Assessors of Boston v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 20 September 1948 |
| Citation | 81 N.E.2d 366,323 Mass. 242 |
| Parties | ASSESSORS OF BOSTON v. JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. CO. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Appellate Tax Board.
Proceeding by the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company against the Assessors of Boston to abate a real property tax assessed against the Company as mortgagee in possession. From a decision of the Appellate Tax Board abating the tax, the Assessors appeal.
Petition for abatement dismissed.
Before QUA, C. J., and LUMMUS, SPALDING, and WILLIAMS, JJ.
H. W. Kerr and S. S. Dennis, Asst. Corp. Counsel, both of Boston, for appellant assessors.
G. K. Richardson, of Boston, and C. W. Cobb Jr., of Combridge, for appellee taxpayer.
The assessors of Boston appeal from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board abating in its entirety a tax for the year 1945 upon the Hotel Buckminister on Beacon Street in that city. G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 58A, § 13, as last amended by St.1939, c. 366, § 1. The tax was assessed to John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, hereinafter called the insurance company, as mortgagee in possession, and was abated as having been invalidly assessed.
The parties have agreed upon the facts. By deed recorded November 1, 1940, Carlton Hotel, Inc., hereinafter called the hotel company, became the owner in fee of the hotel and by deed dated and recorded the same day mortgaged it to the insurance company. On August 5, 1942, the hotel company filed a petition in the District Court of the United States for reorganization under the Chandler act. U.S.C. (1940 Ed.) Title 11 c. 10, 11 U.S.C.A. § 501 et seq. On August 12, 1942, the insurance company made an open, peaceable, and unopposed entry on the premises for the declared purpose of foreclosing its mortgage for breach of conditions thereof and on the same day recorded a certificate of the entry under G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 244, § 2. On August 18, 1942, the District Court of the United States approved the petition of the hotel company and appointed a trustee, and on August 21 approved the trustee's bond. On September 16, 1942, that court ordered the insurance company to relinquish its possession of the hotel and to desist from foreclosing its mortgage. On March 1, 1943, this order was affirmed by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Casey, 1 Cir., 134 F.2d 162. See also John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Casey, 1 Cir., 139 F.2d 207. On May 24, 1943, certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court of the United States, 319 U.S. 757, 63 S.Ct. 1176, 87 L.Ed. 1709. The petition for reorganization was still pending on January 1, 1945. Pursuant to the order of the District Court of the United States, the insurance company surrendered possession of the hotel at some time prior to January 1, 1945. Prior to that date no notice of the proceedings in the Federal courts and no instrument evidencing the insurance company's surrender of possession was filed in the registry of deeds. At the date of assessment, January 1, 1945, all that appeared in the records of Suffolk County was that the hotel company owned the fee of the hotel; that the insurance company held a mortgage upon it; that the insurance company had entered for the purpose of foreclosure; and that the three years required by G.L.(Ter.Ed) c. 244, § 1, to complete the foreclosure after recovery of ‘possession of the land mortgaged’ by means of the entry had not expired. Further facts pertinent to certain aspects of the case will be mentioned later.
The statute governing the assessment is G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 59, § 11, as appearing in St.1939, c. 175. In its material parts the section reads as follows: The ‘three following sections' do not affect the present issue.
It is plain beyond doubt that, under the first sentence of this section, where an estate is assessed to an ‘owner’ as distinguished from a mortgagee, the assessors, although not obliged to rely upon the state of the local records, are ordinarily justified in doing so, whatever the actual facts may be outside the records, and even if they know facts which show that the title is not in the person assessed. City of Boston v. Quincy Market Cold Storage & Warehouse Co., 312 Mass. 638, 643, 650, 45 N.E.2d 959. The crux of the case is the question whether the words in the first sentence of the section permitting the assessors to rely upon the state of the local records when assessing an ‘owner’ apply also when, under the last sentence of the section, they are assessing a mortgagee who by that sentence is to ‘be deemed the owner.’ While the question is not free from doubt, we are of opinion that these words do apply, and that if the local records disclose a mortgage, and that the mortgagee has taken possession, the assessors may safely assess the mortgagee. If the records are to govern an assessment to the ‘owner’ we see no reason why they should not also govern an assessment to a mortgagee who for the purpose of the section must ‘be deemed the owner.’
The history to this section is examined in City of Boston v. Quincy Market Cold Storage & Warehouse Co., 312 Mass. 638, 45 N.E.2d 959. That history seems to us to show a tendency toward greater and greater simplicity and certainty in assessments. Moreover, it is not without some significance that...
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