Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Gee

• Decision Date: 10 July 1905
• Citation: 139 F. 582
• Parties: ATCHISON, T. & S.F. RY. CO. v. GEE et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

139 F. 582

ATCHISON, T. & S.F. RY. CO. v. GEE et al.

United States Circuit Court, S.D. Iowa, Eastern Division.

July 10, 1905

Thomas R. Morrow, W. S. hamilton, and Hughes & Sawyer, for injunction.

E. C Webber and John E. Craig, for the accused.

McPHERSON District Judge.

Gus Hult, William Morley, Wm. Randall, and S. C. Neyer, four of the defendants, are before the court charged with being guilty of contempt, in that they have violated the restraining orders of this court. In the spring of 1904 differences arose between the company and some employes in its shops. A strike was threatened or probable, when the company discharged them, and from that time on there has been what by many is called a 'lockout.' Who is in the right and who is in the wrong as to this has not been the subject of inquiry.

Counsel on both sides agree, as do all informed men, that laboring men have the legal right to strike at will, with or without good reasons, singly, collectively, or as a union; and counsel also agree that the company had the legal right to discharge the men, one, many, or all, at any time, with or without good reasons, and without making the reason known. The rights of both the company and employes as to severing relations were and are reciprocal. The company can discharge employes at will, and employes can quit the company at will. Of course, if the contract of employment is for a fixed time neither can breach the contract without being liable to a demand for damages; but no such claim has been made by either party, and, if it were, it could not be the subject of inquiry in this, a suit in equity, but would be only cognizable in an action at law for damages. That the employes have the legal right to quit or strike at pleasure, and the company the legal right to discharge at pleasure, simple as the proposition is, is too often forgotten. And that the employes have the legal right to organize and maintain a union is equally simple, but just as often forgotten by many. No court, federal nor state, nor, indeed, any informed man longer denies the foregoing. And it is equally simple, obvious, and true that when one, many, or all the employes are out, either by reason of a strike, discharge, or lockout, the positions thus made vacant no longer belong to those once filling them. But those positions belong to those, and those only, who may be thereafter voluntarily employed by the company. Those who are out singly, collectively, or by a union or organization, may seek to have the differences adjusted. This is not only so as a matter of sound reason, but Congress has recognized it as being so by the statutes of June 29, 1886 (Act June 29, 1886, c. 567, 24 Stat. 86 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3204)), and June 1, 1898 (Act June 1, 1898, c. 370, 30 Stat. 424 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3205)).

But, as broad as are the foregoing stated rights, neither can the company by any system, or irrevocable contracts, or force, or intimidation, require a man to continue his employment. It did not take a constitutional amendment nor an act of Congress to make either slavery or peonage indefensible in morals. And our laws, both state and national, upon the subject of peace, good order, good citizenship, a regard for the rights of others, the right of contract, as well as good morals, deny the right of all men to coerce by force, violence, or intimidation, or require a company or person to employ certain parties; and when one is employed, whether union or nonunion, he has the right to work in peace and quiet. A man who does not belong to a union has the same rights, legal and moral, neither more nor less, as has a man who does belong to a union. His rights and his family are just as dear to him as are those of a union man. There are and can be no differences. And the company has precisely the same rights to employ nonunion men as union men, and the absolute legal and moral right to have its rights and property and its employes protected when it does elect for any reason to employ nonunion men; and when such rights are violated the company has the right to seek and obtain an injunction against the repetition of such violations. All the courts. English and American, federal and state, so hold. These questions are not debatable.

And yet, plain as are all the foregoing, if they had been recognized, this case would not have been brought. Not only so, but there would not have been the slightest occasion for bringing this case, had there been any sincerity and honesty of purpose by the local authorities to maintain peace and order. Intimidation, force, violence, and brutality were all winked at, because of the belief on the part of certain peace officers that they would be kindly remembered on future election days, instead of remembering that the great majority of the people of the city are law-abiding, and would reward those who would maintain peace and preserve order, to say nothing of the peace of mind arising from duty performed. The evidence shows that the parties in the employ of the company have been assaulted by the strikers for no offense, for no wrong, for no crime, but solely because they elected to work under terms mutually satisfactory. The accused stoutly deny any complicity. Employes have been denounced and called 'scabs,' and the most vulgar and profane names applied to them, for the sole reason that they elected to work, when work was offered to them of a satisfactory character and at a price agreeable. The accused deny any complicity; but the proofs tend to show some of them guilty.

But as to one phase of the case there is no denial, but practically a confession, with the alleged and boasted right to practice it. A system of 'pickets,' for more than a year around and near by places to the shops of the company, has been kept up by all the accused and others. The...