Associated Press v. Crofts

Decision Date04 May 2004
Docket NumberNo. 03-239.,03-239.
Citation2004 MT 120,89 P.3d 971,321 Mont. 193
PartiesThe ASSOCIATED PRESS, Bozeman Daily Chronicle, the Montana Standard, Missoulian, Great Falls Tribune, Montana Newspaper Association, Montana Broadcasters Association, the Billings Gazette, the Daily Inter Lake, Montana Television Network, Eagle Television Network, Havre Daily News, Helena Independent Record, and Yellowstone Newspapers, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Richard A. CROFTS, in his official capacity as Montana Commissioner of Higher Education, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtMontana Supreme Court

For Appellant: Leroy H. Schramm (argued), Montana University System, Helena, Montana.

For Respondents: Ronald F. Waterman, Laura D. Vachowski (argued), Gough, Shanahan, Johnson & Waterman, Helena, Montana.

For Amicus Montana School Boards Association: Elizabeth A. Kaleva, Montana School Boards Association, Helena, Montana.

For Amicus State of Montana: Hon. Mike McGrath, Montana Attorney General; Chris D. Tweeten, Chief Civil Counsel; Brian M. Morris, Solicitor, Helena, Montana.

Justice JOHN WARNER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 The Respondents, members of the print and television media, filed a complaint against Appellant Richard A. Crofts in the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County. The complaint alleged that meetings between Crofts and other employees of Montana's University System were subject to Montana's open meeting laws. Crofts and the Respondents filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The District Court granted the Respondents' summary judgment motion, and awarded the Respondents their attorneys' fees and costs. Crofts appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the District Court.

¶ 2 We restate the issues on appeal as follows:

¶ 3 1. Did the District Court err when it concluded that meetings between senior employees of the University System were subject to Article II, Section 9, of the Montana Constitution and Montana's open meeting laws?

¶ 4 2. Did the District Court correctly award the Respondents their attorneys' fees?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 5 Montana's University System is a public education system supervised and controlled by the Board of Regents of Higher Education (the Board of Regents). Art. X, Sec. 9, Mont. Const.; § 20-25-301, MCA (2001); Kottel v. State, 2002 MT 278, ¶ 5, 312 Mont. 387, ¶ 5, 60 P.3d 403, ¶ 5. One of the responsibilities of the Board of Regents is to hire the Commissioner of Higher Education, who serves as the chief executive officer of the University System. The Board of Regents also prescribes the Commissioner's official duties. Art. X, Sec. 9(c), Mont. Const. One of the Commissioner's official duties is to act as the person through whom all matters are presented to the Board of Regents, including reports, recommendations and suggestions from the different units of the University System.

¶ 6 At all times relevant to the instant case, Crofts was Montana's Commissioner of Higher Education. During the period between June 30, 1999, and December 7, 2001, Crofts held fourteen meetings with a group of upper-level employees of the University System, such as University presidents and chancellors. For its first twelve meetings, this group referred to itself in its agendas as the Policy Committee. Then, the Committee's name was changed to the Senior Management Group. The meetings were called by Crofts to discuss issues directly related to the operation of the University System. Crofts also used the meetings to seek input from Committee members on proposed actions within the realm of his authority. The various members of the Policy Committee attended the meetings in their official capacity as upper-level University employees and were compensated for their attendance with public funds.

¶ 7 The fifteenth meeting between Crofts and the Policy Committee was scheduled for February 1, 2002. However, before such meeting could commence, a reporter for the Associated Press entered the meeting room and requested to observe, and report on, the meeting. Crofts declined this request. The reporter refused to leave. Crofts then canceled the meeting.

¶ 8 On February 8, 2002, the Respondents filed a complaint against Crofts, in his official capacity as Montana's Commissioner of Higher Education. The complaint sought a declaration that the meetings between Crofts and the Policy Committee were subject to Montana's open meeting laws. The complaint also sought an order enjoining Crofts from excluding the public from such meetings.

¶ 9 Crofts moved for summary judgment on the Respondents' complaint on August 9, 2002. The Respondents filed a cross-motion for summary judgment that same day. The District Court conducted a hearing on the motions on November 13, 2002. On January 3, 2003, the District Court issued its order, granting the Respondents' summary judgment motion, and denying Crofts' summary judgment motion.

¶ 10 On January 9, 2003, the Respondents filed a motion requesting that they be awarded attorneys' fees. The District Court conducted a hearing on the motion for attorneys' fees on February 25, 2003. Crofts filed a notice of appeal on March 11, 2003. On April 3, 2003, the District Court granted the Respondents their attorneys' fees and costs. Crofts then filed an amended notice of appeal on April 7, 2003.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 11 Our review of a district court's grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment is de novo. Hickey v. Baker School Dist. No. 12, 2002 MT 322, ¶ 12, 313 Mont. 162,

¶ 12, 60 P.3d 966, ¶ 12. Therefore, we apply the same Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P., criteria as applied by the district court. Hickey, ¶ 12. Pursuant to Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P.:

The movant must demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Once this has been accomplished, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to prove, by more than mere denial and speculation, that a genuine issue does exist. Having determined that genuine issues of fact do not exist, the court must then determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We review the legal determinations made by a district court as to whether the court erred.

Hickey, ¶ 12.

¶ 12 On appeal, Crofts contests neither the fact that the Respondents incurred attorneys' fees nor that the amount fixed by the District Court was reasonable. This Court generally reviews a district court's award of attorneys' fees for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Steinbeisser, 2002 MT 309, ¶ 18, 313 Mont. 74, ¶ 18, 60 P.3d 441, ¶ 18. However, in this case, Crofts' challenge of the District Court's award of attorneys' fees is purely legal. That is, Crofts alleges that because the District Court failed to make a ruling on the Respondents' motion for attorneys' fees within 60 days, the motion was deemed to be denied. Thus, because there are no factual issues concerning the award of attorneys' fees, the question of whether the award of attorneys fees' was proper is one of law. We review a district court's conclusions of law to determine whether the court's interpretation of the law is correct. Brumit v. Lewis, 2002 MT 346, ¶ 12, 313 Mont. 332, ¶ 12, 61 P.3d 138, ¶ 12.

DISCUSSION
ISSUE 1

¶ 13 Did the District Court err when it concluded that meetings between senior employees of the University System were subject to Article II, Section 9, of the Montana Constitution and Montana's open meeting laws?

¶ 14 Crofts maintains that the District Court erred when it concluded that the Policy Committee's meetings were subject to Montana's open meeting laws. The Respondents counter that the District Court's decision was proper, as Article II, Section 9, of the Montana Constitution and the open meeting laws apply to the type of meetings at issue in this case.

¶ 15 Article II, Section 9, of the Montana Constitution provides:

No person shall be deprived of the right to examine documents or to observe the deliberations of all public bodies or agencies of state government and its subdivisions, except in cases in which the demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure.

The above provision, commonly referred to as the "Right to Know" provision of the Montana Constitution, has been implemented primarily through Montana's open meeting laws, located at §§ 2-3-201 through -221, MCA (2001). Common Cause v. Statutory Committee (1994), 263 Mont. 324, 329, 868 P.2d 604, 607. The legislature created the open meeting laws with the intent that the deliberations of the public agencies of this State be conducted openly. Section 2-3-201, MCA (2001). To that end, the provisions of the open meeting laws are to be liberally construed. Section 2-3-201, MCA (2001).

¶ 16 Section 2-3-203(1), MCA (2001), which addresses the types of meetings subject to the open meeting laws, provides:

All meetings of public or governmental bodies, boards, bureaus, commissions, agencies of the state, or any political subdivision of the state or organizations or agencies supported in whole or in part by public funds or expending public funds must be open to the public[.]

¶ 17 We have previously determined that, in the context of § 2-3-203(1), MCA (2001), the phrase "public or governmental bodies" means a group of individuals organized for a governmental or public purpose. Common Cause, 263 Mont. at 330,868 P.2d at 608; Bryan v. District, 2002 MT 264, ¶ 25, 312 Mont. 257, ¶ 25, 60 P.3d 381, ¶ 25. Therefore, pursuant to § 2-3-203(1), MCA (2001), any group of individuals organized for a governmental or public purpose must allow their meetings to be open to the public.

¶ 18 In past cases, this Court has concluded that various types of committees created by government entities to perform some type of function were public or governmental bodies required to open their meetings to the public. See Common Cause, 263 Mont. at 330, 868 P.2d at 608 (in which we held that a...

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