Atkins v. Crawford Cnty. Clerk's Office
| Decision Date | 01 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-MI-2160 |
| Citation | 171 N.E.3d 131 |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
| Parties | Rebekah A. ATKINS, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. CRAWFORD COUNTY CLERK'S OFFICE, Elected Clerk, Lisa Stephenson Holzbog, Chief Deputy Clerk-Lisa Ward, Deputy Clerk Charla Dawn Wright, and Deputy Clerk Vicki McMullen, Appellee-Defendants. |
Attorney Pro Se: Rebekah A. Atkins, Marengo, Indiana
[1] Rebekah Atkins appeals the dismissal of her complaint against the Crawford County Clerk, the Clerk's office, and its employees (collectively "Appellees"). Atkins composed and filed a lengthy complaint in the Crawford Circuit Court. Among its many claims, Atkins’ complaint alleged that Appellees were withholding (and possibly creating) records pertaining to Atkins, in violation of Indiana's Access to Public Records Act ("APRA"). Atkins then filed a variety of motions, including a motion to waive the filing fee and a motion for appointed counsel, all of which were denied by the trial court. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss Atkins’ complaint, arguing that it failed to state grounds upon which relief could be granted. The trial court agreed and dismissed Atkins’ complaint with prejudice. Because we disagree with the trial court's denial of Atkins’ motion to proceed in forma pauperis and the decision to dismiss her case, we reverse. We affirm, however, the trial court's determination to deny Atkins’ motion for appointed counsel.
[2] Atkins purports to raise thirty-three issues1 , which we consolidate and restate as:
[3] On October 26, 2020, Atkins filed a seventeen-page complaint in the Crawford Circuit Court. The complaint alleged that the Crawford County Clerk was "holding, maintaining, and creating illicit and fictitious court [ ] records [ ] pertain[ing] to Ms. Atkins's [i]dentity." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 27. Atkins further alleged that Appellees repeatedly denied Atkins access to the various record storage systems in the Clerk's office and refused to provide Atkins access to the records that Atkins believed pertained to her. The complaint listed a series of other grievances, including that Appellees perjured themselves by asserting that their office had perfected service on Atkins2 ; that the Clerk's staff "harass" and "intimidate" Atkins; and that the Clerk "[s]huts down the entire Clerk's Office [ ] just to deny access to Ms. Atkins." Id. at 29. Atkins’ complaint specifically asserted that Appellees’ alleged denials of access were in violation of APRA, and unconstitutionally "restrain[ed] Ms. Atkins’ [l]iberty...." Id. at 36.
[4] Atkins claimed that she attempted to avail herself of various administrative remedies in an effort to gain access to public records. Atkins also claimed that she visited the Clerk's office, approximately fourteen different times, and was informed that she needed to obtain a court order if she wished to access records in Appellees’ possession. The complaint also details a series of filings—made by Atkins, pro se—aimed at obtaining access to Clerk's records, including numerous petitions for a writ of habeas corpus. Atkins claimed that she had been denied entry to the courthouse as well, apparently with respect to a different suit against the Clerk.
[5] Atkins proceeded to make sixteen filings—motions, objections, petitions, and affidavits—including a motion to proceed in forma pauperis and a motion for appointed counsel, all of which the trial court denied.3 Appellees responded on December 8, 2020, by filing a motion to dismiss Atkins’ complaint, pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6). The motion argued that Atkins’ complaint failed to state grounds upon which relief could be granted, and that Atkins’ complaint should be dismissed on the grounds that she failed to pay the filing fee. Appellees requested a hearing on their motion. Without a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice on January 23, 2021. On January 26, 2021, the trial court entered a second order, striking all pleadings from the record on the grounds that the trial court had denied Atkins’ motion for waiver of the filing fee and instructed the Clerk to reject any further filings under the cause number of the dismissed complaint. This appeal followed.
[6] It is unclear from the record on what basis the trial court denied Atkins’ motion to proceed in forma pauperis and to waive the filing fee. "Indigency determinations present a subject for the sound discretion of the trial court, and a very clear case of abuse must be shown before this discretionary power can be interfered with." Campbell v. Criterion Grp. , 605 N.E.2d 150, 159 (Ind. 1992) (internal citations omitted).
[7] Regarding the waiver of filing fees, Indiana Code Section 33-37-3-2 provides:
[8] We pause to recognize the standard that Indiana Courts are:
constrained to give a liberal construction to our statutes in favor of the pauper, for we can scarcely conceive of a system of law so inhuman and cruel that would consign the destitute and friendless to conviction and infamy, without affording full and ample means for investigation.... [T]hat part of our constitution, which provides that "justice shall be administered freely, and without purchase, completely and without denial," would be an empty boast, and worse than mockery to the poor.
Campbell , 605 N.E.2d at 155 (quoting Falkenburgh v. Jones , 5 Ind. 296, 299 (1854) ) (emphasis added). "Arbitrary economic discrimination in the halls of justice is wrong." Id. at 159 (internal quotation omitted). We look to the record in this case to determine whether Atkins has complied with the requirements of Indiana Code 33-37-3-2 and has shown that she cannot afford to advance the filing fee due to indigency.
[9] Curiously, our jurisprudence regarding Indiana Code Section 33-37-3-2 and its legislative forefathers is largely bereft of cases in which courts have addressed waiver of the filing fee at the trial court level; most fee issues arise at the appellate level. We endeavor today to fill that gap, given that some version of a statute allowing persons lacking sufficient means to proceed with suits has been on our books for more than a century and a half. See, e.g., Kerr v. State ex rel. Wray, 35 Ind. 288, 290 (1871).
[10] The reasoning set forth in Campbell —a case pertaining to appellate filing fees—carries no less force when the fee at issue is the trial-court-level filing fee. As Justice DeBruler once remarked "[f]rom the date of its admission to the Union down to this day, Indiana has been a leader in providing indigent persons with free access to her courts and in providing them with fair treatment while in court." Thompson v. Thompson , 259 Ind. 266, 273, 286 N.E.2d 657, 661 (1972). We reiterate that sentiment and observe that the dearth of cases regarding trial-court-level-filing fees may simply indicate that the application of our pauper statutes to such fees is so axiomatic as to escape reasonable challenge. We also note that the Indiana Code of Judicial Conduct gives guidance to trial courts and provides: "[a] judge may make reasonable efforts, consistent with the law and court rules, to facilitate the ability of all litigants, including self-represented litigants, to be fairly heard." Ind. Code Jud. Conduct R. 2.2. To vindicate the ability to be fairly heard, the obstacle of the filing fee must first be removed for those without the means to surpass it.
[11] Our review of Indiana authority suggests several ways exist in which trial courts can determine a litigant's indigency. In the context of adult guardianship services, for example, trial courts are instructed to determine whether the litigant "has an annual gross income of not more than one hundred twenty-five percent (125%) of the federal income poverty level as determined annually by the federal Office of Management and Budget under 42 U.S.C. 9902...." Ind. Code § 12-10-7-2.
[12] In the criminal context, our Supreme Court has held:
The determination as to the defendant's indigency is not to be made on a superficial examination of income and ownership of property but must be based on as thorough an examination of the defendant's total financial picture as is practical. The record must show that the determination of ability to pay includes a balancing of assets against liabilities and a consideration of the amount of the defendant's disposable income or other resources reasonably available to him after the payment of his fixed or certain obligations. The fact that the defendant was able to post a bond is not determinative of his nonindigency but is only a factor to be considered. The court's duty to appoint competent counsel arises at any stage of the proceedings when the defendant's indigency causes him to be without the assistance of counsel.
Moore v. State , 273 Ind. 3, 7-8, 401 N.E.2d 676, 679 (1980). Indeed, we have endorsed the approach articulated in Moore even in the civil context, as has our Supreme Court. See, e.g., Sholes v. Sholes , 760 N.E.2d 156, 161 (Ind. 2001) ; Zimmerman v. Hanks , 766 N.E.2d 752, 755 ...
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