Association for Retarded Citizens v. Department of Developmental Services

• Decision Date: 21 March 1985
• Docket Number: CITIZENS--CALIFORNIA,S.F. 24761
• Citation: 211 Cal.Rptr. 758,38 Cal.3d 384,696 P.2d 150
• Parties: , 696 P.2d 150 ASSOCIATION FOR RETARDEDet al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. DEPARTMENT OF DEVELOPMENTAL SERVICES et al., Defendants and Appellants.
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 758

211 Cal.Rptr. 758

38 Cal.3d 384, 696 P.2d 150

ASSOCIATION FOR RETARDED CITIZENS--CALIFORNIA et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. DEPARTMENT OF DEVELOPMENTAL SERVICES et al., Defendants and Appellants.

S.F. 24761.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

March 21, 1985.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Thomas E. Warriner, Asst. Atty. Gen., Anne S. Pressman and Henry Torres, Jr., Deputy Attys. Gen., for defendants and appellants.

Jay-Allen Eisen, David Rosenberg, Whitney Rimel Rogge, Felderstein, Rosenberg & McManus, Sacramento, Gilford M. Eastham, Redondo Beach, and Paul Blake, Tustin, for plaintiffs and respondents.

Nancy E. Fleischer and Ralph Santiago Abascal, San Francisco, as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiffs and respondents.

MOSK, Justice.

Plaintiffs, a number of organizations and individuals concerned with the condition of developmentally disabled persons, brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants, the Department of Developmental Services (DDS), its director (the Director), and another state agency and its secretary, alleging that certain spending directives issued by the Director were void. The court entered an order granting a preliminary injunction, and defendants appealed. (Code Civ.Proc., § 904.1, subd. (f).) We conclude that the order should be affirmed. ¹

I

The Legislature has enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme known as the Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services Act (hereinafter the Lanterman Act or the Act) (Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 4500-4846) ² to provide a "pattern of facilities and services ... sufficiently complete to meet the needs of each person with developmental disabilities, regardless of age or degree of handicap, and at each stage of life." ( § 4501.) Such services include locating persons with developmental disabilities ( § 4641); assessing their needs ( §§ 4642-4643); and, on an individual basis, selecting and providing services to meet such needs ( §§ 4646-4647). The purpose of the statutory scheme is twofold: to prevent or minimize the institutionalization of developmentally disabled persons and their dislocation from family and community ( §§ 4501,4509, 4685), and to enable them to approximate the pattern of everyday living of nondisabled persons of the same age and to lead more independent and productive lives in the community ( §§ 4501, 4750-4751).

In the Lanterman Act "[t]he State of California accepts a responsibility for its developmentally disabled citizens and an obligation to them which it must discharge." ( § 4501.) In so doing, the Legislature has not only recognized that "[p]ersons with developmental disabilities have the same legal rights and responsibilities [as those] guaranteed all other individuals by the Federal Constitution and laws and the Constitution and laws of the State of California" ( § 4502), but has also granted them certain statutory rights, including the right to treatment and habilitation services at state expense. (See §§ 4502, 4620, 4646-4648.) ³

To implement this scheme of statutory rights of developmentally disabled persons and the corresponding obligations of the state toward them, the Legislature has fashioned a system in which both state agencies and private entities have functions. Broadly, DDS, a state agency, "has jurisdiction over the execution of the laws relating to the care, custody, and treatment of developmentally disabled persons" ( § 4416), while "regional centers," operated by private nonprofit community agencies under contract with DDS, are charged with providing developmentally disabled persons with "access to the facilities and services best suited to them throughout their lifetime" ( § 4620).

Under the statutory scheme it is the regional centers, not DDS, that provide services to developmentally disabled persons and determine the manner in which those services are to be rendered. (See §§ 4620, 4630, 4648, 4651.) DDS has the authority to promote uniformity and cost-effectiveness in the operations of the regional centers. For example, DDS is responsible for developing uniform systems of accounting, budgeting, and reporting ( § 4631, subd. (a)), setting the rates for out-of-home care ( § 4681), and auditing and paying funds to the regional centers ( § 4780.5).In short, whereas the responsibility of the regional centers is broadly to provide each developmentally disabled person with services that enable him to live a more independent and productive life in the community (see §§ 4620, 4630, 4646-4648, 4651), the responsibility of DDS, as the Attorney General has concluded on other occasions, is basically limited to promoting the cost-effectiveness of the operations of the regional centers, and does not extend to the control of the manner in which they provide services or in general operate their programs (64 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, 910, 916; 62 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 229, 230-231 (1979); see §§ 4629, 4631, 4751-4753).

The rights of developmentally disabled persons and the corresponding obligations of the state toward them under the Lanterman Act are implemented in the Individual Program Plan (IPP) procedure. Under the Act, the regional centers are required to develop an IPP for each client. ( § 4647.) The IPP must be prepared and reviewed and, if necessary, modified at least annually, and must include the following: an assessment of the client's capabilities and problems; a statement of time-limited objectives for improving his situation; a schedule of the type and amount of services necessary to achieve these objectives; and a schedule of periodic review to insure that the services have been provided and the objectives have been reached. ( § 4646.) While it is true, as the Attorney General has observed, that the regional centers have "wide discretion" in determining how to implement the IPP (62 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, 229, 230; see § 4648), they have no discretion at all in determining whether to implement it: they must do so ( § 4648).

II

Fearing a shortfall in funding in the 1982-1983 fiscal year, the Director issued spending directives, entitled "Priorities for Regional Center Expenditures" (the Priorities), to insure that the regional centers would not exhaust their appropriations before the end of the fiscal year. In the Priorities the Director required the regional centers in effect to cut back services by category, without regard to the individual client's IPP. Specifically, he designated a few categories of services as "basic and essential," and required the regional centers to provide them "[t]o the degree funds are available," and, unless there was a special showing in an individual case, to provide no others. Plaintiffs filed this action to challenge the validity of the Priorities.

III

The scope of judicial review of quasi-legislative administrative action is well settled. ⁴ (See, e.g., J.R. Norton Co. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 26 Cal.3d 1, 29, 160 Cal.Rptr. 710, 603 P.2d 1306; Morris v. Williams (1967) 67 Cal.2d 733, 748, 63 Cal.Rptr. 689, 433 P.2d 697.) To be valid, such administrative action must be within the scope of authority conferred by the enabling statute. (Gov.Code, §§ 11342.1, 11342.2; Morris, supra, at p. 748, 63 Cal.Rptr. 689, 433 P.2d 697.) We have long recognized, of course, that "the construction of a statute by officials charged with its administration, including their interpretation of the authority invested in them to implement and carry out its provisions, is entitled to great weight ...." (Morris, supra, at p. 748, 63 Cal.Rptr. 689, 433 P.2d 697.) Nevertheless, "[w]hatever the force of administrative construction, ... final responsibility for the interpretation of the law rests with the courts." (Whitcomb Hotel v. Cal.Emp.Com. (1944) 24 Cal.2d 753, 757, 151 P.2d 233; accord, Mosk v. Superior Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 474, 499, 159 Cal.Rptr. 494, 601 P.2d 1030; Morris, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 748, 63 Cal.Rptr. 689, 433 P.2d 697.) If, in interpreting the statute, the court determines that the administrative action under attack has, in effect, "alter[ed] or amend[ed] the statute or enlarge[d] or impair[ed] its scope," it must be declared void. (Morris, supra, at p. 748, 63 Cal.Rptr. 689, 433 P.2d 697; accord, J.R. Norton Co. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 29, 160 Cal.Rptr. 710, 603 P.2d 1306.) Thus, if the court concludes that the administrative action transgresses the agency's statutory authority, it need not proceed to review the action for abuse of discretion; in such a case, there is simply no discretion to abuse. (Morris, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 748, 63 Cal.Rptr. 689, 433 P.2d 697; see Whitcomb Hotel v. Cal. Emp. Com., supra, 24 Cal.2d at p. 759, 151 P.2d 233.)

Administrative action that is not authorized by, or is inconsistent with, acts of the Legislature is void. (California Welfare Rights Organization v. Carleson (1971) 4 Cal.3d 445, 455, 93 Cal.Rptr. 758, 482 P.2d 670; Morris, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 737, 63 Cal.Rptr. 689, 433 P.2d 697.) Although we give weight to the construction of the Lanterman Act by DDS, we nevertheless conclude that the Priorities are not authorized by the Act, are in fact inconsistent with it, and are therefore void.

From our review of the provisions of the Act, we reach the following two conclusions. First, the regional centers and DDS have distinct responsibilities in the statutory scheme; that of the regional centers is to provide each developmentally disabled person with the services to which he is entitled under the Act; that of DDS is to promote the cost-effectiveness of the operations of the regional centers, but not to control the manner in which they provide services. Second, the Act defines a basic right and a corresponding basic obligation: the right which it grants to the developmentally disabled person is to be provided with services that enable him to live a more independent and productive life in the community; the obligation...