Aspen Am. Ins. Co. v. Interstate Warehousing, Inc.

Decision Date14 August 2021
Docket Number1:14-CV-383
PartiesASPEN AMERICAN INSURANCE CO., as subrogee of Eastern Fish Company, Plaintiff, v. INTERSTATE WAREHOUSING, INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana
OPINION AND ORDER

William C. Lee, Judge

This matter is before the Court for resolution of numerous pretrial motions. The motions, in the order they were docketed, include the following:

1) Motion in Limine Regarding Trial Issues filed by Defendant Interstate Warehousing, Inc. (ECF No. 105);
2) Motion for Separation of Witnesses filed by Interstate (ECF No. 107);
3) First Motion in Limine to Exclude any Evidence in Support of Defendant's Act of God Defense filed by Plaintiff Aspen American Insurance Co. (ECF No. 108);
4) Second Motion in Limine to Exclude Unauthenticated Climatological or Meteorological Data filed by Aspen American (ECF No. 109);
5) Third Motion in Limine to Exclude Expert Opinions by Persons Who Have Not Been Timely Disclosed filed by Aspen American (ECF No. 110);
6) Fourth Motion in Limine to Exclude Testimony of Witnesses Who Have Not Been Timely Disclosed filed by Aspen American (ECF No. 111);
7) Fifth Motion in Limine to Exclude Reference to Snow Removal Policies filed by Aspen American (ECF No. 112);
8) Sixth Motion in Limine to Exclude Defendant's Untimely Document Production filed by Aspen American (ECF No. 113);
9) Seventh Motion in Limine to Preclude Objections to Admission of FEMA Snow Load Safety Guide Pursuant to FRE 902 filed by Aspen American (ECF No. 114);
10) Eighth Motion in Limine to (I) Preclude Objections to Inferences Made Due to Spoliation of Evidence & (II) Permit Witnesses to Testify About Spoliated Evidence filed by Aspen American (ECF No. 115); and
11) Motion to Amend/Correct Seventh Motion in Limine filed by Aspen American (ECF No. 116).
STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly authorize in limine rulings. However, a district court has inherent authority to manage the course of trials. Fed.R.Evid. 103(c); Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n. 4 (1984). District courts have broad discretion in ruling on motions in limine. Jenkins v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 316 F.3d 663, 664 (7th Cir. 2002); Aldridge v. Forest River Inc., 635 F.3d 870, 874-75 (7th Cir. 2011). However evidence should be excluded only when inadmissible on all possible grounds. Hawthorne Partners v. AT & T Techs., Inc., 831 F.Supp. 1398, 1400 (N.D. Ill. 1993). As a result, in some instances courts should defer rulings until trial, particularly where context would be helpful in determining matters such as relevancy, foundation, and potential prejudice. See Id. A pre-trial ruling denying a motion in limine does not automatically mean that all evidence contested in the motion will be admitted at trial. Id. at 1401. And while a pre-trial ruling granting a motion in limine does bar the introduction of certain evidence, trial judges remain free to alter previously issued in limine rulings, within the bounds of sound judicial discretion. Luce, 469 U.S. at 41-42.

DISCUSSION
I. Motion in Limine Regarding Trial Issues filed by Defendant Interstate Warehousing, Inc. (ECF No. 105).

Interstate Warehousing presents its pretrial issues in a single motion (ECF No. 105) and supporting brief (ECF No. 106), although the issues presented are numerous. Interstate “moves the Court to issue an order in limine prohibiting Plaintiff, its attorneys, and Plaintiff's witnesses from introducing evidence of, making statements concerning, or attempting to convey to the jury in any manner, either directly or indirectly, at any time during the trial of this action, the following:

1. Defendant's financial, economic, or insured status;
2. Settlement agreements or negotiations;
3. A heightened or different standard of care for a bailee/property owner;
4. Evidence of claims of privilege by Defendant;
5. Defendant's failure to call witnesses;
6. Defendant's prior or subsequent acts;
7. The existence of any motion in limine;
8. The suggestion that this litigation is Plaintiff's only opportunity for relief;
9. Evidence for which no foundation is laid, which is not relevant, which was not disclosed in accordance with the Court's orders, and testimony that fails to meet Rule 702 standards;
10. Statements intended to demonize Defendant Interstate Warehousing, Inc. as a company;
11. Claims of negligent hiring, retention, training, and/or supervision of any of Interstate's employees and/or agents.
12. Statements advancing a ‘Golden Rule' argument;
13. Testimony, argument, comment or statements advancing Plaintiff's claim that Defendant committed spoliation of evidence outside or beyond the instruction the Court has stated will be read to the jury;
14. Testimony, argument, comment or statements advancing Plaintiff's claim that Defendant was ‘grossly negligent';
15. Testimony, argument, comment or statements regarding the limitation of damages clause contained in the warehousing agreement at issue in this case;
16. Testimony, argument, comment or statements implying that the substantive law of any other jurisdiction, other than Michigan Law should apply to this case; and
17. Testimony, argument, comment or statements based on pure speculation and conjecture and are not supported by known facts or evidence.”

Defendant's Motion In Limine, pp. 1-2. The Court will address each issue in turn.

A. Defendant's financial, economic, or insured status.

Interstate argues that Aspen American “should be prohibited from introducing into evidence, or conveying to the jury in any manner, Defendant's relative economic or financial status. Such discussion or evidence is inappropriate argument which is presented to sway a jury that the Defendant can afford to pay Plaintiff and can afford a substantial verdict.” Id., p. 1 (citing Igo v. Coachman Industries, Inc. (Sportscoach), 938 F.2d 650, 653 (1991)).

Aspen American acknowledges that, as a general rule, evidence of a party's financial, economic, or insured status is not admissible. Nonetheless, Aspen American argues that in this instance Interstate's motion “should be denied in its entirety. All of the ‘references' and evidence challenged by the Defendant are entirely germane to matters that are at issue in this case, and therefore all exceed (by a considerable margin) the low threshold needed to establish relevance.” Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion In Limine (ECF No. 128), p. 2. Aspen American contends that while [Federal Rule of Evidence] 411 states: [e]vidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible to prove whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully . . . the court may admit this evidence for another purpose, such as proving a witness's bias or prejudice or proving agency, ownership, or control.' . . . Under this plain language, there are certain circumstances in which Defendant's financial, economic, or insured status would be relevant and admissible. Defendant's blanket, generalized Motion to preclude evidence of its ‘financial, economic, or insured status' must therefore be denied.” Id., p. 3. Aspen American insists that [n]one of the cases cited by Defendant in support of this generalized Motion show evidence of insurance as uniformly impermissible.” Id. In other words, because such evidence may become relevant and admissible during trial, Aspen American asks the Court to deny Interstate's motion on this point.

Aspen American is correct that such evidence can be relevant and admissible in certain instances, depending on the evidence and issues presented at trial. But as Interstate argues in its reply brief, the possibility that such evidence might become relevant and admissible at trial is not grounds for denying Interstate's motion in limine:

Interstate is completely surprised at Plaintiff's objection to Interstate's first Motion in Limine. While it is true that there may be valid reasons from introduction evidence [sic] of a party's financial, economic [or] insurance status at a trial, none of the reasons exist in this case. Th[e] issues in this case, that being Interstate's culpability in causing or allowing the collapse of the subject warehouse roof, do not appear to necessitate advising the jury about the Interstate's financial, economic or insurance status. As such, those issues should be excluded because they are not relevant to any issue to be tried to the jury in this case. As such, such evidence should be excluded unless, during the course of trial, one of those issues becomes relevant pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 402.

Reply in Support of Defendant's Motion In Limine (ECF No. 130), pp. 2-3.

The Court agrees with Interstate and GRANTS the motion in limine to preclude evidence of Interstate's financial, economic or insured status. Should this evidence become relevant to an issue during trial, the Court will revisit the matter if raised by a party outside the presence of the jury. This is true of all the Court's rulings since by their nature rulings on motions in limine are preliminary in nature and can be changed or tailored during trial if circumstances warrant. Ocasio v. Turner, No. 2:13-CV-303, 2015 WL 13817409, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 15, 2015).

B. Evidence of settlement agreements or negotiations.

Interstate's motion in limine includes another common and standard request: to preclude evidence of any settlement negotiations between the parties. Interstate's argument in support of this request is simple and concise:

Federal Rule of Evidence 408 provides, in relevant part:
Evidence of the following is not admissible-on behalf of any party-either to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a
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