Atkins v. Rust-Oleum Corp., Civil Action No. 18-1349
Decision Date | 03 February 2020 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 18-1349 |
Parties | LAURA ATKINS, on her own behalf and on behalf of the estate of JOSHUA PAUL ATKINS, Plaintiffs, v. RUST-OLEUM CORPORATION, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendant in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County on September 17, 2018. (ECF No. 1-2). Defendant removed the matter to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction on October 9, 2018. (ECF No. 1). The Complaint alleges claims of negligence per se for alleged violations of the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1261 et seq.; negligence; strict liability; and wrongful death. (ECF No. 1-2). Following the completion of fact and expert discovery, Defendant filed the present Motion for Summary Judgment on November 26, 2019. (ECF No. 22).
For the following reasons, the Motion will be denied.
Thirty-one-year-old Joshua Atkins lived with this mother, Laura Atkins, in South Connellsville, Pennsylvania. (ECF No. 25, at ¶ 3). According to Plaintiffs, Joshua had many hobbies and interests, including BMX biking. (ECF No. 1-2, at ¶ 64). One evening in February 2018, after Ms. Atkins left for her night shift at work, Joshua took the front fork of a bike, a metal bowl, a spatula, a tin pan, and a can of Rust-Oleum Aircraft Remover paint stripper into the bathroom. (ECF No. 1-2, at ¶ 72; ECF No. 25, at ¶ 4). He shut the bathroom door and sat in the bathtub with the bike fork, tin pan, bowl, and spatula. (ECF No. 25, at ¶¶ 4, 8). He propped the bike fork up in the tin pan and poured about one-third of the Aircraft Remover into the pan. (ECF No. 26-10, at 2-3). He then set the container of Aircraft Remover on the floor outside the tub. (ECF No. 25, at ¶ 4). Joshua did not open the bathroom window, and the bathroom did not have an exhaust fan. Id. at ¶¶ 8-9.
The Aircraft Remover, which Rust-Oleum marketed as a professional grade paint stripper and sold to consumers for household use, contained methanol (sometimes called methyl alcohol) and methylene chloride. Id. at ¶¶ 5, 10-11. Both chemicals are hazardous substances under the Federal Hazardous Substances Act (FHSA). Id. at ¶ 11. Because the Aircraft Remover contained hazardous substances, the FHSA required that Rust-Oleum place cautionary language on the Aircraft Remover's packaging. Id. The front panel on the Aircraft Remover container, manufactured in March 2017 and later purchased by Joshua, stated (in smaller print than appears here):
Id. at ¶ 12. The back panel provided, in English and in Spanish (again, in smaller print than appears here):
When Ms. Atkins arrived home from work the next morning, she found Joshua sitting and slumped over in the bathtub. Id. at ¶ 4. Ms. Atkins called emergency services, which reported that Joshua "had obvious signs of death" upon their arrival. (ECF No. 1-2, at ¶ 73). The autopsy and toxicological testing showed that Joshua died as a result of inhalation of methylene chloride vapors. (ECF No. 25, at ¶ 6). One expert report opines that the methylene chloride vapor levels reached the "Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health" range within eight to ten minutes of when Joshua poured the Aircraft Remover into the tin pan. (ECF No. 26-10, at 13).
Ms. Atkins, on her own behalf and on behalf of Joshua's estate, filed suit against Rust-Oleum, alleging in part that Rust-Oleum failed to adequately warn consumers of the hazards of using its Aircraft Remover product. (ECF No. 1-2). Rust-Oleum moves for summary judgment on this issue, arguing that the Aircraft Remover label complied with the FHSA'srequirements, thereby preempting any of Plaintiffs' claims that are based on inadequate labeling. (ECF No. 22).
According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a court must grant summary judgment where the moving party "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact" and the moving party "is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). For a dispute to be genuine, there must be "a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party." Moody v. Atl. City Bd. of Educ., 870 F.3d 206, 213 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotations omitted). Additionally, for a factual dispute to be material, it must have an effect on the outcome of the suit. Id.
In reviewing and evaluating the evidence for a motion for summary judgment, the court must "view the underlying facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the" non-moving party. Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotations omitted). However, where "the non-moving party fails to make 'a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof,'" the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Moody, 870 F.3d at 213 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,...
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