Asmann v. Board of Trustees of Police Retirement System of City of Sioux City

Decision Date14 March 1984
Docket NumberNo. 83-664,83-664
Citation345 N.W.2d 136
PartiesDale P. ASMANN, Appellee, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF POLICE RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF CITY OF SIOUX CITY, Iowa, Appellant.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Patrick J. Nugent, City Atty., Bryan J. Arneson and M. James Daley, Asst. City Attys., for appellant.

Harry H. Smith and MacDonald Smith, Sioux City, for appellee.

Considered by UHLENHOPP, P.J., and HARRIS, LARSON, CARTER, and WOLLE, JJ.

LARSON, Justice.

In this action, retired Sioux City police officers and their police pension fund's board of trustees contest the meaning of statutory language used to compute increases in pension benefits. The facts may be briefly stated.

Plaintiffs, ex-police officers who all had more than eight years of service, retired at Step 4, then the highest step on the pay scale. A new contract, negotiated after their retirement, provided for a new, higher step, "Master Police Officer," or Step 5. Initially, the Board of Trustees of the Police Retirement System determined that henceforth the plaintiffs' pension benefits would be calculated on the basis of the new Step 5 level because, were the retirees still serving, their eight years' service would automatically make them Master Police Officers. The Board later rescinded that action and the retirees sought certiorari review. When the district court ruled in the retirees' favor, this appeal followed. We affirm.

The statutory language in question is found in Iowa Code section 411.6(12)(a), which mandates that semi-annual pension adjustments for retired fire and police department employees reflect increases in the "earnable compensation payable to an active member of the department, of the same rank and position on the salary scale as was held by the retired ... member at the time of the member's retirement," and in section 411.1(12) which defines "earnable compensation," in pertinent part, as:

"the regular compensation which a member would earn during one year on the basis of the stated compensation for the members' rank or position including compensation for longevity ..."

(Emphasis added.)

The district court, interpreting these sections, found the new status of Master Police Officer to be

only a level of compensation. It is not a rank. Designation as a master police officer does not involve an increase in authority or a change of duties. In all respects other than compensation, a master police officer is the same as any other police officer.

Upon the completion of eight years of service a police officer automatically becomes a master police officer. No consideration is given to merit or to any other factor than longevity.

The court concluded that Master Police Officer was, under chapter 411, equivalent to the status from which the officers retired. It therefore ruled that the retirees' pensions should be readjusted accordingly.

In this appeal, the Board first asserts that its decision denying the increase was a finding of fact, review of which is limited to an inquiry into whether the Board's determination is supported by any substantial evidence. The Board further asserts that even as a question of law, the district court erred in defining "earnable compensation" to include longevity-based step increases as longevity pay.

The retirees respond that facts were not at issue here and that the district court's construction of this statute prevails over that of the Board. The retirees contend that what the Board did was illegal and that the district court was correct in its construction of sections 411.6(12)(a) and 411.1(12).

The scope of review in this case is summarized in Norland v. Worth County Compensation Board, 323 N.W.2d 251, 252-53 (Iowa 1982):

Appeal to this court from a certiorari judgment of a district court is treated as an ordinary action, and will be affirmed if supported by competent and substantial evidence.

Certiorari is appropriate...

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5 cases
  • Adam v. State
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 15 Enero 1986
    ...We are not bound by a trial court's statutory construction, as such construction presents a question of law. Asmann v. Board of Trustees, 345 N.W.2d 136, 138 (Iowa 1984). Our goal here is to determine the legislature's intent in enacting sections 542.14 and 543.38. See Hansen v. State, 298 ......
  • Donnelly v. Board of Trustees of Fire Retirement System of City of Des Moines
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 15 Abril 1987
    ...of the statute, not upon findings of fact. Statutory construction is not a fact question. Asmann v. Board of Trustees of Police Retirement Sys., 345 N.W.2d 136, 138 (Iowa 1984). It is unlike an illegality that results from a board's failure to act in accordance with a statute, analysis of w......
  • City of Oelwein v. Board of Trustees of the Mun. Fire and Police Retirement System of Iowa, 96-0877
    • United States
    • Iowa Court of Appeals
    • 29 Mayo 1997
    ...board can be found to have acted illegally if its decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Asmann v. Board of Trustees of Police Retirement System, 345 N.W.2d 136, 138 (Iowa 1984). The claimant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence the injuries arose out of and ......
  • Golinvaux v. City of Dubuque, 88-899
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 19 Abril 1989
    ...officers to a fixed percentage increase in wages over the remaining years of their employment. As we noted in Asmann v. Board of Trustees, 345 N.W.2d 136, 138 (Iowa 1984), the pension adjustment provisions of chapter 411 are designed to protect retirees' "unrepresented interests" in the pol......
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