Atlanta Life Ins. Co. v. Ash
Decision Date | 01 March 1934 |
Docket Number | 6 Div. 521. |
Citation | 228 Ala. 184,153 So. 261 |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Parties | ATLANTA LIFE INS. CO. v. ASH. |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; R. B. Carr, Judge.
Action by Mason Price Ash against the Atlanta Life Insurance Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Transferred from Court of Appeals.
Affirmed.
It is within the discretion of the court whether or not to admit further evidence after the testimony has been closed.
Counts 3 and 4 of the complaint are as follows
This charge was refused to defendant: "(12) The court charges you, gentlemen of the jury, that the defendant, the Atlanta Life Insurance Company, would not be liable for the acts of its agent N. S. Thompson unless you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence that he was acting for the defendant company at the time he received the checks in question or that the defendant later ratified his acts."
L. H. Etheridge, of Bessemer, for appellant.
Robert J. Wheeler, of Birmingham, for appellee.
Suit by plaintiff against the defendant to recover damages for two alleged fraudulent acts, perpetrated by an agent of defendant, against the plaintiff, in the collection of premiums upon an insurance policy issued by defendant upon the life of plaintiff's brother.
When the suit was first filed, the complaint consisted of two counts. Thereafter, on the day set for the trial of the cause, the plaintiff, by leave of the court, amended her complaint by adding two additional counts numbered 3 and 4. These counts, added by way of amendment, appear in the report of the case.
There was a demurrer to each of the counts of the complaint, but the judgment entry discloses that the court made no order thereon, and the judgment recites: "Defendant files pleas 1, 2 and 3; attorneys in open court agree to plead in short by consent."
The case was tried upon the theory that the defendant had pleaded the general issue, and an election on the part of plaintiff to hold the agent, Nedric Thompson, not the principal, the Atlanta Life Insurance Company, liable to her for the wrongs complained of.
The evidence on the part of the plaintiff tended to prove each and every material allegation of the complaint, and that she had not elected to look to the agent for repayment of the amount due her, and had not renounced any remedy she may have had against the Atlanta Life Insurance Company, for and on account of the fraud of its agent.
On the part of the defendant, there was evidence tending to show that the defendant's agent, Nedric Thompson, practiced no fraud or deceit upon the plaintiff; that while he did get from her, on the dates set out in counts 3 and 4, a check for $140, and a check for $200 drawn on the First National Bank of Birmingham, Ala., which were afterwards paid to him by said bank, the transactions represented, in truth and fact, two loans made by the plaintiff to said Thompson. There was also testimony offered by the defendant tending to show that, after this suit was brought, the plaintiff and her attorney, duly authorized, entered into negotiations for the repayment of the money by the said agent, and that the said Thompson had actually repaid to the plaintiff, or to her attorney, $15, for which plaintiff executed to Thompson a receipt, and had also paid to the plaintiff's attorney $10 on his fee. That he also executed his note to the plaintiff for the sum of $300, payable in the monthly sum of $20 until paid in full.
The testimony on the part of the plaintiff tended to show that she specifically informed her attorney that she would not settle her case against the defendant until she was paid in full. That plaintiff did not authorize the taking of the note, and has never ratified the act. In other words, the question of an election was, under the pleading and the evidence in the case, one for the jury, assuming that, in a case like the present, such a plea would present a defense to the action-a question we are not now called upon to decide, as the parties treated the plea as presenting a defense, if it was proven.
Let it be here understood, however, that this action is to recover damages for a tort committed, so it is charged, by the defendant's agent against the plaintiff. It must not be taken for granted that, in anything said above, we commit ourselves to the proposition that the principle of an election applies, nor do we commit ourselves to the proposition that the plaintiff, in...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Wilkey v. State ex rel. Smith, 6 Div. 603.
... ... 472; ... Haley v. Western Transit Co., 76 Wis. 344, 45 N.W ... 16; Smith v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 49 Wis. 322, 5 ... N.W. 804; Cohen v. Hurwitz, Sup., 127 N.Y.S. 341; ... Fletcher v. London ... discretion of the trial court. In Atlanta Life Ins. Co ... v. Canady, 225 Ala. 377, 143 So. 561, it was held that ... opening statements ... ...
-
Foster & Creighton Co. v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co.
...argument as set out in the cases: Wilkey v. State ex rel. Smith, 238 Ala. 595, 192 So. 588, 129 A.L.R. 549; Atlanta Life Insurance Co. v. Ash, 228 Ala. 184, 153 So. 261; Birmingham News Co. v. Payne, 230 Ala. 524, 162 So. 116; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Calvin, 227 Ala. 146, 148 So. Appellant a......
-
Daniels v. State
... ... (Brown v. Leek, 221 Ala. 319, 128 So. 608; ... Atlanta Life Ins. Co. v. Canady, 225 Ala. 377, 143 ... So. 561), unless it is manifest that such proof ... ...
-
State v. Alabama Public Service Commission
...has been closed. James v. Tait, 8 Port. 476; Patterson v. Alabama Fuel & Iron Co., 194 Ala. 278, 69 So. 952; Atlanta Life Ins. Co. v. Ash, 228 Ala. 184, 153 So. 261; Bundy v. Echols, 239 Ala. 421, 195 So. To have reopened the hearings would have involved the initiation of an entirely new ra......