Astenjohnson v. Columbia Cas. Co.
Decision Date | 30 March 2007 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 03-1552. |
Citation | 483 F.Supp.2d 425 |
Parties | ASTENJOHNSON, Plaintiff v. COLUMBIA CASUALTY CO., et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
John N. Ellison, Michael Conley, Anderson Kill & Olick PC, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff.
Jay I. Morstein, Piper & Marbury, LLP, Baltimore, MD, Nicole Rosenblum, Ronald P. Schiller, DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary US, LLP, Philadelphia, PA, Jeffrey Kaufman, Lisa G. Rowe, Paul A. Peters, Kaufman & Logan LLP, San Francisco, CA, Susan Simpson Brown, Nelson Levine de Luca & Horst LLC, Blue Bell, PA, for Defendants.
AstenJohnson, Inc. made a product which contained asbestos fibers and which was used in paper manufacturing. Since the late 1970s Asten has been named as a defendant in lawsuits brought by plaintiffs who allege injuries from exposure to asbestos products. In the early 1990s these claims increased dramatically. To defend these cases and, where appropriate, to pay the plaintiffs, Asten tendered the cases to its insurance carriers.
Columbia Casualty Company and American Insurance Company wrote $52 million worth of liability insurance for Asten in 1981 and 1982. Their policies contained an exclusion from coverage for any claim resulting from "an exposure to or the contracting of asbestosis." The interpretation of that phrase lies at the center of this case. If Asten's interpretation is correct, it will enjoy coverage for all asbestos claims, except for asbestosis claims. If Columbia and American's interpretation is correct, all asbestos-related claims would be excluded and Asten will not have the benefit of any coverage from these carriers for pending and future asbestos claims.
The problem with the exclusion is that it does not make sense. A person cannot be "exposed to asbestosis" because it is not a contagious disease. A person can, however, be exposed to asbestos, and can develop asbestosis or other illnesses (mesothelioma, to name one) from this exposure. The language of the exclusion is clear, i.e., unambiguous, in that asbestosis is a medically recognized disease. Yet, the parties cannot agree on the meaning of the term "asbestosis" in the context of their insurance contracts.
In the interpretation of contract terms, the intent of the parties must be ascertained from the language of the policy. After considering the language of the exclusion in light of the various manifestations of the intent of the parties, the trade usage of the term "asbestosis," the parties' usage of the term "asbestosis," and the course of performance of Asten under the policies, I conclude that the parties intended to exclude from coverage all claims arising from exposure to asbestos.
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