined BCS in 2007, Docket Item 1 at ¶ 73, and almost immediately started behaving as a "serial sexual predator." Id. at ¶¶ 41, 74. Among other things, he pried into female students' sex lives, id. at ¶ 107; used overtly sexual language, id. at ¶ 108; and publicly discussed the sexual attractiveness of female colleagues, id. at ¶ 113. These and many other things he did created a hostile environment for women. Id. at ¶¶ 457-58.
The plaintiffs are a group of students and employees at BCS, both current and former, who tried to do something about Jaeger's conduct. They first complained inNovember 2013, when Keturah Bixby, a BCS Ph.D. student, formally advised Greg DeAngelis, Ph.D., the Chair of BCS since 2010, about female students' "toxic experiences with Jaeger" and "that his regular pattern of behavior was causing major problems for female students." Id. at ¶ 160.
A few years later, in March 2016, Richard Aslin, Ph.D., and Jessica Cantlon, Ph.D., the two most senior faculty members at BCS, made allegations of sexual harassment to the University's counsel. Id. at ¶ 186-87. That complaint prompted an investigation by Catherine Nearpass, Associate Counsel for Employment and Labor relations at UR. Id. at ¶ 188-98. Attorney Nearpass then issued a report (the "Nearpass Report") which cleared Jaeger of any wrongdoing, but the plaintiffs contend that it was inadequate in several ways. Id. at ¶¶ 211-51.
Indeed, soon after the Nearpass Report was issued, Celeste Kidd, Ph.D., one of the plaintiffs, complained that it had "named and shamed her" in retaliation for speaking out. Id. at ¶ 262. Therefore, in July 2016, the University hired outside counsel, Cynthia Maxwell Curtin, to investigate Kidd's claim that the Nearpass Report amounted to retaliation against her. Id. Attorney Curtin then prepared another report (the "Curtin Report"), finding that Nearpass did not "mitigate" the risk that her report could result in retaliation or "follow[] up with Kidd to explore what kind of retaliation she expected." Id. at ¶ 267. But the University rejected that aspect of Curtin's findings without explanation. Id.
As the plaintiffs tell it, things then went from bad to worse. In July 2016, BCS faculty received a memo aimed at silencing their continued pursuit of action against Jaeger. Id. at ¶ 254. Provost Robert Clark circulated a memo calling the accusationsagainst Jaeger rumors and misinformation. Id. at ¶ 288. The University fostered a narrative that the plaintiffs had violated confidentiality by speaking out about Jaeger's conduct. See, e.g., id. at ¶ 382(f). Many of the plaintiffs were shamed for their actions at BCS faculty meetings. See id. at ¶¶ 303, 310. Plaintiffs Aslin and Ben Hayden, Ph.D., both left their faculty positions at the University, and BCS did not hire plaintiff Sarah Heilbronner, Ph.D., when she completed her graduate studies.
The plaintiffs argue that these actions and others breached their employment contracts and amounted to retaliation by the University for their attempts to address Jaeger's conduct. For the plaintiffs who remained, the University limited their professional and educational opportunities. See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 335-36. They argue that this, too, was retaliation, and they also argue that it created a hostile work and educational environment.
The plaintiffs also allege that Joel Seligman, President of the University, and other University officials including DeAngelis made defamatory statements that impugned the plaintiffs' reputation for honesty as academics. For example, Seligman compared the plaintiffs' allegations to allegations about the University of Virginia that had been reported in a later-discredited Rolling Stone article. Id. at ¶ 523. As a result, the plaintiffs were portrayed as dishonest—both to their faculty colleagues, id. at ¶ 518, and in the wider academic community, id. at ¶ 521.
Between August 2017 and November 2017, the plaintiffs filed charges of retaliation and employment discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Id. at ¶¶ 17-32. On September 1, 2017, the University appointed a special committee and hired outside counsel to investigate all mattersinvolving the EEOC complaints. Id. at ¶ 48. Still dissatisfied, the plaintiffs filed this action on December 8, 2017.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must include sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Because it involves employment discrimination, this retaliation case invokes the long-established pleading requirements of Title VII.2 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and its progeny establish what plaintiffs alleging employment discrimination must demonstrate as their case progresses. First, the plaintiffs must establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation. See Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 2010). If the plaintiffs sustain this initial burden, a presumption arises, see id.; Jute v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 420 F.3d 166, 173 (2d Cir. 2005), and the defendants must then articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. See Hicks, 593 F.3d at 164. If thedefendants do so, the plaintiffs have the ultimate burden to show that the legitimate reason was a pretext and that unlawful discrimination or retaliation was a substantial reason for the adverse employment action. See id. at 164-65.
In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506 (2002), the Supreme Court found that the McDonnell Douglas line of cases establish an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement, and that a plaintiff alleging discrimination needed only "give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. "Reading Swierkiewicz on its face, it appears to have meant that a Title VII plaintiff is not required to plead facts supporting even a minimal inference of discriminatory intent." Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 309 (2d Cir. 2015). While it is unclear how the plausibility standard of Twombly and Iqbal apply to complaints in the McDonnell Douglas framework, the Second Circuit has concluded "that Iqbal's requirement applies to Title VII complaints of employment discrimination, but does not affect the benefit to plaintiffs pronounced in the McDonnell Douglas quartet." Id. at 310. Therefore, "at the initial stage of the litigation—prior to the employer's coming forward with the claimed reason for its action—the plaintiff does not need substantial evidence of discriminatory intent" but only enough to sustain "a minimal burden of showing facts suggesting an inference of discriminatory motivation." Id. at 311 (emphasis in original).
Almost all the plaintiffs—Richard Aslin, Jessica Cantlon, Benjamin Hayden, Sarah Heilbronner, Celeste Kidd, Bradford Mahon,3 Elissa Newport, and Steven Piantadosi (together, the "Retaliation Plaintiffs")—bring claims against UR for retaliation. They assert that the University retaliated against them because they engaged in protected activities and that the University thus violated Title VII, Title IX, and the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL").4 But the allegedly retaliatory actions differ from plaintiff to plaintiff.
Title VII includes an explicit anti-retaliation provision. 42...
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