Atkinson v. Middlesex Cnty.
| Decision Date | 18 June 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 09-4863 (FLW) |
| Parties | JORDAN ATKINSON, Plaintiff, v. MIDDLESEX COUNTY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
*NOT FOR PUBLICATION*
In November 2013, this Court entered an Order denying Plaintiff Jordan Atkinson's ("Plaintiff") 1) motion to reopen the instant matter, which was filed approximately two years after this case was closed, and 2) motion to amend the First Amended Complaint ("November Order"). The Court found that Plaintiff failed to meet the requirements of reopening a civil matter under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Now, Plaintiff moves for reconsideration of the November Order. Because the issues Plaintiff raises in this motion warrant a full discussion, the Court renders this written Opinion to provide further explanations why Plaintiff's previous request to reopen this suit must be denied, and for the same reasons, Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
Plaintiff, represented by his former attorney, Gerald Gordon, Esq., filed his Initial § 1983 Complaint on September 21, 2009, against defendants Middlesex County, Middlesex County Board of Freeholders, Middlesex County Adult Correction Center andvarious other individual defendants (collectively, "Defendants"). In that Complaint, Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that because of Defendants' failure to act or protect, Plaintiff was sexually assaulted in September 2007 while confined in prison. See Orig. Compl., ¶¶ 20-23. However, because the Complaint was, on its face, woefully deficient, various defendants moved for more definite statement. Those motions were granted by the Magistrate Judge, and as a result, Plaintiff was directed to file a statement setting forth his claims. Thereafter, the Magistrate Judge further directed Plaintiff to file a motion to amend the Complaint, which motion was filed in April 2011. However, rather than oppose Plaintiff's motion to amend, Defendants filed cross-motions to dismiss the proposed Amended Complaint.
On May 31, 2011, this Court granted Defendants' motions to dismiss, explaining that:
in response to Defendants' motions to dismiss, Plaintiff argues that he needs discovery in order for him to sufficiently allege all of the counts; however, at this juncture, discovery is irrelevant as to the sufficiency of pleadings; it appearing that none of the counts identify to which of the varying defendants the count is directed, and the counts only contain vague, one sentence allegations as the entire cause of action; indeed, a majority of the counts contain legal conclusions which fails to comport with the Twombly standard; for example, titled as counts XV-XVIII, Plaintiff simply alleges that he has been "libeled," "slandered," and "held in false light," and furthermore, for counts XXII and XIV, Plaintiff alleges "gross negligence" and "negligence" as the only allegations in those counts; it appearing that clearly, all of the counts are grossly insufficient as pled.
Order dated May 31, 2011 ("Dismissal Order"). Importantly, Plaintiff's claims were dismissed without prejudice and the Court did not provide Plaintiff leave to amend his Complaint. For reasons not relevant here, Plaintiff's relationship with his prior counsel, Mr. Gordon, broke down. By Plaintiff's own account, after the dismissal, Mr. Gordonadvised Plaintiff that Plaintiff had certain period of time to take further action to prosecute his case. In that regard, at that time of dismissal, Plaintiff could have - either on his own behalf or with replacement counsel - 1) moved pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) to amend the judgment; 2) moved for reconsideration of the Court's Order; 3) appealed the Order to the Third Circuit; or 4) moved to reopen the matter pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Unfortunately, Plaintiff did not pursue any of those options; rather, almost two months after the dismissal of his case, Plaintiff submitted a letter asking the Court to "freeze" this matter since he was unsuccessful at finding legal representation.1
On May 20, 2013 - nearly two years after the closure of this case - Plaintiff's new attorney, Paul Linker, Esq., filed a motion to reopen on Plaintiff's behalf and sought to amend the original Complaint pursuant to Rule 15(a). The Court denied that motion on the basis that Plaintiff failed to satisfy Rule 60's requirements. In particular, the Court noted Plaintiff could not move to reopen the matter pursuant to the liberal standard of Rule 15 because Rule 60 governs the reopening of cases, and that Rule only allows a party to seek relief from a final judgment under a limited set of circumstances. The Court found that not only was the filing of Plaintiff's motion untimely under Rule 60(b)(1), (2) and (3), but that Plaintiff's excuses for delaying approximately two years to reopen this case did not meet the extraordinary circumstances standard pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6)'s "catch-all" provision.
After the denial of his motion to reopen, Plaintiff, now, moves for this Court to reconsider its ruling. The gravamen of Plaintiff's argument is that an order dismissing acomplaint without prejudice is not final, and thus, it cannot terminate the case. By Plaintiff's logic, because his Complaint was dismissed in May 2011 without prejudice, Plaintiff may move, pursuant to Rule 15, to amend his Complaint any time after dismissal. Indeed, Plaintiff maintains that not even the passage of a significant period of time can transform a dismissal without prejudice into a final order.
I. Standard of Review
Local Civil Rules 7.1(i) governs a motion for reconsideration. Clark v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 940 F. Supp. 2d 186, 189 (D.N.J. 2013); see L. Civ. R. 7(i). The Rule states that "a motion for reconsideration shall be served and filed within 14 days after the entry of the order or judgment on the original motion by the Judge or Magistrate Judge." L. Civ. R. 7.1(i). A party may seek reconsideration of a court's decision if the party "believes the Judge or Magistrate Judge has overlooked" a "matter or controlling decisions" when it ruled on the motion. Clark, 940 F. Supp. 2d at 189. The word "overlooked" is the operative term in the Rule. Id.
In order to succeed on a motion for reconsideration, the movant has the burden of demonstrating at least one of the following grounds: "(1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available when the court [issued its order]; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice." Max's Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). To succeed under the third prong, "the movant must show that 'dispositive factual matters or controlling decisions of law were brought to the court's attention but not considered.'" D'Argenzio v. Bank of Am. Corp., 877 F. Supp. 2d 202, 207 (D.N.J. 2012).Furthermore, the movant must demonstrate that (1) the holdings on which it bases its request were without support in the record, or (2) would result in "manifest injustice" if not addressed. Leja v. Schmidt Mfg., Inc., 743 F. Supp. 2d 444, 456 (D.N.J. 2010).
In addition, "[a] motion for reconsideration should not provide the parties with an opportunity for a second bite at the apple." Tischio v. Bontex, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 511, 533 (D.N.J. 1998). In other words, Local Rule 7.1(i) "does not permit a Court to rethink its previous decision, rather, the rule permits reconsideration only when 'dispositive factual matters or controlling decisions of law' were presented to the court but were overlooked." Buffa v. N.J. State Dep't of Judiciary, 56 Fed. App'x 571, 575 (3d Cir. 2003); see P. Schoenfeld Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Cendant Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 (D.N.J. 2001) () (citations and quotations omitted); see also CPS MedManagement LLC v. Bergen Reg'l Med. Ctr., L.P., 940 F. Supp. 2d 141, 168 (D.N.J. 2013) ().
Here, Plaintiff submits that this Court "overlooked" the fact that a dismissal without prejudice does not constitute a final order terminating a case. Thus, Plaintiff reasons, Rule 60 should not have governed the reopening of this matter. In support of his position, Plaintiff cites various Third Circuit precedents that stand for the legal proposition that dismissal without prejudice is not a final order for the purposes of appeal. See, e.g., WRS, Inc. v. Plaza Entm't, Inc., 402 F.3d 424 (3d Cir. 2005).Plaintiff's argument in this context is not without some support. This Court has conducted a lengthy review of the case law on this issue and found that circuit courts across the country have affirmatively found that "the dismissal of an action - whether with or without prejudice - is final." Ciralsky v. Central Intelligence Agency, 355 F.3d 661, 666 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see Rinieri v. News Syndicate Co., 385 F.2d 818, 821 (2d Cir. 1967); Mirpuri v. ACT Mfg., 212 F.3d 624, 629 (1st Cir. 2000); De Tie v. Orange County, 152 F.3d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 1998); Trippe Mfg. Co. v. Am. Power Conversion Corp., 46 F.3d 624, 626 (7th Cir. 1995); Justice v. United States, 6 F.3d 1474, 1481 (11th Cir. 1993); Quartana v. Utterback, 789 F.2d 1297, 1300 (8th Cir. 1986).
The Third Circuit, however, has not directly addressed the issue whether a dismissal without prejudice is final for the purposes of terminating a case. In the appeals context, the Third Circuit has explained that "dismissals without prejudice have been held to be final and appealable if they end the suit so far as the...
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