Athridge v. Rivas, 01-7185.

• Decision Date: 17 December 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01-7186.,No. 01-7185.,01-7185.,01-7186.
• Citation: 312 F.3d 474
• Parties: Thomas P. ATHRIDGE, Jr., Appellant, v. Francisco RIVAS, et al., Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

312 F.3d 474

Thomas P. ATHRIDGE, Jr., Appellant, v. Francisco RIVAS, et al., Appellees.

No. 01-7185.

No. 01-7186.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

December 17, 2002.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 89cv01222 & No. 92cv01868).

Erik S. Jaffe was on the brief for appellants. William J. Rodgers entered an appearance.

David F. Grimaldi was on the brief for appellees.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and EDWARDS and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge EDWARDS.

HARRY T. EDWARDS, Circuit Judge:

Thomas Athridge, who was struck by a driver operating a car owned by the appellees, seeks to impose vicarious liability on the appellees on the theory that they expressly or impliedly consented to the driver's use of their car. Under the District of Columbia Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act ("MVSRA"), D.C.CODE § 50-1301.08, proof of ownership of a car is prima facie evidence that a driver operated the car with the owner's permission, and the defendant bears the burden of proving non-consent. The District Court granted summary judgment for the appellees, holding that the appellees had overcome the statutory presumption of consent. We reverse.

The appellees' evidence of non-consent was contradicted by the appellants' evidence of implied consent. Therefore, because there is a genuine issue of material fact, the District Court erred in granting summary judgment. The weighing of evidence and the drawing of legitimate inferences from disputed facts are jury functions, not those of a judge. On the record at hand, it cannot be held that, as a matter of law, the appellees have presented evidence sufficient to overcome the statutory presumption. The District Court should have allowed a jury to weigh the evidence. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand the case for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

In July 1987, Francisco and Hilda Rivas went on an extended vacation, arranging for Jorge Iglesias, the 17-year-old son of Mrs. Rivas' first cousin, to mow their lawn while they were away from home. In the Rivases' absence, Iglesias, who did not have a driver's license, entered their house, found the keys to their car, and went for a drive. The car was titled to Churreria Madrid Restaurant, a partnership then owned by the Rivases. Iglesias accidentally struck and seriously injured his friend Tommy Athridge.

On May 4, 1989, Athridge and his father filed a suit in the District Court against Iglesias, Francisco Rivas, and the restaurant, alleging that Iglesias' negligence caused the injuries. Four months later, GEICO, the Rivases' insurance carrier, sued Francisco Rivas, the restaurant, and Iglesias in D.C. Superior Court, seeking a declaratory judgment that Iglesias' use of the car was without the owners' permission, and that therefore GEICO was not liable for any judgment that may be rendered against Rivas, the restaurant, or Iglesias. On March 7, 1990, GEICO, for reasons not contained in the record, moved to dismiss its own case against Rivas and the restaurant with prejudice, and the motion was granted. GEICO continued to pursue its claim against the driver Iglesias. On June 6, 1990, the D.C. Superior Court granted summary judgment for GEICO on the issue of non-coverage of Iglesias. See June 6, 1990 Order, reprinted in Joint Appendix 75. This judgment did not purport to implicate the Athridges or the Rivases.

On August 12, 1992, the Athridges filed additional complaints in the District Court against Hilda Rivas, Iglesias' parents, and Aetna, the insurance carrier of Iglesias' parents. The District Court consolidated these three new actions with the original lawsuit. The District Court then dismissed the claims against all defendants except Iglesias. On November 8, 1996, after a bench trial, the District Court found Iglesias liable for negligence and awarded the Athridges a $5.5 million judgment. See Athridge v. Iglesias, 950 F.Supp. 1187, 1190-94 (D.D.C.1996).

The Athridges appealed the District Court's grant of summary judgment for the Rivases, Iglesias' parents, and Aetna. This court affirmed the grant of summary judgment for Iglesias' parents and Aetna, reversed the grant of summary judgment for the Rivases, and remanded the case to the District Court. See Athridge v. Rivas, 141 F.3d 357, 364 (D.C.Cir.1998).

On remand, the Athridges moved for partial summary judgment. They argued that the D.C. Superior Court's dismissal with prejudice of GEICO's claim against the Rivases should be deemed a determination that Iglesias had the Rivases' permission to drive the car, and that this determination precluded the Rivases from relitigating the issue of permission. They also argued that the Rivases were precluded from contesting damages, which had already been determined in the Athridges' lawsuit against Iglesias. On November 14, 2000, the District Court denied the Athridges' motion for summary judgment. It held that the Superior Court's dismissal with prejudice of GEICO's claim against the Rivases could not be deemed to have determined that the Rivases gave Iglesias permission to use the car. See Athridge v. Iglesias, Nos. 89-1222 & 92-1868, 2000 WL 1780273, at 2 (D.D.C. Nov.14, 2000). Therefore, the District Court held that the Rivases were not precluded from arguing that Iglesias' use of their car was non-permissive. The District Court declined to reach the issue of whether the Rivases were precluded from relitigating the question of damages that had previously been resolved in the suit against Iglesias, since there was no reason to reach the issue until the Rivases' liability was first established. See id. at 5.

The Rivases then filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that they were not liable as a matter of law under the MVSRA. The statute provides that when a vehicle is operated by a person other than the owner, "proof of ownership of said motor vehicle shall be prima facie evidence that such person operated said motor vehicle with the consent of the owner." D.C.CODE § 50-1301.08. The Rivases claimed that Iglesias' use of the car was non-permissive. The Athridges opposed the motion and filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment. On October 15, 2001, the District Court granted the Rivases' motion, finding that they had met their burden of proving that they did not consent to Iglesias' use of their car, by presenting uncontradicted and conclusive evidence of non-consent, including the testimony of both Iglesias and the Rivases. See Athridge v. Rivas, 167 F.Supp.2d 389, 394 (D.D.C.2001). The District Court rejected the Athridges' arguments that there was consent and rejected their motion for summary judgment. See id. at 395-98. The Athridges now appeal the District Court's judgment in favor of the appellees.

II. ANALYSIS

This court reviews the District Court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Ass'n of Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO v. USAir, Inc., 24 F.3d 1432, 1436 (D.C.Cir. 1994). Summary judgment may not be granted if the record reveals genuine issues of material fact. Goldman v. Bequai, 19 F.3d 666, 672 (D.C.Cir.1994). "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge ... on a motion for summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

Under the MVSRA, proof of ownership of a car is prima facie evidence that the driver operated the car with the owner's permission. This creates a rebuttable presumption that the owner consented to the use of the car, a powerful presumption that can only be overcome by "uncontradicted and conclusive evidence" of non-consent. The defendant has the heavy burden of establishing non-consent. See Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d 216, 218 (D.C.Cir.1968) (holding that the presumption of consent "will support a jury verdict and judgment for the plaintiff unless the defendant demonstrates nonconsent by `uncontradicted' and `conclusive' evidence") (citing Hiscox v. Jackson, 127 F.2d 160 (D.C.Cir.1942); Rosenberg v. Murray, 116 F.2d 552 (D.C.Cir.1940)).

Under District of Columbia law, an automobile owner is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if he or she asserts without contradiction that the vehicle was taken and used without consent. "`If the presumption is overcome by uncontradicted proof — and this may be done by the positive testimony of the owner — the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict as a matter of law.'" Love v. Gaskins, 153 A.2d 660, 662 (D.C.Mun.App.1959) (quoting Stumpner v. Harrison, 136 A.2d 870, 871 (D.C.Mun.App.1957)). In other words, if the owner's testimony of non-consent is uncontradicted and the statutory presumption has been overcome, then there...