Association of Trial Lawyers of America, Matter of

• Decision Date: 13 October 1988
• Citation: 549 A.2d 446,228 N.J.Super. 180
• Parties: In the Matter of the ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AMERICA, New Jersey, and Chapter 197 of the Laws of 1987.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 180

228 N.J.Super. 180

549 A.2d 446

In the Matter of the ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AMERICA, New Jersey, and Chapter 197 of the Laws of 1987.

Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division.

Argued Sept. 19, 1988.

Decided Oct. 13, 1988.

Jerry Fischer, Deputy Atty. Gen., for intervenor-appellant (W. Cary Edwards, Atty. Gen., Deborah T. Poritz, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel; Jerry Fischer, on the brief).

William S. Greenberg, Princeton, for respondent (Greenberg & Prior, attorneys; William S. Greenberg of counsel; William S. Greenberg, Karen L. Jordan and Adam S. Henschel, on the brief).

Before Judges DEIGHAN, BAIME and D'ANNUNZIO.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

BAIME, J.A.D.

We granted leave to appeal to review an interlocutory order entered by the Superior Court, Chancery Division, denying the Attorney General's motion to dismiss a complaint filed by the New Jersey Chapter of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA) challenging the constitutionality of the recently enacted Products Liability Act ( N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-1 et seq.). The pivotal question is whether ATLA, either in its own right or as a representative of others, has an interest in the subject matter sufficient to support this action. We hold that it does not.

The salient facts are not in dispute and are essentially a matter of public record. On July 22, 1987, our Legislature adopted the Products Liability Act. The articulated objective in enacting the statutory scheme was to clarify "certain matters relating to actions [seeking compensation] for harm caused by products, including certain principles under which liability is imposed and the standards and procedures for the award of punitive damages." N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-1 a. We need not describe the Act in detail. Suffice it to say, it contains substantive provisions, setting forth rules of liability and defenses, see N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-2, 3, 4, 6 and 7, and procedural requirements, see N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-5, mandating bifurcated proceedings for the determination of compensatory and punitive damages.

In January 1988, ATLA instituted an action under the federal Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C.A. § 1983) and the New Jersey Declaratory Judgment Act ( N.J.S.A. 2A:16-50 et seq.), attacking the constitutionality of the new products liability law. In its complaint, ATLA contended that the statute (1) "impaired the obligation of contracts between manufacturers and sellers of products and the public," contrary to Art. I, § 10, cl. 1 of the United States Constitution, (2) violated the cognate impairment of contracts prohibition contained in the New Jersey Constitution (Art. IV, § VII, par. 3), (3) constituted an unlawful invasion of the Supreme Court's rule-making prerogative (Art. VI, § 2, par. 3), (4) impinged upon the right to equal protection and (5) deprived litigants of the right to trial by jury.

No defendant was named in the suit. Pursuant to R. 4:28-4(a), however, ATLA notified the Attorney General of the pending action. The Attorney General intervened and immediately moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, R. 4:6-2(e), contending that ATLA lacked standing.

Following oral argument, the trial court issued a written opinion, holding that ATLA had the requisite standing to maintain the action and that its complaint presented a justiciable controversy. Noting that ATLA is a non-profit organization composed of trial attorneys, the court concluded that it could lawfully assert the rights of its members and their clients. ATLA was thus said to possess a sufficient personal stake in the litigation. The court found, alternatively, that the case raised questions of "great public interest" sufficient to afford standing even assuming that ATLA's private interest was slight. We disagree with these conclusions and thus reverse.

As we noted at the outset of our opinion, this suit was commenced under the Declaratory Judgment Act. That statute empowers the courts to declare rights, status and other legal relations "to afford litigants relief from uncertainty and insecurity." U.S.A. Chamber of Commerce v. State, 89 N.J. 131, 140, 445 A.2d 353 (1982) Its purpose is to end uncertainty concerning the legal rights and relations of parties before they have suffered ineradicable damage or injury for which only a compensatory or coercive remedy can provide redress. N.J. Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Human Services, 89 N.J. 234, 242, 445 A.2d 704 (1982). See also N.J.S.A. 2A:16-52 and 53. Toward that end it has been said that the statute constitutes "remedial legislation entitled to liberal construction and administration." N.J. Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Human Services, supra, 89 N.J. at 241-242, 445 A.2d 704. See also Union Cty. Bd. of Freeholders v. Union Cty. Park Comm'n., 41 N.J. 333, 336, 196 A.2d 781 (1964); Burlington Tp. v. Middle Dep't. Inspection Agency, 175 N.J.Super. 624, 628, 421 A.2d 616 (Law Div.1980); Hammond v. Doan, 127 N.J.Super. 67, 72, 316 A.2d 68 (Law Div.1974); N.J.S.A. 2A:16-51.

The remedy thus provided, however, is circumscribed by the salutary qualification that the jurisdiction of the courts may not be invoked in the absence of an actual controversy. New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Parsons, 3 N.J. 235, 240, 69 A.2d 875 (1949) Although there is no express language in New Jersey's Constitution similar to its federal counterpart which confines the exercise of our judicial power to actual cases and controversies, compare U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2, with N.J. Const., Art. VI, § I, we have long held that we will not render advisory opinions or function in the abstract. Crescent Pk. Tenants Assoc. v. Realty Eq. Corp. of N.Y., 58 N.J. 98, 107, 275 A.2d 433 (1971). Nor will we entertain proceedings by litigants who are mere intermeddlers, interlopers or strangers to the dispute. Id. at 107, 275 A.2d 433. See also Bergen County v. Port of New York Authority, et al., 32 N.J 303, 307, 160 A.2d 811 (1960); New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Parsons, supra, 3 N.J. at 240, 69 A.2d 875; Baxter v. Baxter, 43 N.J.Eq. 82, 86, 10 A. 814 (Ch. 1887), aff'd 44 N.J.Eq. 298, 18 A. 80 (E. & A. 1888). In essence, "a plaintiff must have an interest in the subject matter in order to maintain a declaratory judgment action." Bergen County v. Port of New York Authority, supra, 32 N.J. at 307, 160 A.2d 811. This relation to the cause "is necessary to a finding that a controversy, or at least uncertainty, exists as to the status or rights" of the litigants. N.J. Home Builders Ass'n v. Div. on Civil Rights, 81 N.J.Super. 243, 252, 195 A.2d 318 (Ch. Div.1963), aff'd sub nom. David v. Vista Co., 45 N.J. 301, 212 A.2d 345 (1965). In addition, the courts should not "decide or declare the rights or status of parties upon a state of facts which is future, contingent and uncertain." Tanner v. Boynton Lumber Co., 98 N.J.Eq. 85, 89, 129 A. 617 (Ch. 1925). It is the threshold findings of both justiciability and standing which form the basis for relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act. N.J. Home Builders Ass'n v. Div. on Civil Rights, supra, 81 N.J.Super. at 252, 195 A.2d 318.

These considerations have particular efficacy in the context of a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute. Deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is the settled principle against resolving disputes in advance of constitutional necessity. State v. Jones, 198 N.J.Super. 553, 559, 487 A.2d 1278 (App.Div.1985). In the federal arena, this doctrine was established as early as 1793, see H. Johnson, Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay, pp. 486-489 (1891), and has been applied without significant deviation. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 n. 14, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1950 n. 14, 20 L.Ed.2d 947, 959 n. 14 (1968); United States v. Freuhauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157, 81 S.Ct. 547, 553, 5 L.Ed.2d 476, 483 (1961); Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461, 65 S.Ct. 1384, 1389, 89 L.Ed. 1725, 1734 (1945); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 348, 31 S.Ct. 250, 250, 55 L.Ed. 246, 247 (1911). While our decisions have historically taken a much more liberal approach on the issues of standing and justiciability than have the federal cases, see, e.g., Crescent Pk. Tenants Assoc. v. Realty Eq. Corp. of N.Y., supra, 58 N.J. at 101, 275 A.2d 433; Walker, Inc. v. Stanhope, 23 N.J. 657, 660-661, 130 A.2d 372 (1957); New Jersey Bankers Assoc. v. Van Riper, 1 N.J. 193, 196-197, 62 A.2d 677 (1948), we have nevertheless long recognized that "our authority is confined to deciding questions presented in an adversary context in a form capable of resolution through the judicial process." State v. Jones, supra, 198 N.J.Super. at 559-560, 487 A.2d 1278. Whether grounded in constitutional principle or viewed as a mere policy limitation, we have avoided passing prematurely on constitutional questions. Id. at 560, 487 A.2d 1278. Hence, "the related doctrines of standing, ripeness and mootness that have evolved over the years are incidents of the 'primary conception that ... judicial power is to be exercised to strike down legislation ... only at the instance of one who is himself immediately harmed, or immediately threatened with harm, by the challenged action.' " Ibid., quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 504, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 1756, 6 L.Ed. 989, 996 (1961). The party who seeks to "annul legislation on grounds of its unconstitutionality must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid, but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement," Poe v. Ullman, supra, 367 U.S. at 505, 81 S.Ct. at 1756, 6 L.Ed.2d at 997. See also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3360, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113, 1129 (1982); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2914, 37 L.Ed.2d 830, 839 (1973); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21, 80 S.Ct. 519, 522, 4 L.Ed.2d 524, 529 (1960). In short, the judiciary does not have a roving commission to seek and destroy...