Asselin and Connolly v. Heath

• Decision Date: 10 June 2008
• Docket Number: No. 28459.,28459.
• Citation: 947 A.2d 1051,108 Conn.App. 360
• Parties: ASSELIN AND CONNOLLY, ATTORNEYS, LLC v. Catherine HEATH.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

947 A.2d 1051

108 Conn.App. 360

ASSELIN AND CONNOLLY, ATTORNEYS, LLC v. Catherine HEATH.

No. 28459.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 18, 2008.

Decided June 10, 2008.

Conrad Ost Seifert, Old Lyme, with whom, on the brief, was Gilbert Shasha, New London, for the appellant (defendant).

Richard E. Joaquin, for the appellee (plaintiff).

BISHOP, BEACH and BORDEN, Js.

BEACH, J.

The defendant, Catherine Heath, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying her motion to vacate an arbitration award and granting the application to confirm the award filed by the plaintiff law firm, Asselin & Connolly, Attorneys, LLC. The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the court had subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant's motion to vacate.¹ Because we answer that question in the negative, we reverse the judgment in part and remand the case to the trial court with direction to dismiss the defendant's motion to vacate for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the defendant's appeal. In 2001, the defendant hired the plaintiff to represent her in connection with a marriage dissolution action. On November 30, 2001, she signed an attorney-client retainer agreement with the plaintiff that provided that all fee disputes would be settled by binding arbitration.² After the defendant failed to pay attorney's fees to the plaintiff, the court ordered the parties, on April 19, 2004, to proceed to arbitration. One of the issues before the arbitrator was the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In her motion, the defendant argued that the arbitration clause was invalid and that the American Arbitration Association's rules were inapplicable to disputes arising out of the attorney-client relationship. On September 17, 2004, an arbitration hearing on the matter was held. The defendant did not attend. On the same day, the arbitrator issued a decision and award, stating in relevant part: "The [defendant's] motion for dismissal [of] the arbitration is denied. ... Accordingly, I award as follows: The [defendant] shall pay to the [plaintiff] the total sum of $34,239.23."

On April 12, 2005, the plaintiff filed an application to confirm the award. Shortly thereafter, on May 6, 2005, the defendant filed both an objection to the plaintiff's application to confirm the award and a motion to vacate the award. In her motion, the defendant renewed her arguments as to the arbitrability of the dispute. In a later supplemental motion, the defendant further argued that enforcement of the arbitration clause would violate public policy. On June 22, 2006, the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the defendant's motion to vacate as, inter alia, untimely pursuant to General Statutes § 52-420(b).³

On December 8, 2008, the court issued a memorandum of decision denying the defendant's motion to vacate and granting the plaintiff's application to confirm the arbitration award. In its decision, the court first addressed the question of subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, as to the court's ability to review the defendant's claim that the agreement was not arbitrable, it found that it "has jurisdiction to review claims that an arbitration award violates public policy, as the thirty day limitations period of § 52-420(b) does not apply to the common-law grounds for challenging an arbitration award. Alternatively, the court has jurisdiction under General Statutes § 52-408, which permits a party to challenge a contract's arbitration clause where `there exists sufficient cause at law or in equity for the avoidance of written contracts generally.'<sup>4</sup> Accordingly, where a party claims that an arbitration clause is void or voidable under § 52-408, the six year statute of limitations governing contract actions under General Statutes § 52-576 applies. In the present case, the parties entered into the attorney-client retainer agreement on November 11, 2001. Therefore, the defendant's challenge to the validity of the arbitration clause is timely." The court then found, on the merits, that the arbitration agreement did not violate public policy. It further noted that as to the defendant's additional argument that she entered into the agreement under "`coercive circumstances' involving `duress' ... the defendant has failed to provide the court with any legal analysis or citation to authority that would support a claim for avoidance of the arbitration clause contained within the retainer agreement. Accordingly, the court finds that any claims relating to the avoidance of the written contract have been abandoned." This appeal followed.

The defendant's primary claim on appeal is that enforcement of arbitration clauses in attorney-client retainer agreements violates the state's public policy concerning the ethical conduct of attorneys in relation to their clients. The record reveals, however, that the defendant's motion to vacate the award was not filed within the thirty days following the receipt of notice of the arbitration award, as required by § 52-420(b). The timeliness of the defendant's motion to vacate implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Middlesex Ins. Co. v. Castellano, 225 Conn. 339, 344, 623 A.2d 55 (1993).

The legal principles concerning subject matter jurisdiction are well settled. Our Supreme Court has "long held that because [a] determination regarding a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, our review is plenary.... Moreover, [i]t is a fundamental rule that a court may raise and review the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at any time.... Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it ... [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bloomfield v. United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America, Connecticut Independent Police Union, Local 14, 285 Conn. 278, 286, 939 A.2d 561 (2008).

The legal principles regarding arbitration are also well settled. "[T]he law in this state takes a strongly affirmative view of consensual arbitration.... Arbitration is a favored method to prevent litigation, promote tranquility and expedite the equitable settlement of disputes.... As a consequence of our approval of arbitral proceedings, our courts generally have deferred to the award that the arbitrator found to be appropriate.... The scope of review for arbitration awards is exceedingly narrow.... Additionally, every reasonable inference is to be made in favor of the arbitral award and of the arbitrator's decisions....

"[C]ourts recognize three grounds for vacating arbitration awards.... As a routine matter, courts review de novo the question of whether any of those exceptions apply to a given award.... The first ground for vacating an award is when the arbitrator has ruled on the constitutionality of a statute.... The second acknowledged ground is when the award violates clear public policy.... Those grounds for vacatur are denominated as common-law grounds and are deemed to be independent sources of the power of judicial review.... The third recognized ground for vacating an arbitration award is that the award contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of [General Statutes] § 52-418."⁵ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) International Brotherhood of Police Officers, Local 361 v. New Milford, 81 Conn.App. 726, 729-30, 841 A.2d 706 (2004).

In reaching our conclusion as to the effect of the untimeliness of the defendant's motion to vacate, we find our Supreme Court's recent decision in Bloomfield v. United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America, Connecticut Independent Police Union, Local 14, supra, 285 Conn. at 278, 939 A.2d 561, to be controlling. In that case, the plaintiff employer moved to vacate the arbitration award on the ground that it violated the state's public policy encouraging honesty among the state's police forces. Id., at 279-80, 939 A.2d 561. The plaintiff, however, filed its application to vacate more than thirty days following the issuance of the arbitration award. Id., at 280, 939 A.2d 561. Our Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the matter because "the thirty day filing period set forth by § 52-420(b) applies to an application to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that it violates public policy." Id., at 292, 939 A.2d 561.

In reaching its conclusion, the court interpreted the language of § 52-420(b), which provides: "No motion to vacate, modify or correct an award may be made after thirty days from the notice of the award to the party to the arbitration who makes the motion." The court reasoned that the statute's "broad language plainly states that the limitations period applies regardless of the grounds for the motion to vacate. It is neither qualified by, nor limited to, any particular grounds for the application and is not, therefore, ambiguous because, when read in context, [it] is [not] susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 287, 939 A.2d 561. More specifically, the court reasoned that § 52-420(b) does not limit the thirty day filing period to applications arising out of the grounds for vacatur enumerated in § 52-418, but also applies to common-law grounds, such as a claimed violation of public policy. Id., at 287-88, 939 A.2d 561. "Indeed, a conclusion that public policy claims are not subject to the thirty day limitations period would undermine the legislature's well established support of arbitration as a mechanism for the inexpensive and expedient resolution of private disputes." Id., at 290, 939 A.2d 561; see also Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's & Cos. Collective, 271 Conn. 474, 493, 857 A.2d 893 (2004...