Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Love

• Decision Date: 13 November 1909
• Citation: 174 F. 59
• Parties: ATCHISON, T. & S.F. RY. CO. v. LOVE et al. GULF, C. & S.F. RY. CO. v. SAME. MISSOURI, K. & T. RY. CO. v. SAME.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma

174 F. 59

ATCHISON, T. & S.F. RY. CO. v. LOVE et al. GULF, C. & S.F. RY. CO. v. SAME. MISSOURI, K. & T. RY. CO. v. SAME.

United States Circuit Court, W.D. Oklahoma.

November 13, 1909

Frank Hagerman and Cottingham & Bledsoe (Gardiner Lathrop, Robert Dunlap, and T. J. Norton, of counsel), for complainants Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. and Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co.

Clifford L. Jackson, C. G. Horner, and Frank Hagerman (James Hagerman and Joseph M. Bryson, of counsel), for complainant Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co.

Charles West, Atty. Gen., and George A. Henshaw, Asst. Atty. Gen for defendants.

HOOK Circuit Judge.

These are suits by railroad companies doing business in the state of Oklahoma to enjoin the enforcement of certain freight and passenger rates, upon the ground, among others, that after the test of experience they have proved to be so unreasonably low as to amount to a confiscation of their property contrary to the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The defendants are the members of the Corporation Commission, the Attorney General of the state and certain citizens who are alleged to be representative shippers and passengers. The freight rates in question were prescribed by orders of the commission; the passenger rate, two cents per mile, by the state Constitution. The complainants have applied for temporary injunctions. The question now before the court is presented by defendants, and it is whether this court should not suspend further proceedings in the cases, so far as the freight rates are concerned, until their validity is determined by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, and, as regards the passenger rate, until complainants have sought relief from the commission.

The Constitution of Oklahoma confers upon the Corporation Commission the power to regulate, supervise, and control the rates and charges of transportation companies, to prescribe and enforce such rates and charges, and from time to time to alter and amend them. In such matters it is also given the power and authority of a court of record to administer oaths, require the attendance of witnesses, etc., and to compel compliance with its lawful orders by adjudging and enforcing, upon notice and opportunity to be heard, such fines or other penalties as may be prescribed or authorized by the Constitution or by law. In a proceeding to enforce a penalty for disobedience, the validity or reasonableness of the order of the commission may be drawn in question. The commission may impose a fine not exceeding $500 for each day's default, or such sum in excess thereof as may be authorized by law; but, should the operation of the order be suspended pending an appeal therefrom, the period of suspension is not to be computed in imposing fines. The Constitution also provides for an appeal to the Supreme Court of the state from an order of the commission prescribing rates and charges, or refusing to approve a suspending bond. The appeal is a matter of right, and no other court of the state has jurisdiction to review the orders of the commission made within the scope of its authority. The appeal is heard in the Supreme Court of the state upon the record made before the commission, no additional evidence being received; but the court may remand the case to the commission for further investigation pending the appeal.

No reversal by the Supreme Court is valid, unless it substitutes for the order of the commission such order as in its opinion the commission should have made. The substituted order of the court has the same force and effect, and none other, as if it had been entered by the commission at the time the original order appealed from was entered.

It is apparent these provisions were substantially copied from those of the Constitution of the state of Virginia, which were considered, and their character and effect upon suits in the courts of the United States determined, in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210, 29 Sup.Ct. 67, 53 L.Ed. 150. Indeed, that case is relied upon by defendants as authority for the suspension of further proceedings in the present suits. There the State Corporation Commission of Virginia, after a thorough hearing, promulgated an order fixing two cents per mile as a maximum passenger rate. The railroad companies neither obeyed the order nor appealed from it to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, as the Constitution permitted, but at once brought suits in the Circuit Court of the United States to enjoin the commission from enforcing its order. Restraining orders were granted. On appeals to the Supreme Court of the United States it was held that the proceedings for fixing rates and charges whether in the commission or in the state Court of Appeals on appeal were legislative in character, although the principal aspect of those tribunals may be judicial; and it was said in substance, but in carefully measured terms, that the legislative process fixing the rates complained of was not so complete as to give an absolute, unqualified right to resort to the courts, and that considerations of comity and equitable fitness or propriety would be best subserved by an appeal by the railroad companies from the legislative order of the commission to the state Court of Appeals. There was a question whether the time for such appeals had not expired, and regarding it the Supreme Court said:

'As our decision does not go upon a denial of power to entertain the bills at the present stage, but upon our views as to what is the most proper and orderly course in cases of this sort, when practicable, it seems to us that the bills should be retained for the present to await the result of the appeals, if the companies see fit to take them. If the appeals are dismissed, as brought too late, the companies will be entitled to decrees.

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