Ass'n of Apartment Owners of Liliuokalani Gardens at Waikiki v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 31 August 2012
• Docket Number: Civil No. 11–00751 LEK–BMK.
• Citation: 892 F.Supp.2d 1268
• Parties: ASSOCIATION OF APARTMENT OWNERS OF LILIUOKALANI GARDENS AT WAIKIKI, a Hawaii nonprofit corporation, by its Board of Directors, Plaintiffs, v. Joel Lee TAYLOR, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii

892 F.Supp.2d 1268

ASSOCIATION OF APARTMENT OWNERS OF LILIUOKALANI GARDENS AT WAIKIKI, a Hawaii nonprofit corporation, by its Board of Directors, Plaintiffs,

v.Joel Lee TAYLOR, Defendant.

Civil No. 11–00751 LEK–BMK.

United States District Court,

D. Hawai‘i.

Aug. 31, 2012.

Dan C. Oyasato, John A. Morris, Richard S. Ekimoto, Ekimoto & Morris, LLLC, Honolulu, HI, for Plaintiffs.

Christopher Brancart, Brancart & Brancart, Loma Mar, CA, Leba T. Kaufmann, Legal Aid Society of Hawaii, Honolulu, HI, for Defendant.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIM PLAINTIFF JOEL LEE TAYLOR'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING PLAINTIFF ASSOCIATION OF APARTMENT OWNERS OF LILIUOKALANI GARDENS AT WAIKIKI'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND DENYING JOINDER IN MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY COUNTERCLAIM DEFENDANT ASSOCIATION OF APARTMENT OWNERS OF LILIUOKALANI GARDENS AT WAIKIKI

LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI, District Judge.

Before the Court is Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff Joel Lee Taylor's (“Taylor”) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“Taylor Motion”), filed on May 18, 2012. [Dkt. no. 26.] The Hawai'i Civil Rights Commission (“HCRC”) filed its Brief of Amicus Curiae Hawai'i Civil Rights Commission in Support of Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Filed on May 18, 2012 (“HCRC Brief”), on June 19, 2012. [Dkt. no. 42.] Plaintiff Association of Apartment Owners of Liliuokalani Gardens at Waikiki, a Hawai'i nonprofit organization, by its Board of Directors (“AOAO”), filed its memoranda in opposition to the Taylor Motion and the HCRC Brief on July 2, 2012. [Dkt. nos. 43, 47.] Taylor filed his reply on July 9, 2012. [Dkt. no. 49.] Also before the Court is the AOAO's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“AOAO Motion”), filed on May 21, 2012. [Dkt. no. 31.] The AOAO, as counterclaim defendant, filed its Joinder in Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“AOAO Joinder”) on May 21, 2012. [Dkt. no. 30.] Taylor filed his memorandum in opposition on July 7, 2012, [dkt. no. 45,] and the AOAO did not file a reply. These matters came on for hearing on July 23, 2012. Appearing on behalf of the AOAO were Dan C. Oyasato, Esq., and Lissa H. Andrews, Esq; appearing on behalf of Taylor were Christopher Brancart, Esq., and Leba Kaufmann, Esq.; and appearing on behalf of the HCRC was Livia A. Wang, Esq. After careful consideration of the motions, supporting and opposing memoranda, and the arguments of counsel, the Taylor Motion is HEREBY DENIED without prejudice, and the AOAO Motion and AOAO Joinder are HEREBY DENIED without prejudice, for the reasons set forth below.

BACKGROUND

Taylor purchased an apartment in the Liliuokalani Gardens at Waikiki condominium project (“Liliuokalani Gardens”) in 2011.¹ [Complaint at ¶ ¶ 7, 35.] The AOAO represents that Taylor had first considered purchasing a unit in Liliuokalani Gardens in 2009 and at that time was aware of the AOAO's no-pets policy. [ Id. at ¶¶ 23–24.] Taylor entered into a purchase agreement but conditioned the purchase on being able to keep his dog, Nell, as an accommodation for his mental disability. [ Id. at ¶ 24.]

In or around July 2009, in response to Taylor's request that the AOAO make an accommodation to its no-pets policy, the AOAO gave Taylor a questionnaire to be completed by a physician to provide information for the AOAO to consider in evaluating whether an accommodation is necessary and appropriate. [ Id. at ¶¶ 25–26.] Alex E. Torres, M.D. (“Dr. Torres”) responded to the questionnaire, but the AOAO claims that “some of his responses were incomplete and others were unclear.” [ Id. at ¶ 27.] Dr. Torres indicated that Taylor suffers from “ ‘agarophobia [sic] and social phobia-permanent condition’.” [ Id. at ¶ 28.] In response to the question “What major life activity or activities are the subject of Patient's disability or record of disability?”, Dr. Torres stated: “Neuro-science report establishes a brain chemistry imbalance. Epinephrine is very low, dopamine is optimal, serotonin is very low. Very low levels of serotonin promote agarophobia [sic] and social phobia. ‘Caring for oneself’ is possible with his service dog.” [ Id. at ¶ 29.] The AOAO contends that “Dr. Torres failed to indicate how the requested accommodation would alleviate or mitigate [Taylor's] disability or otherwise assist him in using and enjoying the dwelling. Dr. Torres instead indicated ‘[i]t would provide a safe haven from outside stress and allowing [sic] a refuge from the outside world.’ ” [ Id. at ¶ 30 (some alterations in Complaint).] The answers to the questionnaire also did not state what training, if any, Nell had received. [ Id. at ¶ 32.]

Taylor did not follow through with the purchase agreement in 2009, but, on or around April 27, 2011, he purchased a different unit at Liliuokalani Gardens. [ Id. at ¶ 35.] At that time, he renewed his request for an accommodation to permit him to keep his dog in the unit and provided the AOAO with the 2009 answers to the questionnaire. [ Id. at ¶ 36.] The AOAO was unable to contact Dr. Torres, who had apparently moved to Puerto Rico. [ Id. at ¶ 37.] The AOAO claims that Taylor “did not submit any additional medical information that would indicate [Taylor] suffers from a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of his major life activities, has a record of having such an impairment, or is regarded as having such an impairment.” [ Id. at ¶ 38.]

The AOAO states that, on information and belief, Nell has not received any training to do work or perform tasks which ameliorate any of Taylor's symptoms or conditions. [ Id. at ¶ 39.] Taylor apparently has represented Nell's services as that:

she must be quartered with me so as to be on call when I am required to engage with the general public to care for myself.... I refer you to the training required to act as an “emotionally supportive” Service Dog. There is none other than being a calming support in stressful situations.

[ Id. at ¶ 40.] The AOAO contends that Nell is a “companion” or “pet whose mere presence allows [Taylor] to ‘function in a calm collected manner in crowded environments such as airline travel and grocery stores.’ ” [ Id. at ¶ 41.]

On or around November 9, 2011, Taylor moved into his unit, and the AOAO has allowed Nell to remain in the unit pending the outcome of this action. [ Id. at ¶¶ 42–43.]

On December 12, 2011, the AOAO filed the present action again Taylor, arguing that Taylor does not suffer:

from a handicap as defined under 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) or a disability under HRS § 515–2, and submits that even assuming the owner qualifies as a disabled person under the FHA, Plaintiff is not required under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) or HRS § 515–3(11), or any other provision of the FHA or its Hawai'i counterpart, to waive its no pet policy and permit the owner to keep a dog that has not received any training which would make it particularly suited to ameliorate the unique problems of the owner's disabilities.

[ Id. at ¶ 2.]

On March 12, 2012, the magistrate judge issued a briefing schedule on motions for partial summary judgment on the applicability and validity of Prindable v. Association of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 304 F.Supp.2d 1245 (D.Hawai'i 2003), as it applies to the present case. [Dkt. no. 25.]

I. Taylor MotionA. Motion

Taylor takes the position that Senior United States District Judge Alan C. Kay's decision in Prindable “erroneously applied the [Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) ] definition of service animals to the FHA, imposing a requirement that does not exist in the text of the FHA or its implementing regulations” and “conflicts with administrative interpretations of the FHA and ADA and more recent case law.” [Mem. in Supp. of Taylor Motion at 8.]

1. No FHA Limitation to Trained Animals

Taylor first argues that the FHA does not limit reasonable accommodations to specially trained “service animals.” Taylor claims that the term “service animals” is not used in the FHA, which simply prohibits “ ‘a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford [a disabled] person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.’ ” [ Id. (alteration Taylor's) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B)).] Taylor argues that, under the FHA, “no category of accommodation request is precluded as a matter of law [,]” and “[t]he reasonable accommodation analysis is a ‘highly fact-specific [inquiry], requiring case by case determination.’ ” [ Id. at 8–9 (some alterations Taylor's) (some citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Cal. Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir.1994)).]

Taylor further argues that the FHA's implementing regulations do not contain any requirement that a service animal be specially trained. [ Id. at 9.] The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), which is charged with administering the FHA, has not promulgated any regulation that would limit reasonable accommodation under the FHA to dogs with special training. [ Id. at 9–10 (citing 24 C.F.R. § 100.204).²]

Taylor contends that HUD has interpreted the FHA's reasonable accommodation provision to require accommodations for non-trained emotional support animals. He cites a case in which a HUD administrative law judge issued a decision finding that a landlord had violated the FHA by refusing to grant a mentally disabled man a reasonable accommodation to allow him to keep his emotional support cat in a no-pets apartment. [ Id. at 10 (citing HUD v. Dutra, 1996 WL 657690 (HUDALJ 1996)).] HUD also issued a memorandum in February 2011 that stated:

[Animals] with or without training, and animals that provide emotional support have been recognized as necessary assistance animals under the reasonable accommodationprovisions of the FHAct and Section 504. The new ADA regulation does not change this FHAct/Section [504] analysis, and specifically notes, “[u]nder...