Atlanta Falcons Football Club LLC v. Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n

• Citation: 906 F.Supp.2d 1278
• Decision Date: 05 November 2012
• Docket Number: Civil Action File No. 1:12–CV–753–TWT.
• Parties: The ATLANTA FALCONS FOOTBALL CLUB LLC, et al., Plaintiffs, v. The NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

906 F.Supp.2d 1278

The ATLANTA FALCONS FOOTBALL CLUB LLC, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.The NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action File No. 1:12–CV–753–TWT.

United States District Court,

N.D. Georgia,

Atlanta Division.

Nov. 5, 2012.

L. Rachel Lerman, Rex S. Heinke, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, Los Angeles, CA, Daniel L. Nash, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, Washington, DC, Darrick L. McDuffie, Sidney Stewart Haskins, II, King & Spalding, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiffs.

Adam J. Kaiser, David G. Feher, Jeffrey L. Kessler, Jeffrey H. Newhouse, Winston & Strawn, New York, NY, Cheryl L. Haas–Goldstein, Sutherland Asbill & Brennan, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants.

ORDER

THOMAS W. THRASH, JR., District Judge.

This is an action to confirm an arbitration award. It is before the Court on the Plaintiffs' Motion to Confirm the Arbitration Award [Doc. 27] and the Defendants' Motion to Vacate the Arbitration Award [Doc. 16]. For the reasons set forth below, the Plaintiffs' Motion to Confirm the Arbitration Award [Doc. 27] is GRANTED and the Defendants' Motion to Vacate the Arbitration Award [Doc. 16] is DENIED.

I. Background

This dispute began when the Defendant former professional football players Roderick Coleman, Wilrey Fontenot, Tony Gilbert, Kindal Moorehead, Stanley Pritchett, Karon Riley, Brett Romberg, Jason Webster, and Dez White (the “Players”) filed for workers' compensation benefits in California. The Plaintiffs, the Atlanta Falcons Football Club LLC and the National Football League Management Council (“NFLMC”), alleged the Defendants' filings in California violated the Players' contracts which were made under the collective bargaining agreement between the NFLMC and the Defendant National Football League Players' Association (“NFLPA”). Pursuant to the bargaining agreement, the Plaintiffs initiated binding arbitration.

In the arbitration award, the arbitrator first listed the workers' compensation provisions of each Players' contract. (Compl. Ex. B, the “Award,” at 3). Player Coleman's contract had a clause which stated:

Player and Club acknowledge and agree that the exclusive jurisdiction for resolving injury related claims shall be the Division of Workers' Compensation of Georgia, and in the case of Workers' Compensation claims, the Georgia Workers' Compensation Act shall govern, regardless of the location or situs of injury giving rise to the dispute.

( Id.) Players Fontenot, Gilbert, and Romberg held contracts stating that disputes:

shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the state in which [the] Club is located, including without limitation, workers' compensation disputes. Jurisdiction of all workers' compensation claims and other matters related to workers' compensation, ... and including all issues of law, issue [sic] of fact and matters related to workers' compensation benefits, shall be exclusivelydetermined by and exclusively decided in accordance with the internal laws of the state in which [the] Club is located, including, without limitation, its labor code and workers' compensation laws, without resort to choice of law rules, regardless of the location or situs of the injury giving rise to the dispute.

(Award, at 4). Likewise, Players White, Riley, Webster, and Pritchett's contracts stated that “the exclusive jurisdiction for resolving injury related claims shall by [sic] the Division of Workers' Compensation of Georgia, and in the case of Workers' Compensation claims the Georgia Workers' Compensation Act shall govern.” (Award, at 4–5). Each of the Players was employed by the Falcons for varying periods from 2002 to 2010. (Compl. ¶¶ 7–15). The Falcons are based in Georgia, play their home games in Georgia, and conduct practices in Georgia. During the Players' employment, the Falcons played four of their 186 professional football games in California.¹ The Players argue their injuries are cumulative and were sustained in part from their games in California. ( See Compl. ¶¶ 20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, 32, 34, & 36).

The arbitrator concluded, after reviewing prior National Football League arbitration awards to determine the “law of the shop,” that the NFLMC was entitled to enforce the choice of law and choice of forum provisions contained in the individual contracts. (Award, 7–12). The Award accordingly ordered the Players to cease and desist from bringing their claims under the California workers' compensation regime. ( Id. at 12). The arbitrator did not review state or federal public policy in issuing the Award; he only enforced the agreements as written. ( Id. at 11). The Plaintiffs seek to confirm the Award, while the Defendants argue the Award violates state and federal public policy.

II. Motion to Vacate Standard

“An arbitration award pursuant to an arbitration provision in a collective bargaining agreement is treated as a contractual obligation that can be enforced through a § 301 [Labor Management Relations Act] lawsuit.” United Steel v. Wise Alloys, LLC, 642 F.3d 1344, 1349 (11th Cir.2011) (citing Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 451, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957)). “When faced with a motion to vacate under § 301, ‘[a] court may not vacate an arbitral award unless it is irrational, exceeds the scope of the arbitrator's authority, or fails to draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.’ ” Wise, 642 F.3d at 1352–53 (quoting IMC–Agrico Co. v. Int'l Chem. Workers Council of the United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 171 F.3d 1322, 1325 (11th Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). A court may also refuse to confirm an arbitral award that violates public policy. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Asso., 861 F.2d 665, 670 (11th Cir.1988). However, the Court's refusal to enforce such an award must be based on “some explicit public policy that is well-defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.” Id. (quoting United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The party seeking to vacate an arbitration award bears the burden of setting forth sufficient grounds to support the vacatur. O.R. Securities, Inc. v. Professional Planning Assoc., 857 F.2d 742, 748 (11th Cir.1988).

III. Discussion

Preliminarily, the Plaintiffs contend that the Defendants are time-barred from seeking to vacate the arbitration award because they did not seek to vacate the award within the three-month window set forth in United Steel v. Wise Alloys, LLC, 642 F.3d 1344, 1352 (11th Cir.2011). The Award was issued on February 23, 2012, and the Defendants did not seek to vacate the Award until June 6, 2012, when they filed their answer and a motion to vacate. However, on April 13, 2012, this Court issued an order granting an extension of time to the Defendants “within which to answer or otherwise respond” to the Plaintiffs' complaint. See Order Granting Motion for Extension of Time [Doc. 5]. The Defendants filed their answer and motion to vacate pursuant to this extension. The Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants' motion was nevertheless untimely because the decisions in Wise and its predecessors contemplate untimely motions to vacate contained within otherwise timely responses. See Wise, 642 F.3d at 1354–55. Given the common practice of attaching motions to vacate with initial responses, the Court concludes that the Order granting an extension also applied to the motion to vacate. The Defendants' motion to vacate will not be dismissed as untimely.

As noted, a court may only vacate an arbitral award based on public policy if the award runs contrary to “some explicit public policy that is well-defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.” Delta Air Lines, 861 F.2d at 670 (quoting Misco, 484 U.S. at 43, 108 S.Ct. 364 (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Defendants argue that the Award here violates Georgia, national, California, and federal labor public policy, as well as the Full Faith and Credit Clause.² The Plaintiffs argue that California public policy is irrelevant, and that Georgia, national, California, and federal labor public policy are not offended by the Award. These arguments will be addressed in turn.

A. Georgia Public Policy

The Defendants contend that the Award violates Georgia public policy. Specifically, the Defendants identify two Georgia statutes among the Georgia workers' compensation regime that prevent the contractual waiver of coverage and contemplate stacking the awards of other states. SeeO.C.G.A. §§ 34–9–10 & 34–9–242. These two statutes, however, do not describe an “explicit, well-defined, and dominant” public policy against confirming this Award. Section 34–9–10 states that “[n]o contract or agreement, written, oral, or implied, nor any rule, regulation, or other device shall in any manner operate to relieve any employer in whole or in part from any obligation created by this chapter except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter.” O.C.G.A. § 34–9–10. Here, the Award in no way relieves the employer—the Falcons—of obligations created by the Georgia workers' compensation law. Indeed, the Award makes it more likely the Players will seek benefits in Georgia. Likewise, O.C.G.A. § 34–9–242 provides that “[i]f an employee shall receive compensation or damages under the laws of any other state, nothing contained in this Code section shall be construed so as to permit a total compensation for the same injury greater than is provided for in this chapter.” O.C.G.A. § 34–9–242. Again, there is no indication that the Award will allow the Players to receive more than the total compensation provided for in the chapter. Indeed, limiting the Players...