Atkinson v. Denton Pub. Co.

• Decision Date: 15 May 1996
• Docket Number: No. 94-40302,94-40302
• Citation: 84 F.3d 144
• Parties: 70 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1352 Franklin ATKINSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DENTON PUBLISHING COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 144

84 F.3d 144

70 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1352

Franklin ATKINSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DENTON PUBLISHING COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 94-40302.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

May 15, 1996.

Rehearing Denied June 6, 1996.

David Stanley Jones, Steven H. Phelps, Dallas, TX, for Appellant.

J. Shelby Sharpe, Sharpe & Spurlock, Ft. Worth, TX, for Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.

Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, DeMOSS and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

DeMOSS, Circuit Judge:

For 21 years Franklin Atkinson was the circulation manager for the Denton Record-Chronicle, a paper owned by Denton Publishing Company. On December 30, 1991, at age 58, Atkinson was terminated. Atkinson filed this lawsuit, claiming that he was unlawfully discharged in that (1) he was discharged because of his age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623, (2) his discharge breached a written employment contract, (3) the Paper's actions rose to the level of intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (4) he was terminated because he refused to commit an illegal act. The district court issued an order granting Denton Publishing's motion for summary judgment as to each of Atkinson's claims, and denying Atkinson's cross-motion for summary judgment. Atkinson appeals the district court's disposition of his age discrimination, breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, arguing that summary judgment was inappropriate because genuine issues of material fact exist as to each of those claims. ¹ Atkinson also appeals several rulings made by the district court prior to summary judgment, which he claims impermissibly prejudiced his ability to present probative summary judgment evidence. We first address the propriety of the district court's procedural rulings.

PROCEDURAL RULINGS

Atkinson argues that the district court abused its discretion by (1) refusing to allow Atkinson to propound interrogatories in excess of those allowed by the court's local rules; (2) refusing to compel production of personnel files for many of Denton Publishing's past and present employees; and (3) refusing to allow Atkinson additional time to obtain his expert's report. Atkinson further maintains that the district court abused its discretion by (1) relying upon incompetent summary judgment evidence, and (2) by quashing Atkinson's amended motion for summary judgement. The district court's disposition of these contested discovery and procedural matters is reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. McKethan v. Texas Farm Bureau, 996 F.2d 734, 738 (5th Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 694, 126 L.Ed.2d 661 (1994); Mayo v. Tri-Bell Indus., Inc., 787 F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir.1986) (discovery rulings are reversed only if they are "arbitrary or clearly unreasonable"). After careful consideration of the complete record, we find no abuse of the considerable discretion afforded the district court as to these matters. Only two of the issues raised merit further discussion.

1. Interrogatories

Atkinson initially filed this suit in the Northern District of Texas because he believed both parties were residents of Tarrant County. Because both parties were in fact residents of Denton County, the district court sua sponte transferred the case to the Eastern District of Texas. Once assigned to the Eastern District, the case was placed on Track 3 pursuant to the Eastern District's Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan. ² Track 3 allows 15 interrogatories, in addition to the mandatory disclosures required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Atkinson moved to expand the allowed number of interrogatories from 15 to 31 in order to accommodate two sets of interrogatories served on the defendant with his complaint while the case was still pending in the Northern District of Texas. The district court denied his motion.

On appeal, Atkinson claims that Denton Publishing's responses to the required interrogatories was with reference to the mandatory disclosure requirements, such that he received no additional benefit from the defendant's limited responses. In addition, Atkinson claims that the district court abused its discretion by not requiring Denton Publishing to answer the remaining interrogatories, which addressed issues central to Denton Publishing's defenses and would have helped Atkinson develop competent summary judgment evidence.

Denton Publishing answered Atkinson's first set of interrogatories with 18 responses. The 18 responses included a total of 36 subparts. Only seven of those responses are framed with any reference to the information disclosed as part of the mandatory discovery requirements. Atkinson did not complain that the district court lacked authority to limit discovery, or that Denton Publishing had failed to comply with the requirement for 15 responses. Instead, Atkinson argued solely that Denton Publishing should be compelled to respond to the remaining interrogatories. Atkinson did not explain why additional interrogatories were necessary, beyond stating that the information related to Denton Publishing's defenses in some unspecified way. Moreover, the text of the propounded but refused interrogatories does not appear in the record.

Given the scope of Denton Publishing's multiple-part responses, and the absence of a compelling reason to expand discovery, it was not an abuse of the district court's discretion to deny Atkinson's motion to expand the number of allowed interrogatories.

2. Personnel Files

Atkinson also moved to compel production of the Denton Publishing personnel files for 12 designated past or present employees of Denton Publishing, plus personnel files for an additional 47 former employees who were voluntarily or involuntarily separated from the company at the age of 40 or older. The district court ordered production of the requested personnel files for in camera inspection. After examining many of the requested files, the court ordered production of one file in its entirety and excerpts from a second file.

Atkinson argues generally that the files had the potential for establishing a pattern and practice of age discrimination, which would be admissible circumstantial evidence of discrimination. But Atkinson's complaint alleges that he was terminated because his general manager, who valued his performance, was replaced by Bill Patterson, a younger man who discriminated against Atkinson and other employees on the basis of age. Many of the personnel files requested related to employees who left Denton Publishing long before Bill Patterson became general manager. In light of the district court's in camera review, and the lack of any nexus between Atkinson's complaint and the employees terminated prior to Bill Patterson's promotion, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Atkinson's motion to compel production of the remaining files.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This Court reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 956 (5th Cir.1993). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). There is no genuine issue of material fact if the evidence is such that, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant, Atkinson, a reasonable jury could not return a verdict in his favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-51, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-11, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

1. Age Discrimination Claim

In reviewing summary judgment, this Court must decide whether Atkinson produced facts which, if believed, would lead a reasonable jury to conclude that it was more likely than not that Denton Publishing terminated Atkinson because of his age. Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 994 (5th Cir.1996) (en banc); Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 958 n. 8 (5th Cir.1993). To conduct that review, we have historically employed the familiar McDonnell Douglas framework. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801-03, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); but see O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., --- U.S. ----, ----, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 1309, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996) (leaving open the question of whether McDonnell Douglas applies in ADEA cases).

Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff bears the initial burden to demonstrate a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence. Rhodes, 75 F.3d at 992. Once established, the prima facie case serves to create a rebuttable presumption of unlawful discrimination. Id. at 993. The employer can rebut that presumption with evidence that, if believed by the trier of fact, would support a finding that unlawful discrimination did not motivate the employer's action. Id. At that point, a plaintiff can avoid summary judgment if:

the evidence taken as a whole (1) creates a fact issue as to whether each of the employer's stated reasons was what actually motivated the employer and (2) creates a reasonable inference that age was a determinative factor in the actions of which plaintiff complains. The employer, of course, will be entitled to summary judgment if the evidence taken as a whole would not allow a jury to infer that the actual reason for the discharge was discriminatory.

Id. at 994.

The district court concluded and it is not seriously disputed that Atkinson demonstrated a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination: (1) he was discharged; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) at age 58, he was within the protected class; and (4) he was replaced by someone outside of the protected class--a 38-year-old worker. Denton Publishing effectively rebutted the presumption of discrimination with evidence that Atkinson was terminated for insubordination after he refused to accept a transfer to the...