Atkins v. Urban Redevelopment Authority of Pittsburgh

• Decision Date: 30 April 1980
• Docket Number: A,Nos. 64 and 65,No. 65,No. 64,64,65,s. 64 and 65
• Parties: , 7 A.L.R.4th 1120 Marion ATKINS, Appellant atppellee at, v. URBAN REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY OF PITTSBURGH, a municipal authority, Appellee atppellant at, v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF the CITY OF PITTSBURGH, Appellee at
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 100

414 A.2d 100

489 Pa. 344, 7 A.L.R.4th 1120

Marion ATKINS, Appellant at No. 64, Appellee at No. 65, v. URBAN REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY OF PITTSBURGH, a municipal

authority, Appellee at No. 64, Appellant at No. 65, v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF the CITY OF PITTSBURGH, Appellee at

Nos. 64 and 65.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued March 10, 1980.

Decided April 30, 1980.

[489 Pa. 347] Joseph M. Zoffer, Pittsburgh, for appellant at No. 64.

Cosmos J. Reale, Murovich, Reale & Fossee, Warren D. Ferry, Pittsburgh, for appellant at No. 65.

George I. Buckler, Meyer, Darragh, Buckler, Bebenek & Eck, Pittsburgh, for Housing Authority of City of Pittsburgh in both cases.

Warren D. Ferry, Cosmos J. Reale, Pittsburgh, for Urban Redevelopment Authority.

Joseph M. Zoffer, Pittsburgh, for Marion Atkins.

Before EAGEN, C. J., and O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, NIX, LARSEN, FLAHERTY and KAUFFMAN, JJ.

OPINION

LARSEN, Justice.

The Urban Redevelopment Authority of Pittsburgh (URA) is, and was at the time of the events precipitating this appeal, the owner of numerous properties in the City of Pittsburgh slated for urban redevelopment. URA entered into a contractual relationship with the Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh (HACP) wherein HACP agreed to provide many and varied services with respect to URA's properties. ¹ The contract makes it quite clear that URA was to have no active role in the supervision, operation and maintenance of its properties, and that HACP would assume all responsibility for the performance of these duties. HACP was, specifically, entirely responsible for preparing vacant properties for demolition when URA determined demolition was appropriate. Services in this regard included rat and other pest extermination, sealing (boarding up) the buildings, making sure all utilities were disconnected and making whatever repairs or maintenance necessary to keep the vacant land safe and clear of debris.

This action in trespass arises out of an incident occurring at a vacant house at 549 Junilla Street, Pittsburgh, a property owned by URA and scheduled for demolition as the house was uninhabitable. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, HACP made several visits to 549 Junilla Street to remove debris and board up the house to prevent unauthorized entry. On October 11, 1973, Marion Atkins (plaintiff below), an employee of HACP, accompanied two fellow HACP employees to 549 Junilla Street. Atkins knew the house was to be demolished because it was uninhabitable and had gone there to be sure all of the utilities were disconnected. Atkins had been employed by the HACP for some three years as a general maintenance man and laborer, and had often inspected and disconnected utilities of buildings that were to be demolished.

Atkins was going to the basement of the house to determine if the water meter had been removed. When he stepped off the top step of the stairway leading to the basement, he fell down the stairs because the second step was missing.

Atkins testified that the stairway was well-lit, that he could see the bottom four or five steps, that he stepped on the first step, and that, if he had looked, he would have been able to see that the second step was missing. One of the other employees rushed to his aid, noticing as he did so that the second step was missing. Atkins sustained a fractured skull fragments of the fractured skull caused brain damage.

Atkins filed suit against URA in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, alleging, inter alia, that URA was negligent in failing to repair or maintain a proper stairway and in failing to warn plaintiff of the dangerous condition. URA joined HACP as an additional defendant, asserting that HACP was solely responsible for the condition of the property and that, therefore, any liability for Atkins' injuries was HACP's alone, or that HACP was liable over to URA.

A jury returned a verdict against both defendants in the amount of $115,000.00. At the direction of the trial court, the jury also returned a "verdict over in favor of the Urban Redevelopment Authority of Pittsburgh against Housing Authority of Pittsburgh." Both URA and HACP filed post-trial motions for judgment non obstante veredicto ; HACP also filed a motion to remold the verdict by removing the verdict over in favor of URA and against HACP.

A court en banc granted both defendants' motions for judgments n.o.v. The judgments n.o.v. were predicated on the finding that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law for failing to observe a dangerous and obvious condition, and that there was no breach of duty to plaintiff by URA according to section 343 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965). As the motions for judgments n.o.v. were granted, there was no need for the court en banc to address HACP's motion to remold the verdict.

Atkins appealed to the Superior Court; HACP also filed a cautionary appeal to the Superior Court to preserve its position that the lower court had erroneously directed the molding of the jury's verdict. That court affirmed the granting of the judgments n.o.v. The Superior Court reversed the action of the trial judge in molding the verdict over to URA against HACP, but stated it was unnecessary to take any action to restore the original verdict because of the dispositions of the judgments n.o.v.

This Court then granted Atkins' petition for allowance of appeal (No. 64 March Term, 1979); we also granted URA's "cautionary" petition for allowance of appeal in the matter of the motion to remold the verdict (No. 65 March Term, 1979). We now affirm the granting of the motions of both defendants for judgment n.o.v., for the following reasons.

Our standard of review is settled. A judgment n. o. v. should be entered only in a clear case, and any doubts should be resolved in favor of the verdict. Steward v. Chernicky, 439 Pa. 43, 266 A.2d 259 (1970). In considering a motion for judgment n. o. v., the evidence, together with all reasonable inferences therefrom, is considered in the light most favorable to the verdict winner. Miller v. Checker Cab Co., 465 Pa. 82, 348 A.2d 128 (1975). Applying these standards, we have no doubt that appellant Atkins failed to meet his burden of proving the liability of either defendant.

URBAN REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

As correctly noted by the court en banc, and as conceded by appellant Atkins, Brief for Appellant at 25, the instant case is governed by section 343 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), which provides:

Dangerous Conditions Known to or Discoverable by Possessor

A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees ² by a condition on the land if, but only if, he (a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and

(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger. (emphasis added).

It is clear from this section, and the comments thereto, that liability depends not simply on the status of the injured party (e. g., "licensee" v. "invitee"), but on many variables. Major variables include the purposes of the invitation, ³ the obviousness of the danger, ⁴ the likelihood that the invitee will realize the danger and will take steps to protect himself, ⁵ the nature of the land and the purposes for which it is used. ⁶

The case of Palenscar v. Michael J. Bobb, Inc., 439 Pa. 101, 266 A.2d 478 (1970), applied section 343 to a factual matrix strikingly similar to that presented here. In Palenscar, defendant, leasee/possessor of a warehouse, contracted with plaintiff and his father, electricians, to locate and repair a short in their electrical system. Defendant had informed plaintiff's father that the entire electrical system was obsolete and should be replaced, but that, as the warehouse was scheduled for condemnation, they had no intention of refurbishing or replacing the entire system.

Plaintiff located what he believed to be the source of the short, a circuit breaker, and, while attempting to remove a cover from the box enclosing the breaker, the damaged wires within the box caused an explosion, and plaintiff was severely burned. A jury returned a verdict of $51,000.00 in favor of plaintiff but a court en banc granted defendant's motion for judgment n. o. v.

On appeal, this Court affirmed. We stated section 343 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, "has been cited numerous times by this Court as support for the proposition that 'the law of Pennsylvania does not impose liability if it is reasonable for the possessor to believe that the dangerous condition would be obvious to and discovered by his invitee.' " Id. at 105, 266 A.2d at 480. (cits. omitted). We further stated:

It is perfectly clear under Section 343(b), as quoted above, that (defendant) would have no duty to warn an invitee, such as (plaintiff) of a danger which was more obvious to and more likely to be discovered by (plaintiff) than by any employee of (defendant). Repyneck v. Tarantino, 415 Pa. 92, 95, 202 A.2d 105, 107 (1964). Contrary to the terms of this section of the Restatement, it was the expectation and the intention of both the possessor and the invitee in the case at bar that the electricians would "discover or realize the danger," and, accordingly, "protect themselves against it." That is precisely why they were hired.

It would be unjust to find that (defendant) should have repaired the system, and yet hold the company liable to one who had been employed to do exactly that. See Engle v. Reider, 366 Pa. 411, 77 A.2d 621 (1951). (emphasis added)

Id. at 106-07, 266 A.2d at 480-81. See also Brletich v. United States Steel Corporation, 445 Pa. 525, 285 A.2d 133 (1971).

In the instant case, the variables all point to the same conclusion there was no duty on the...