Athanson v. Grasso

• Decision Date: 30 March 1976
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 15074.
• Citation: 411 F. Supp. 1153
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: George A. ATHANSON et al., Plaintiffs, v. Ella T. GRASSO, Governor of the State of Connecticut, et al., Defendants.

411 F. Supp. 1153

George A. ATHANSON et al., Plaintiffs, v. Ella T. GRASSO, Governor of the State of Connecticut, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 15074.

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

March 30, 1976.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Alexander A. Goldfarb, Corp. Counsel, Richard M. Cosgrove, Deputy Corp. Counsel, Peter G. Boucher, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Hartford, Conn., for plaintiffs.

Carl Ajello, Atty. Gen., F. Michael Ahern, David J. Della-Bitta, Asst. Attys. Gen., Hartford, Conn., for defendants.

Before SMITH, Circuit Judge, and CLARIE and BLUMENFELD, District Judges.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

BLUMENFELD, District Judge:

This action challenges Connecticut's method of financing public education.^* The gravamen of the complaint is that differences in the amount of property available for taxation in the several school districts throughout the state result in a heavier burden on Hartford taxpayers for expenditures per pupil for education. The plaintiffs claim that the State's statutory method of paying an equal amount per pupil to assist each town in bearing its costs of education, when considered in light of this burden, denies them the equal protection of the laws, in violation of the fourteenth amendment.

In the complaint as originally filed, the plaintiffs were: (1) City of Hartford; (2) City of Hartford, represented by the City Council (both as official representatives of the city and as individuals); and (3) the "aggregate resident population of" Hartford, represented by (a) The City of Hartford, and (b) The City Council of Hartford.¹

The amended complaint names the Mayor, the members of the City Council and the Treasurer, "in their respective capacities as officials of the City of Hartford," as plaintiffs.

The defendants have filed a motion to dismiss.² Although the Supreme Court held contrary to these plaintiffs' contention in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973), a case challenging Texas' similar educational financing method, before we can consider whether Rodriguez requires dismissal of this case we must address the threshold question of the plaintiffs' standing to bring this suit.³

Standing

Standing is a "threshold question in every federal case," and, ". . . the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute . . .." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205, 45 L.Ed.2d 343, 354 (1975). The standing requirement is derived from article III, section 2, which limits federal judicial power to "cases" and "controversies." Among the essential elements of a "case" are that the litigant have "a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy" Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663, 678 (1962), and allege some "injury in fact" to himself, Association of Data Processing Services Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152, 90 S.Ct. 827, 829, 25 L.Ed.2d 184, 187 (1970), as distinguished from injury to "the legal rights or interests of third parties." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 499, 95 S.Ct. at 2205, 45 L.Ed.2d at 354.⁴

The description of the plaintiffs as "officials" in the amended complaint was apparently a reaction to two decisions in this circuit, City of New York v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 923 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950, 93 S.Ct. 3012, 37 L.Ed.2d 1002 (1973), and Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146, 94 S.Ct. 900, 39 L.Ed.2d 101 (1974). In those cases the Court of Appeals, relying upon Williams v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40, 53 S.Ct. 431, 432, 77 L.Ed. 1015, 1020 (1933), and its reasoning that

"a municipal corporation, created by a state for the better ordering of government, has no privileges or immunities under the federal constitution which it may invoke in opposition to the will of its creator"

held that "The City New York lacks standing to assert constitutional claims against the State . . .."⁵

As those cases reveal, the plaintiffs were well advised to abandon their reliance in the original complaint upon their capacity to sue as representatives of the City or as the City Council. It is not that a city lacks capacity to sue, but only that it cannot sue its creator. That disability to sue its creator cannot be circumvented by substituting the city's governing body for the city. As a city is a creature of the state, so also is the city's governing council. Williams, 289 U.S. at 40, 53 S.Ct. at 432, 77 L.Ed. at 1020. Thus, the plaintiffs lack standing in the first two capacities in which they have brought this suit.

The plaintiffs are no more successful in the third capacity. As already indicated by Warth v. Seldin, the plaintiffs must allege injury other than one to "the legal rights or interests of others." 422 U.S. at 499, 95 S.Ct. at 2205, 45 L.Ed.2d at 355. Thus, they cannot sue on behalf of the "aggregate resident population of Hartford." Furthermore, those on behalf of whom they would bring this action would not themselves be able to maintain it in this court. The Chief Justice has recently discussed the fact that the injury required for standing must be particularized, in United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 94 S.Ct. 2940, 41 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) and Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee To Stop The War, 418 U.S. 208, 94 S.Ct. 2925, 41 L.Ed.2d 706 (1974). The importance of this concept was epitomized in the concurring opinion of Justice Powell in United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 195 n. 16, 94 S.Ct. at 2955, 41 L.Ed.2d at 698:

"All standing cases, even the most recent ones, include references to the need for particularized injury or similar language. None of them as yet has equated the interest of a taxpayer or citizen, suing in that status alone, with the particularized interest that standing doctrine has traditionally demanded. To take that step, it appears to me, would render the requirement of direct or immediate injury meaningless and would reduce the Court's consistent insistence on such an injury to mere talk."

We next consider the fourth and final capacity with which the plaintiffs clothe themselves in their effort to achieve standing. The plaintiffs contend that as "officials" they fit within the holding in City of New York, 473 F.2d at 933 that:

". . . those plaintiffs who sued in their official capacities may assert constitutional claims against the state under the rule announced in Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 241, n. 5, 88 S.Ct. 1923, 20 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1968). This is so because of the conflict each of the officials must face between his sworn duty to uphold the Constitution of the United States and his responsibility for administering New York's allegedly unconstitutional Social Services Law."

See also Aguayo, 473 F.2d at 1100.

As a district court, although composed of three judges, we are required to follow the law of our own circuit insofar as it is pertinent. Lewis v. Rockefeller, 431 F.2d 368, 371 (2d Cir. 1970); Thoms v. Smith, 334 F.Supp. 1203 (D.Conn. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Thoms v. Heffernan, 473 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 418 U.S. 908, 94 S.Ct. 3199, 41 L.Ed.2d 1154 (1974), reaff'd, No. 72-1013 (2d Cir. Nov. 18, 1974).

The standing of certain public officials in both City of New York and Aguayo was upheld on the authority of footnote 5 in Allen. Probably because standing had been conceded in Allen, the issue was disposed of there without discussion, and without reference to precedents other than a citation to Baker v. Carr.⁶

However, it would be a serious mistake to assume that Allen stands for the broad proposition that all public officials have standing to challenge the constitutionality of laws with which they do not agree. In "extrapolating broad general rules from particular holdings" caution must be exercised. Kimbrough v. O'Neil, 523 F.2d 1057, 1067 (7th Cir. 1975) (concurring opinion of Justice Stevens, then Cir. J.). Justice Jackson's reminder to counsel in Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 132-33, 65 S.Ct. 165, 168, 89 L.Ed. 118, 123 (1944), is equally applicable to judges:

"It is timely again to remind counsel that words of our opinions are to be read in the light of the facts of the case under discussion. To keep opinions within reasonable bounds precludes writing into them every limitation or variation which might be suggested by the circumstances of cases not before the Court. General expressions transposed to other facts are often misleading. The context of the language cited from the Tennessee Coal case should be sufficient to indicate that the quoted phrases were not intended as a limitation on the Act, and have no necessary application to other states of facts."

See also Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., Long Lines Dept., 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S. L. W. 3684 (U.S. June 24, 1975) (No. 74-1601).

Heeding these admonitions, we note preliminarily that, in considering whether Allen ought to control the decision on standing in this case, the fact that standing was not put in issue there means only that it was not briefed or argued. The Court necessarily conducted its own examination of the issue, and concluded that the board members had standing to sue. Otherwise, counsel for the parties would be permitted to make significant choices having binding precedence.

The remainder of footnote 5 in Allen is not framed in the abstract, but fits within the legal system of the State of New York. There is a story behind these words. It is only in the whole context of the Allen case that Justice White's complete meaning is revealed. The conflict between "violating their oath and taking a step — refusal to comply with § 701 — that would be likely to bring their expulsion from office . ." 392 U.S. at 241 n.5, 88 S.Ct. at 1925, 20 L.Ed.2d at 1064, may be misleading if applied to the case...