Atcha v. Indiana

• Decision Date: 06 November 2015
• Docket Number: CIVIL NO. 2:15cv110
• Parties: DR. IRFAN ATCHA, D.D.S. P.C. d/b/a DYER FAMILY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF INDIANA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

DR. IRFAN ATCHA, D.D.S. P.C. d/b/a DYER FAMILY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF INDIANA, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL NO. 2:15cv110

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

November 6, 2015

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the court on two motions to dismiss. First, the State Defendants¹ filed a motion to dismiss on June 30, 2015. The Plaintiff, Dr. Irfan Atcha ("Atcha"), who is suing the defendants individually and as the Dyer Family Dentistry, Inc., filed his response on July 31, 2015, to which the State Defendants replied on August 17, 2015. Second, Defendant Dr. Rajan Sharma ("Sharma") filed a motion to dismiss on July 6, 2015. Atcha responded to the motion on August 5, 2015, to which Sharma replied on August 12, 2015.

For the following reasons, both motions to dismiss will be granted.

Discussion

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 694 F.3d 873, 878 - 879 n.4 (7th Cir. 2012). In particular, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion inquires as to whether a complaint has set fortha "viable cause of action upon which relief can be granted." Rangel v. Reynolds, 607 F. Supp. 2d 911, 917 (N.D. Ind. 2009); FED. R. CIV. PRO. 12(b)(6). To properly assess dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept all well-pleaded, factual allegations as true and view them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 -680 (2009); Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2007). However, a court need not accept legal conclusions couched as factual assertions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Instead a complaint must contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 at 663 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

In March 2012, an administrative complaint was filed against Atcha, alleging multiple advertising violations. (Complaint ¶ 28.) In November 2013, the Indiana State Board of Dentistry ("ISBD") found Atcha in violation of several of these advertising regulations and placed him on probation. (Complaint ¶ 30-34). Atcha subsequently filed a petition for judicial review, in Marion County, under Cause No. 49D03-1312-MI-044739, against the Indiana Professional Licensing Agency ("IPLA") and the ISBD, challenging the Board's November 2013 Order. On December 31, 2014, Marion County Superior Court 3 reversed the Board's November 2013 Order, setting it aside as contrary to a constitutional right, in that some advertising regulations did not meet constitutional muster under the First Amendment. (December 31, 2014 Order, Marion County, Cause No. 49D03-1312-MI-044739.) On April 2, 2015, the IPLA and the ISBD appealed the Marion County ruling, and the appeal is now pending with the Indiana Court of Appeals, under Cause No. 49A02-1504-MI-00197.

Prior to the Marion County appeal deadline, Atcha filed the present Complaint against theState of Indiana, the IPLA, the ISBD, several ISBD members (collectively "State Defendants"), and Sharma. (Complaint; DE 1.) Atcha's Complaint against the State Defendants brings claims under the First Amendment (Counts I and II), and a claim for malicious prosecution (Count IV)².

In support of their motion to dismiss, the State Defendants first argue that they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution bars suit against states and state agencies in federal court, regardless of the relief sought. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996); Tucker v. Williams, 682 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2012).

Further, the Eleventh Amendment extends to state officials sued in their official capacity for damages, as they are representatives of the state. Garcia v. City of Chicago, 24 F.3d 966, 969 (7th Cir. 1994) ("The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from deciding suits brought by private litigants against states or their agencies, and that prohibition extends to state officials acting in their official capacities.") (citing Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Although Atcha repeatedly refers to this matter as a "complaint for damages", (Complaint ¶ 1, 3, 52), Counts I, II, and IV include requests for injunctive relief. (Complaint p. 10-16.) Under the Ex parte Young doctrine, a plaintiff may seek prospective relief against state officials for continued violations of federal law. Perick v. Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis Athletics Dept., 510 F.3d 681, 695 (7th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted.) But to the extent Atcha is seeking damages against Cindy Vaught in her official capacity, the Defendantsargue that the claims should be dismissed under the Eleventh Amendment.

Atcha, however, contends that pursuant to Ex Parte Young, Eleventh Amendment Immunity does not apply to the State, IPLA, or the ISBD because he is seeking injunctive relief. As noted, Atcha's Complaint does contain language seeking injunctive relief. However, Atcha's analysis of Young is in error. As noted, Ex parte Young allows a plaintiff to seek prospective relief against state officials for continued violations of federal law. Perick v. Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis Athletics Dept., 510 F.3d 681, 695 (7th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted.) The State, IPLA, and ISBD are not state officials and Atcha offers no legal support to grant an extended reading of the Ex Parte Young doctrine to either states or state agencies. Further, to the extent Atcha contends that Eleventh Amendment immunity is somehow abrogated in the First Amendment context, Atcha relies on five cases, none of which directly support this abrogation in a civil context under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Further, many of the cases cited are reviews by the Supreme Court of a particular state's high court decision, and thus those cases are in wholly different procedural postures and are not applicable to the present case. This court holds that Atcha's claims against the State Defendants, including the damages claims against Cindy Vaught in her official capacity, are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Next, the State of Indiana, the IPLA, the ISBD and Cindy Vaught, in her official capacity, argue that they are not "persons" as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Supreme Court has consistently held that states, state agencies, and state officials, sued in their official capacity, for damages, are not "persons" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (1989); see also Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27 (1991) ("State officers sued for damages in their official capacity are not 'persons' for purposes of the [§ 1983] suit because they assume the identity of the governmentthat employs them."). As stated above, although Atcha repeatedly refers to this matter as a "complaint for damages", (Complaint ¶ 1, 3, 52), Counts I, II, and IV include requests for injunctive relief. (Complaint p. 10-16.) Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking damages against the State of Indiana, the IPLA, and the ISBD, and Cindy Vaught in her official capacity, those claims must be dismissed.

Although Atcha's Response recognizes the Supreme Court's holding in Will v. Michigan as good law, Atcha argues that "the rationale used by the Will Court, and promulgated through the years in its progeny of cases, is flawed." (Plaintiffs' Response, p. 5.) Atcha's Response offers scant authority in support of this bold assertion. Rather, Atcha's Response relies upon Justice Brennan's dissent in Will, which holds no binding authority, and two cases, United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) and King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015), that neither overturn the Supreme Court's decision in Will or directly support inclusion of states or state agencies as "persons" under Section 1983. As it is clear that Will is binding on this court, all claims for damages against the State of Indiana, the IPLA, the ISBD, and Cindy Vaught in her official capacity will be dismissed.

Next, the State Defendants argue that Atcha's First Amendment claims should be dismissed under the Younger Abstention Doctrine. Broadly stated, the Younger Abstention Doctrine stands for the proposition that, absent special circumstances (such as bad-faith enforcement), a federal court should dismiss or stay a case rather than interfere with pending state proceedings. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 431-432 (1982); Gakuba v. O'Brien, 711 F.3d 751, 751 (7th Cir. 2013) (staying the action as opposed to dismissal without prejudice because claims maybecome time-barred after state prosecution and monetary damages unavailable in his criminal defense). In Younger, the Supreme Court observed that a "vital consideration" in such circumstances is "the notion of 'comity,' that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways." Id. at 44.

In Middlesex County Ethics Commission v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423 (1982), an attorney directly challenged the constitutionality of state disciplinary rules in district court, rather than filing a response to a complaint with the ethics commission as part of the administrative process. In evaluating whether the Younger Abstention Doctrine appropriately applied, the Court looked to three factors: (1) whether the state proceedings constituted ongoing judicial proceedings; (2) whether the proceedings implicated important state interests; and (3) whether there was an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional questions....