Associated Gen. Contractors Workers' Comp. Self-Insurers Fund v. Harding (In re Associated Gen. Contractors Workers' Comp. Self-Insurers Fund)
| Decision Date | 06 January 2017 |
| Docket Number | 2160120. |
| Citation | 227 So.3d 528 |
| Parties | EX PARTE ASSOCIATED GENERAL CONTRACTORS WORKERS' COMPENSATION SELF–INSURERS FUND, ALABAMA BRANCH, and Good Hope Contracting, Inc. (In re: Associated General Contractors Workers' Compensation Self–Insurers Fund, Alabama Branch v. Lynn Harding ) |
| Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
Jonathan L. Berryhill, Candace M. Deer, and Devona J. Segrest of Wilson & Berryhill, P.C., Birmingham, for petitioner.
Submitted on mandamus petition only.
Associated General Contractors Workers' Compensation Self–Insurers Fund, Alabama Branch ("the AGC Fund"), and Good Hope Contracting, Inc. ("Good Hope"), petition this court for a writ of mandamus directing the Cullman Circuit Court ("the trial court") to vacate an order transferring the action to Jefferson County, to reinstate the action in Cullman County, and to enter an order denying Lynn Harding's motion to dismiss based on improper venue or, alternatively, to transfer the action. Harding did not file a response to the petition with this court. For the reasons set forth below, we grant the petition and issue the writ.
On June 29, 2016, the AGC Fund filed a complaint against Harding in the trial court seeking a judgment declaring that Harding was not entitled to benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act, codified at § 25–5–1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. According to the allegations in the complaint, the AGC Fund is a pooled-risk self-insurer fund in accordance with §§ 25–5–8 and –9, Ala. Code 1975, of the Workers' Compensation Act, and the AGC Fund, which has corporate offices in Jefferson County, provided workers' compensation coverage through a written agreement to Good Hope, which has its principal place of business in Cullman County. Good Hope was named as Harding's employer. The AGC Fund further alleged that Harding had made a claim for workers' compensation benefits with Good Hope, that the claim had been forwarded to the AGC Fund, and that the AGC Fund disputed Harding's asserted entitlement to workers' compensation benefits.
On August 2, 2016, Harding filed a "Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue or in the Alternative, Motion to Transfer Venue to Jefferson County." The motion states the following:
Harding supported his motion with an affidavit in which he testified:
On August 5, 2016, Harding filed an answer denying the AGC Fund's allegations regarding his claim for workers' compensation benefits and asserting improper venue as an affirmative defense. Harding alleged a counterclaim against the AGC Fund and a cross-claim against Good Hope seeking workers' compensation benefits. In those claims, Harding alleged that he was injured in Walker County working within the scope of his employment with Good Hope and other facts purporting to show that he was entitled to workers' compensation benefits. Harding also alleged that his employment was wrongfully terminated on December 16, 2015, because he was pursuing his workers' compensation claim, and he alleged a claim of retaliatory discharge against Good Hope. The AGC Fund and Good Hope both filed answers denying liability for workers' compensation benefits, and, in its answer, Good Hope denied the allegations supporting Harding's retaliatory-discharge claim.
On October 12, 2016, the AGC Fund filed a response to Harding's motion, arguing that Harding incorrectly asserted that § 6–3–2, Ala. Code 1975, pertaining to venue in civil actions against individuals, applied to the workers' compensation action. The AGC Fund asserted that venue for the action was governed by the venue provisions in the Workers' Compensation Act and § 6–3–7, Ala. Code 1975, the statute pertaining to venue in civil actions against corporations. The AGC Fund supported its response with the affidavits of Danny Hall, a risk manager for Good Hope, and Zachary D. Spanick, a supervisor for Good Hope, who both testified that Good Hope was a domestic Alabama corporation with its principal place of business in Cullman County. Good Hope filed a response to Harding's motion in which it joined the AGC Fund's response and incorporated its arguments. In its motion, Good Hope additionally asserted that venue was proper in Cullman County based on the retaliatory-discharge cross-claim filed by Harding against Good Hope.
On October 14, 2016, after conducting a hearing on Harding's motion to dismiss or transfer and the responses from the AGC Fund and Good Hope, the trial court entered an order transferring the case in its entirety to the Jefferson Circuit Court. On November 18, 2016, the AGC Fund and Good Hope jointly filed the present petition for a writ of mandamus to this court. Upon the petitioners' motion, we stayed the execution of the October 14, 2016, order and other proceedings in the trial court pending a ruling on this petition.
Ex parte Children's Hosp. of Alabama, 931 So.2d 1, 5–6 (Ala. 2005).
Ex parte Pike Fabrication, Inc., 859 So.2d 1089, 1091 (Ala. 2002).
In his motion to dismiss the case or, alternatively, to transfer the case to the Jefferson Circuit Court, Harding relied upon § 6–3–2, which generally governs venue in actions against individuals. Harding asserted in his motion that, pursuant to § 6–3–2, the only proper venues are Jefferson County, because of his residence there, or Walker County, where his injury allegedly occurred. The AGC Fund and Good Hope argue that § 6–3–7 is the applicable statute governing venue of this case, and that, under that statute, venue is proper in Cullman County.
This case began with the filing of a complaint by the AGC Fund against Harding regarding his claim for workers' compensation benefits. In Ex parte Adams, 11 So.3d 243, 246 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008), this court held that § 6–3–2 did not apply in an action brought pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act; instead, we held that the specific venue provisions in the Workers' Compensation Act governed the determination of venue. Under the Workers' Compensation Act, "the court" is defined as "[t]he circuit court that would have jurisdiction in an ordinary civil action involving a claim for the injuries or death in question ...." § 25–5–1(18), Ala. Code 1975. Section 25–5–81(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part:
"In case of a dispute between employer and employee ... with respect to the right to compensation under [Article 1 or Article 2 of the Workers' Compensation Act], or the amount thereof, either party may submit the controversy to the circuit court of the county which would have jurisdiction of a civil action in tort between the parties."
See § 25–5–88, Ala. Code 1975, ("Either par...
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