Atkins v. Deere & Co.

• Decision Date: 11 September 1997
• Docket Number: Nos. 82220,82221,s. 82220
• Citation: 177 Ill.2d 222,685 N.E.2d 342,226 Ill. Dec. 239
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Parties: , 226 Ill.Dec. 239 Larry D. ATKINS, Appellee, v. DEERE & COMPANY et al., Appellants. Thomas E. KIENITZ, Appellant, v. BRADLEY & BRADLEY, INC., et al., Appellees.

Page 342

685 N.E.2d 342

177 Ill.2d 222, 226 Ill.Dec. 239

Larry D. ATKINS, Appellee, v. DEERE & COMPANY et al., Appellants.

Thomas E. KIENITZ, Appellant, v. BRADLEY & BRADLEY, INC., et al., Appellees.

Nos. 82220, 82221.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 11, 1997.

[177 Ill.2d 223] [226 Ill.Dec. 240] Brian S. Nelson, Katz, McHard, Balch, Lefstein & Fieweger, P.C., Rock Island, for Deer & Co., Western Structural Co. in No. 82220.

Brad A. Elward, Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, Peoria, for Roofing Systems, Inc. in No. 82220.

Curt N. Rodin, Anesi, Ozmon & Rodin, Ltd., Chicago, for Larry D. Atkins in No. 82220, and for Thomas E. Kienitz, in No. 82221.

Robert E. Elworth, Bollinger Ruberry & Garvey, Chicago, for amicus curiae W.E. O'Neil Construction Co. in No. 82220.

Michael T. Reagan, Herbolsheimer, Lannon, Henson, Duncan & Reagan, Ottawa, for amicus curiae Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel in No. 82220.

David A. Novoselsky, David A. Novoselsky & Associates, Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois State Federation of Labor in No. 82220.

Matthew K. Krueger, Brassfield, Cowen & Howard, Streator, Alfred W. Cowan, Brassfield, Cowan & Howard, Rockford, for amicus curiae in No. 82220.

Bruce L. Carmen, Hinshaw & Culbertson, Chicago, for Bradley & Bradley in No. 82221.

John A. Guzzardo, Ward, Murray, Pace & Johnson, Sterling, for Lena Winslow Community Unit School Dist. No. 202 in No. 82221.

Justice McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:

We granted leave to appeal in this consolidated case in order to determine whether the repeal of the Illinois Structural Work Act (740 ILCS 150/0.01 et seq. (West 1994)) operates as a bar to all causes of actions which accrued prior to the effective date of the repeal. 134 Ill.2d R. 302(b). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that all such causes of actions are preserved.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs, Larry D. Atkins and Thomas E. Kienitz, each filed a lawsuit pursuant to the Structural Work Act to recover damages for injuries they received while working on separate construction sites. During the pendency of these actions, the Illinois General Assembly repealed the Structural Work Act, effective February 14, 1995. The repealing statute, Public Act 89-2, provides in toto:

"PUBLIC ACT 89-0002

(House Bill No. 201)

AN ACT to repeal the Structural Work Act.

WHEREAS, It is the intent of the General Assembly that the repeal of the Structural Work Act shall operate as a bar to any action accruing on or after the effective date of this Public Act; and

WHEREAS, It is the intent of the General Assembly that any action accruing under the Structural Work Act before the effective date of this Public Act may be maintained in accordance with the provisions of that Act as it existed before its repeal by this Public Act; therefore

Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly:

(740 ILCS 150/Act rep.)

Section 5. The Structural Work Act is repealed.

Section 99. This Act takes effect upon becoming law.

Passed in the General Assembly February 9, 1995.

Approved February 14, 1995.

Effective February 14, 1995." Pub. Act 89-2, eff. February 14, 1995 (rep. 740 ILCS 150/0.01 et seq. (West 1994)).

Shortly thereafter, defendants in both of the instant actions moved for dismissal of plaintiffs' complaints based upon the above quoted repealer. Defendants argued that although the legislature expressed an intention to apply the repealing act prospectively, that intention appeared in the introductory paragraphs preceding the words "Be it enacted * * *." According to defendants, those paragraphs merely constituted a preamble and, as such, could not be considered a part of the act itself. Defendants further submitted that the paragraphs following the enacting clause, i.e., "The Structural Work Act is repealed" and "This Act takes effect upon becoming law," constituted the only operative portions of the statute. Defendants concluded, therefore, that because the legislature repealed the Structural Work Act without a saving clause, and because plaintiffs did not have a vested right in the continuation of the Structural Work Act, plaintiffs' statutory cause of action ceased as of the date of the repeal.

The circuit court in Atkins v. Deere & Co., No. 82220, disagreed with defendants and denied the motion to dismiss. The court held that the language contained in the preamble evinced a legislative intent not to give the repealing act retrospective effect. Finding that the issue involved a question of law as to which there was a substantial ground for a difference of opinion (155 Ill.2d R. 308), the Atkins court certified the following question for our review:

"Does the statute, known as Public Act 89-2, which repealed the Structural Work Act, bar all claims under the Structural Work Act regardless of when the causes of action accrued and including cases that are pending in the trial or appellate courts?"

In contrast to the Atkins court, the circuit court in Kienitz v. Bradley & Bradley, Inc., No. 82221, agreed with defendants that the preamble was not a part of the act itself. The court further ruled that because the legislature repealed the Structural Work Act without a saving clause, plaintiff's statutory cause of action no longer existed. Accordingly, the court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. As in Atkins, the court entered an order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill.2d R. 308), asking us to decide:

"Does the Repeal of the Structural Work Act of Illinois (Ch. 48, Sec. 60-69, Illinois Revised Statutes) on February 14, 1995 (P.A. 89-2) apply retroactively to terminate a cause of action under the Structural Work Act which accrued prior to February 14, 1995?" We answer each of the certified questions in the negative.

DISCUSSION

The critical inquiry in this case is whether Public Act 89-2 constitutes an unconditional repeal of the Structural Work Act. The resolution of this issue turns upon whether we must, under our prior case law, disregard the legislature's express statement that "any action accruing under the Structural Work Act before the effective date of this [repealer] may be maintained in accordance with the provisions of that Act." A review of our past precedent, therefore, is necessary to a proper understanding of today's decision.

We note that the unconditional repeal of a remedial statute without a saving clause stops all pending actions where the repeal finds them. People ex rel. Eitel v. Lindheimer, 371 Ill. 367, 373, 21 N.E.2d 318 (1939). See also Wall v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 290 Ill. 227, 125 N.E. 20 (1919); Shelton v. City of Chicago, 42 Ill.2d 468, 248 N.E.2d 121 (1969); Isenstein v. Rosewell, 106 Ill.2d 301, 88 Ill.Dec. 15, 478 N.E.2d 330 (1985). As early as 1871, this court held that "[t]he effect of a repealing statute is to obliterate the prior law as completely from the records as if it had never passed, and it must be considered as a law that never existed." Van Inwagen v. City of Chicago, 61 Ill. 31, 34 (1871) (citing Key v. Goodwin, 4 Moore & Payne 341 (Ex. Ch. 1830), and Dwarris on Statutes 676). More recently, this court held that "[i]n the absence of a general saving clause or a saving clause within the repealing act, the effect of the repeal of a statute 'is to destroy the effectiveness of the repealed act in futuro and to divest the right to proceed under the statute, which, except as to proceedings past and closed, is considered as if it had never existed.' " Isenstein v. Rosewell, 106 Ill.2d 301, 310, 88 Ill.Dec. 15, 478 N.E.2d 330 (1985), quoting 1A C. Sands, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 23.33, at 279 (4th ed.1972). The only exceptions to the foregoing rule involve (i) contractual obligations and (ii) vested rights, neither of which may be affected by the repeal of the act upon which they are grounded. Lindheimer, 371 Ill. at 372, 21 N.E.2d 318. These exceptions are derived from court decisions which hold that the legislature cannot pass a retrospective law impairing the obligation of a contract, nor can it deprive a person of a vested right by a mere legislative act. Lindheimer, 371 Ill. at 372, 21 N.E.2d 318. See also Shelton v. City of Chicago, 42 Ill.2d 468, 248 N.E.2d 121 (1969); Maiter v. Chicago Board of Education, 82 Ill.2d 373, 47 Ill.Dec. 721, 415 N.E.2d 1034 (1980).

Applying these principles to the instant case, we must first determine whether Public Act 89-2 contains an effective saving clause. As noted above, the General Assembly expressly indicated that "any action accruing under the Structural Work Act before the effective date of this [repealer] may be maintained in accordance with the provisions of that Act." Ordinarily, there would be little difficulty in construing these words as an effective saving clause, for they clearly evince the legislative intent to preserve all causes of action which had accrued prior to the effective date of the repeal. However, contrary to customary legislative practice, the General Assembly included these words within the preamble to Public Act 89-2 rather than within the body of the act itself. Although the placement or location of the legislature's intent may initially appear to be inconsequential, the location becomes significant in light of our case law which treats a statute's preamble differently from its body, or "purview."

Under Illinois law, a preamble "is not a part of the Act itself (Triple A Services, Inc. v. Rice, 131 Ill.2d 217, 227, 137 Ill.Dec. 53, 545 N.E.2d 706 (1989)) and has no substantive legal force." Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 176 Ill.2d 401, 414, 223 Ill.Dec. 641, 680 N.E.2d 374 (1997); see also Brown v. Kirk, 64 Ill.2d 144, 152, 355 N.E.2d 12 (1976). Because a preamble customarily precedes the enacting clause, " '[it] is not regarded as being an operative part of statutory enactments.' " Monarch Gas Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 261 Ill.App.3d 94, 99, 199...