At Al. v. Riley

• Decision Date: 17 June 1948
• Docket Number: No. 3729.,3729.
• Citation: 59 A.2d 476
• Parties: INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL UNION NO. 633, at al. v. RILEY et al.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

59 A.2d 476

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL UNION NO. 633, at al.

v.RILEY et al.

No. 3729.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

June 1, 1948.

Rehearing Denied June 17, 1948.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

Transferred from Superior Court, Hillsborough County; Lampron, Judge.

Petition for a declaratory judgment by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local Union No. 633, an affiliation of the American Federation of Labor, and others, against William H. Riley, Labor Commissioner, Ernest R. D'Amours, Attorney General, and Joseph E. Faltin, proprietor of J. E. Faltin Motor Transportation Company, for determination whether provisions of Laws 1947, c. 195, are applicable to petitioners and Joseph E. Faltin. The case was transferred without ruling on an agreed statement of facts.

Judgment for plaintiffs.

Petition for a declaratory judgment, in which it is alleged that the petitioners, on February 8, 1947, entered into a contract with the defendant Faltin to take effect as of January 1, 1947, and continue in effect until twelve o'clock midnight, December 31, 1948; that one of the terms of said contract is as follows:

‘(c) When an Employer lacks a full complement of men, the Union (Business Agent, office of shop steward) shall be notified. If the Union cannot furnish members, upon request by Employers, non-members may be employed subject to the terms of this agreement, but such non-members must meet the membership requirements of the Union within two (2) weeks from date of employment. The Employer will, after three (3) days notice from an authorized representative of the Union, discharge any employee who fails to become, or to remain, a member in good standing of the Union;’ that the defendants Riley and D'Amours, who are respectively the Labor Commissioner and the Attorney General of New Hampshire, claim that ‘the provisions in said contract between said Local Union No. 633 and the said defendant Joseph E. Faltin requiring membership in Local Union No. 633 as a condition of securing or continuing the employment of any person are unlawful by virtue of Chapter 195 of the Laws of 1947, and have informed your petitioners that they will be prosecuted in the event that said Local Union No. 633 or any of your petitioners undertake to enforce and carry out the provisions of said contract requiring membership in said Union as a condition of securing or continuing the employment of any person.’

It is the position of the petitioners that the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq., supersedes the provisions of Laws of 1947, Chapter 195, so far as the provisions thereof are applicable to the business engaged in by your petitioners and the defendant Joseph E. Faltin, which is conceded to be wholly interstate commerce, and that said contract will be lawful until the termination of said contract on December 31, 1948 by virtue of the provisions of said contract and the provisions of Section 102 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, passed by the Congress of the United States of America. The petitioners, accordingly, pray for a declaratory judgment, 1, that the provisions of Laws 1947, c. 195, are not applicable to petitioners and the defendant Joseph E. Faltin as proprietor of J. E. Faltin Transportation Company in the business in which they are engaged; 2, that the above article between Local Union No. 633 and the defendant Joseph E. Faltin is not unlawful and that the petitioners will not be liable to prosecution or for civil liability for damages by reason of any provisions in the Laws of 1947, Chapter 195.

Transferred without ruling by Lampron, J., upon an agreed statement of facts.

BLANDIN, J., dissenting.

H. Thornton Lorimer, Thomas F. Donovan, and Francis E. Perkins, all of Concord, for plaintiffs.

Ernest R. D'Amours, Atty. Gen., and Edward J. Reichert, Law Asst., of Concord, for defendants Riley and D'Amours.

Hamblett & Hamblett, of Nashau (Robert B. Hamblett, of Nashau, orally), for defendant Faltin.

Richard F. Upton and Robert W. Upton, both of Concord, for New Hampshire Federation of Labor, amicus curiae.

BRANCH, Chief Justice.

Before a hearing was held, the defendant Faltin, filed a motion that the petition be dismissed as to him, which reads as follows: ‘The Defendant Joseph E. Faltin moves as follows: That the petition be dismissed as to him because the petition does not set forth that the Defendant Faltin is claiming adversely to any right or title of the Petitioners and because the Petition does not set forth any facts from which it could be found that the Defendant Faltin is asserting a claim adverse to the Petitioners' rights and therefore the Petition is not within the provisions of Section 20 of Chapter 371 of the Revised Laws.’

This motion embodies an erroneous theory as to the requisites of a petition for a declaratory judgment under our statute. R.L. c. 370, § 20; Faulkner v. Keene, 85 N.H. 147, 155 A. 195. The purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Law ‘is to make disputes as to rights or titles justiciable without proof of a wrong committed by one party against the other.’ Faulkner v. Keene, supra, 85 N.H. 149, 155 A. 197.

In the present case, two statutes have been passed since the plaintiffs' contract with the defendant Faltin was executed, both of which, by their terms, are applicable thereto, the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq., passed by Congress June 23, 1947, over the presidential veto and known as the Taft-Hartley Act, and Chapter 195 of New Hampshire Laws of 1947, known as the Willey Act. Which one of these statutes determines the validity of the contract between the plaintiffs and the defendant Faltin, is a proper matter to be determined by a declaratory judgment in advance of actual controversy between the parties. The allegation of the petition that the plaintiffs have been threatened with prosecution under the Laws of 1947, c. 195, is an additional factor which indicates the propriety of the present proceeding. It must, therefore, be held that the order of the Superior Court dismissing the petition as against the defendant Faltin, was erroneous.

Chapter 195 of the Laws of 1947, known as the Willey Act, was approved and took effect upon June 14, 1947, thus antedating by more than two months the provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, known as the Taft-Hartley Act, here involved, which were effective August 23, 1947. The Willey Act has been characterized by defendants' counsel as ‘a prohibitory and regulatory act.’ The prohibitory provisions are contained in Section 21 and provide that no person, firm or corporation shall make or agree to make membership or non-membership in a labor organization, or payment or non-payment of money to a labor organization a condition of employment or continuing of employment of any person. The chief regulatory provisions of the Act appear in Section 21 A and provide that any person, firm or corporation, shall not be prohibited by Section 21, from entering into any contract with a labor organization reached with his or its employees where at least two-thirds of such employees have voted affirmatively by secret ballot in favor of such contract in an election under the supervision of the Labor Commissioner. Such contract shall contain a clause providing that such labor organizations shall impose no discriminatory qualifications for membership in such organization based on race, color, national origin, etc., and a further clause providing that such labor organization shall grant to all members equal voting rights in such organization. It shall also contain a clause providing that no member shall be suspended or expelled from membership except for just cause. Section 21-C of the Act provides that Section 21 shall not apply to existing contracts until the expiration thereof or until six months after the effective date of this Act, whichever shall be sooner.

A comparison of these provisions with those of the Taft-Hartley Law dealing with unfair labor practices (section 8), demonstrates that the two acts deal with the same subject matter in much the same way. There are, however, many conflicts between the provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act and the Willey Act. The closed shop agreement under which the employer may hire only union members is entirely outlawed by the Taft-Hartley Act, while permitted under certain conditions by the Willey Act. In regard to the union shop under which an employer may hire nonunion men of his own selection who, after a probationary period of employment must become union members as a condition of further employment, the Taft-Hartley Act permits such agreements when a majority of employees vote in favor of it, while the Willey Bill requires a two-thirds majority to validate such contracts. Numerous other inconsistencies between the two acts are pointed out in the excellent brief of the petitioners.

The Constitution of the United States, art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, gives Congress jurisdiction over the entire field of interstate commerce, and since Congress has already pre-empted the subject of labor management relations within the field of interstate commerce, it follows from the paramount character of its authority that state regulation of the subject matter is excluded. Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 41, 36 S.Ct. 482, 60 L.Ed. 874; Public Service Commission v. H. P. Welch Co., 91 N.H. 328, 18 A.2d 826. ‘When Congress has taken the particular subject-matter in hand, coincidence is as ineffective as opposition.’ Charlestown & Western Carolina Railway Co. v. Varnville Furniture Company, 237 U.S. 597, 604, 35 S.Ct. 715, 717, 59 L.Ed. 1137, Ann.Cas.1916D, 333.

An application of these principles to the situation now confronting us would lead inevitably to the conclusion that the regulations of the Willey Act are superseded...