ATC Partnership v. Windham, (SC 16173)

• Decision Date: 14 December 1999
• Docket Number: (SC 16173)
• Citation: 741 A.2d 305,251 Conn. 597
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: ATC PARTNERSHIP v. TOWN OF WINDHAM ET AL.

251 Conn. 597

741 A.2d 305

ATC PARTNERSHIP v. TOWN OF WINDHAM ET AL.

(SC 16173)

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued November 2, 1999.

Officially released December 14, 1999.

Borden, Katz, Palmer, Sullivan and Peters, JS. Richard P. Weinstein, with whom was Nathan A. Schatz, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Thomas R. Gerarde, with whom, on the brief, was Michael J. Rose, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).

Richard S. Cody, with whom were Lisa Silvestri and, on the brief, Ana Navarro, for the appellees (defendant Northeast Connecticut Economic Alliance, Inc., et al.).

Opinion

PETERS, J.

This case concerns the extent to which constitutional principles of substantive due process, under the federal constitution or under our state constitution, permit a property owner to pursue an action for damages premised on a claim of intentional abuse of a municipality's power of eminent domain. The plaintiff property owner claims that it is entitled to recover for the wilful, arbitrary and capricious seizure and condemnation of its property, in furtherance of a municipality's intent to usurp an opportunity for economic development of the property. The question before us is whether such a claim states a viable cause of action either under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (§ 1983),¹ or under state constitutional law as articulated in Binette v. Sabo, 244 Conn. 23, 710 A.2d 688 (1998). We conclude that it does not and, accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff, ATC Partnership, filed a two count third amended revised complaint (complaint), alleging that the defendants, the town of Windham and the Northeast Ct. Economic Alliance, Inc.,² had violated the plaintiffs right to substantive due process in the course of seizing and condemning certain real and personal property owned by the plaintiff. The first count of the complaint claimed a violation of § 1983, and the second count claimed a violation of the plaintiffs rights under the state constitution. The trial court, Beach, J., granted the defendants' motion to strike both counts of the plaintiffs complaint. Thereafter, the trial court granted the plaintiffs motion for judgment, and subsequently rendered judgment in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff appealed from that judgment to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the case to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.

The plaintiffs complaint contains the following factual allegations in support of its claim that the defendants had engaged in conduct that constituted a "gross abuse of governmental power ... for purposes of oppression ... which ha[s] deprived the plaintiff of its substantive constitutional right to due process of law." The plaintiff was the owner of the American Thread Complex (complex), a piece of real property located in Windham. The complex premises also housed extensive personal property belonging to the plaintiff. On or about August 12, 1994, the defendants acted to condemn the complex, for the purpose of an ongoing economic redevelopment in northeastern Connecticut.³

Prior to the condemnation, the plaintiff and the defendants had engaged in extensive, lengthy and unsuccessful negotiations for the sale of the complex to the defendants for the aforementioned economic redevelopment. The plaintiff alleged that, although it had "engaged at all times in good faith negotiations," the defendants had "plotted, planned and conspired to usurp the economic development of said project as well as the personal property located therein and to confiscate same by whatever means were expedient to accomplish said purpose." As evidence of this alleged conspiracy, and of the defendants' bad faith, the plaintiff claimed that, at the end of the negotiations between it and the defendants, agents of the defendants had given the plaintiff an ultimatum: either accept $250,000 as a full and final settlement on all claims to the complex and any personal property located therein, or the defendants would condemn the property and award the plaintiff the token sum of $1.

The plaintiff further alleged that, in order to exert pressure on it to accept the defendants' terms, the defendants had ordered the Windham tax collector, the defendant Linda Theriault, to levy an improper alias tax warrant on the personal property contained in the complex. The plaintiff also claimed that the defendants, prior to the condemnation, unlawfully had ordered officers of the Windham police department to prevent the plaintiff from exercising control over, and gaining access to, the complex and the personal property therein.

The record reveals the following additional relevant facts. On March 15, 1995, following the condemnation of its property, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants for damages pursuant to § 1983. In its initial complaint, the plaintiff claimed only that the defendants had condemned its property without just compensation.⁴ The trial court, Silbert, J., struck the plaintiffs initial complaint on the grounds that the plaintiff had not yet exhausted its available state remedies, and that, therefore, the plaintiffs claim was not ripe for adjudication. The plaintiff subsequently filed an amended revised complaint and a second amended revised complaint. Thereafter, the trial court, Dunnell, J., struck the plaintiff's second amended revised complaint for essentially the same reasons that the initial complaint had been struck. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed the complaint that is the subject of this appeal.

In striking the plaintiff's complaint, the trial court, Beach, J., began by noting the similarity between the plaintiffs current complaint, and the two previously stricken complaints. As justification for striking the plaintiffs claim under § 1983, the court, relying on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 195, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1985), concluded that the plaintiffs claim was premature because the plaintiff had not yet exhausted all of its available state remedies. In conjunction with that determination, the court noted the line of United States Supreme Court cases that have held that "where a particular amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Finally, the court noted its reluctance to "[expand] the concept of substantive due process, at least partly because it is a generally subjective standard that, at least at the stage of allegations, could run the gamut of tort law."

Turning to the plaintiffs claim under the state constitution, the court concluded that our decision in Kelley Property Development, Inc. v. Lebanon, 226 Conn. 314, 627 A.2d 909 (1993), was controlling, and that under the holding of that case, there "was no ... cause of action, partly because there already existed means of redress which may afford some, even if not all, of the relief sought." The court acknowledged that our decision in Binette v. Sabo, supra, 244 Conn. 23, had, for some circumstances, created a private cause of action for violations of article first, §§ 7 and 9, of the Connecticut constitution, but concluded that this case was governed by Kelley Property Development, Inc., rather than by Binette.

On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claims that the trial court, Beach, J., improperly struck its complaint. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that the trial court improperly concluded that the alleged conduct of the defendants did not give rise to a valid claim for damages either under § 1983 or under the state constitution. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in both respects.

I STANDARD OF REVIEW

As an initial matter, we set forth the standard of review by which we judge the plaintiffs appeal. "Because a motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court, our review of the court's ruling on the defendants' motions is plenary. See Napoletano v. CIGNA Healthcare of Connecticut, Inc., 238 Conn. 216, 232-33, 680 A.2d 127 (1996)." Knight v. F. L. Roberts & Co., 241 Conn. 466, 470, 696 A.2d 1249 (1997). "In an appeal from the granting of a motion to strike, we must read the allegations of the complaint generously to sustain its viability, if possible; Parsons v. United Technologies Corp., 243 Conn. 66, 68, 700 A.2d 655 (1997)...." Cotto v. United Technologies Corp., 251 Conn. 1, 18, 738 A.2d 623 (1999). We must, therefore, "take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint that has been stricken and ... construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency. Bohan v. Last, 236 Conn. 670, 674, 674 A.2d 839 (1996); Skuzinski v. Bouchard Fuels, Inc., 240 Conn. 694, 696, 694 A.2d 788 (1997); Waters v. Autuori, 236 Conn. 820, 825, 676 A.2d 357 (1996)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jacoby v. Brinckerhoff, 250 Conn. 86, 89, 735 A.2d 347 (1999). Even under this deferential standard, however, neither of the plaintiffs claims may be sustained.

II SECTION 1983 CLAIM

In the first count, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants' conduct in seizing and condemning the plaintiffs real and personal property was so arbitrary and capricious that it rises to the level of a violation of the plaintiff's federal constitutional right to substantive due process, and therefore supports an action for damages under § 1983. See footnote 1 of this opinion. We agree with the trial court that the plaintiff has not stated a legally viable claim as a matter of federal law.

Section 1983 permits a federal cause of action to be brought against any "person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,...