Astriku v. Sail Away, LLC (In re Wilson Yachts, LLC)
| Decision Date | 06 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil No.: 1:20-cv-03452-JRR |
| Citation | 605 F.Supp.3d 695 |
| Parties | In the MATTER OF the Complaint of WILSON YACHTS, LLC James S. Astriku, et al., Claimants and Third Party Plaintiffs, v. Sail Away, LLC, et al., Third Party Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Bryant Steven Green, Zelle LLP, Washington, DC, Robert P. O'Brien, Niles Barton and Wilmer LLP, Baltimore, MD, for Claimant and Third Party Plaintiff In the Matter of the Complaint of Wilson Yachts, LLC.
Stephen Barnie Freeman, S. B. Freeman Law Group, LLC, Brunswick, MD, Arnold I. Berschler, Pro Hac Vice, Berschler Associates PC, San Francisco, CA, for Claimants and Third Party Plaintiffs James S. Astriku, Joseph Astriku, Felicia Astriku.
Margaret Fonshell Ward, Downs Ward Bender Herzog & Kintigh, P.A., Hunt Valley, MD, Steven E. Leder, Downs Ward Bender Hauptmann & Herzog, P.A., Hunt Valley, MD, for Third Party Defendant Sail Away, LLC.
Gregory Ross Singer, Lochner Law Firm PC, Annapolis, MD, for Third Party Defendant Steven Michael Coffman.
This matter comes before the court on Plaintiff Wilson Yachts, LLC's ("Wilson Yachts") Motion for Summary Judgment or Partial Summary Judgment, Third Party Defendant Sail Away, LLC's ("Sail Away") Motion for Summary Judgment, and Third Party Defendant Steven Michael Coffman's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (ECF 59, 60 and 63, respectively; the motions are referred to as the "Wilson Yachts Motion," the "Sail Away Motion," and the "Coffman Motion".) The court has reviewed all motions papers. No hearing is necessary. Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2021.)
The parties do not dispute the following:
The Verified Complaint (ECF 1) arises out of the drowning death of Jerry Astriku while on a recreational day trip on a sailing vessel, the Seven Day Weekend ("SDW"), owned by Wilson Yachts. Third Party Defendant Sail Away managed SDW under a Charter Management Agreement with Wilson Yachts entered November 30, 2016. (ECF 59, Ex. 3; the "Management Agreement".) Wilson Yachts has two members, Robert and Deborah Sholtes.
By Bareboat Charter Agreement of August 8, 2019, Sail Away chartered SDW to Mr. Samuel Brew for recreational use for one day (August 8, 2019). (ECF 59, Ex. 4; the "Charter Agreement".) The terms of the Charter Agreement state that Mr. Brew had "full control of" and "full authority" over SDW's "management" for the duration of the charter. Id. ¶16. Further, pursuant to the Charter Agreement, Mr. Brew was "responsible for the navigation of [SDW]" or, if he was not competent to navigate the vessel, Mr. Brew was required to hire a captain of his choosing (subject to confirmation of industry standard qualifications), which obligation could be discharged by hiring a captain on Sail Away's "pre-approved list" of captains. Regardless of the means by which Mr. Brew secured a captain, the Charter Agreement required Mr. Brew to pay the captain for his services directly. Id. ¶15.
Mr. Brew was not competent to captain SDW and did not engage a third party to do so on his own. Instead, Third Party Defendant Steven Michael Coffman, one of Sail Away's pre-approved captains, was selected to captain the SDW charter. At the time of the charter, Mr. Coffman held a United States Coast Guard 50-ton Master's license, had sailed more than one hundred passenger boats, and had captained several charters for Sail Away and other charter companies. (ECF 59, Ex. 8 at pp. 28, 79; Ex. 9.) Mr. Brew had previously chartered another vessel through Sail Away in April 2019 under a charter agreement identical to that through which he chartered SDW. (ECF 59, Ex. 5.)
Neither Robert Sholtes nor Deborah Sholtes, the sole members of Wilson Yachts (ECF 59, Ex. 2 at pp. 25-26), was aboard SDW on the day of the charter and, but for their status as members of the LLC, the Sholteses had no involvement in the Charter Agreement.
On the day of the charter, August 24, 2019, Mr. Brew was accompanied by his two guests, brothers Jerry Astriku (the decedent) and Claimant/Third Party Plaintiff James Astriku. While the boat was anchored, the brothers expressed a desire to swim. Neither of the Astriku charter guests knew how to swim. Captain Coffman demonstrated how to don the personal flotation devices ("PFDs") and secured a PFD on James Astriku. Decedent Jerry Astriku entered the water with an improperly secured PFD and drowned.
Wilson Yachts filed this action for exoneration from or limitation of liability pursuant to the Limitation of Shipowners’ Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501 et seq. (the "Act"). James Astriku, individually and in his capacity as administrator of the Estate of Jerry Astriku, and the decedent's parents, Joseph and Felicia Astriku, filed claims against Wilson Yachts, Sail Away and Captain Coffman for damages for decedent's death. James Astriku also claims personal injury due to the incident and seeks damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides for summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A dispute is considered genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party;" a fact is considered material if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
At the summary judgment stage, the facts are considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Ausherman v. Bank of America Corp., 352 F.3d 896, 899 (4th Cir. 2003). However, the nonmoving party must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc. , 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003). At the summary judgment stage "the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
Wilson Yachts argues that, at a minimum, the Act entitles it to a limitation of liability. The Act restricts a shipowner's liability to the "value of the vessel and pending freight" provided the fault causing the loss occurred without the shipowner's "privity or knowledge." 46 U.S. § 30505(a) and (b). In determining whether the Act limits a shipowner's liability, "first, the court must consider what acts of negligence or conditions of unseaworthiness caused the accident." Second, the court must determine whether the shipowner had "privity or knowledge" of the acts. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Prudential Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 159, 166 (4th Cir. 1984) ; Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas S.A. v. U.S. , 730 F.2d 153, 155 (4th Cir. 1984). Claimants bear the burden to prove the instrument of unseaworthiness; following which the burden shifts to the shipowner to prove a lack of privity or knowledge. 730 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984). Privity under the Act means "that a shipowner knew or should have known that a condition existed" or had "some personal participation of the owner in the fault or negligence which caused or contributed to the loss or injury." Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 730 F.2d at 166 ; Coryell v. Phipps , 317 U.S. 406, 411, 63 S.Ct. 291, 87 L.Ed. 363 (1942). Charging an owner with privity or knowledge "usually implies some degree of culpable participation or neglected duty on the shipowner's part." Matter of Manhattan by Sail, Inc. , No. 12-CV-8182 (VEC), 2018 WL 6684768 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. September 14, 2018) (citing Otal Inv. Ltd. v. M/V Clary , 673 F.3d 108, 115 (2nd Cir. 2012) ).
In Matter of Manhattan by Sail, Inc ., a passenger on a cruise was injured by a part of the sail over which the deckhand had lost control. The court limited the shipowner's liability concluding there was Id. In contrast, the court in Tug Ocean Prince, Inc. v. U.S. , imputed knowledge or privity to the shipowner because the owner knew of the crewmember's incompetence as a captain for that particular journey and was in contact with the vessel via dispatch. 584 F.2d 1151 (2nd Cir. 1978).
Applying the two-part test to the instant case, the on which the Astriku parties rely are limited to the alleged incompetence of Captain Coffman. Evaluation of a captain's competence includes consideration of "whether the captain, pilot, and navigator are licensed; whether they have satisfactory safety records; whether they are familiar with the vessel and the waters on which it travels; and whether they are adequately trained." Illinois Constructors Corp. v. Logan Transp., Inc. , 715 F. Supp. 872, 886 (N.D. Ill. 1989). Further, "while it is possible to estimate the competency of a vessel's crew by examining their experience and licenses, perhaps the dispositive measurement is their performance as crew members." Matter of Ta Chi Navigation (Panama) Corp., S.A. , 513 F. Supp. 148, 159 (E.D. La. 1981).
Wilson Yachts asserts that the undisputed facts establish Captain Coffman held a license to operate SDW, was properly trained, and did not have a record of safety infractions, rendering him competent.1 The Astriku parties do not contest these facts. Instead, they argue that Captain Coffman's alleged incompetence was rooted in his performance on the day of the charter. They allege that Captain Coffman's deficiencies include the failure to give the passengers a safety briefing, allowing passengers, including the decedent, to jump off the deck roof, and not ensuring that the lifejackets...
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