Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. South Carolina Public Service Commission
Decision Date | 13 January 1965 |
Docket Number | No. 18293,18293 |
Citation | 245 S.C. 229,139 S.E.2d 911 |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant, v. SOUTH CAROLINA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent. |
McKay, McKay, Black & Walker, Columbia, Phil C. Beverly, David E. Wells, Jacksonville, Fla., for appellant.
Daniel R. McLeod, Atty. Gen., Harry M. Lightsey, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Columbia, George E. Campsen, Jr., Charleston, for respondent.
This is an appeal from an Order of the Honorable John Grimball affirming the actions of the South Carolina Public Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission) in granting to the applicant, Dangerous Materials Disposal Co., Inc., of Charleston, South Carolina, a Class E Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity to transport by motor vehicle radioactive materials in intrastate commerce.
Application was made to the Commission on February 20, 1962. After two hearings thereon, the Commission on June 28, 1962, issued its Order granting the requested Certificate to applicant. Several motor carriers and the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, Appellant herein, appeared in protest. Petition for reconsideration was denied by the Commission's Order, July 25, 1962.
On August 16, 1962, a rule to show cause with summons and complaint, later amended, was served seeking to set aside the Commission's Order. Returns were duly filed by the Commission and the issues joined. After Judge Grimball issued his Order affirming the Commission, notice of intention to appeal to this Court was filed.
Appellant contends that the Motor Carrier Certification Law contained in Section 58-1401 et seq., is unconstitutional in that said Statutes are alleged to be an invalid delegation of legislative power since they do not outline specific elements of proof or standards for the Commission to follow in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
Legislative enactments are presumed to be constitutional, and the Courts should not declare such Acts unconstitutional unless its invalidity appears so clearly as to leave no room for reasonable doubt that it violates some provision of the Constitution. Cox v. Bates, 237 S.C. 198, 116 S.E.2d 828; McElveen v. Stokes, 240 S.C. 1, 124 S.E.2d 592; Ellison v. Cass, 241 S.C. 96, 127 S.E.2d 206.
It must be conceded that the State, through the exercise of its legislative or administrative function, has the power to limit, control and regulate the use of highways and streets in the exercise of its police power whenever and to the extent necessary to provide for and promote the public health, safety, morals or general welfare. 25 Am.Jur. Highways, Sec. 253, p. 544; 40 C.J.S. Highways § 232, p. 240.
The question of the constitutionality of Act No. 170 of the Acts of April 8, 1925, 34 St. at L. 252, incorporated in Chapter 13 of Title 58 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1962, together with certain amendments, has not heretofore been passed upon by this Court; however, in State ex rel. Coney v. Hicklin, 168 S.C. 440, 167 S.E. 674, the Act, together with certain amendments thereto, was challenged with respect to the various classifications, and certain exemptions thereto, the right of the Commission to regulate rates and charge for license fees. The Court, in upholding the Statutes, notes that neither the due process nor the equal protection clauses of the Constitution were violated.
Appellant strongly relies upon South Carolina State Highway Department v. Harbin, et al., 226 S.C. 585, 86 S.E.2d 466, wherein this Court held that legislation authorizing the Highway Department to suspend or revoke a driver's license 'for cause satisfactory,' was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Reference to the Harbin case reveals that in arriving at its decision the Court used the following language:
'The question of delegation of legislative tive power has confronted the courts with many perplexing problems, particularly during recent years when the complexities of government have been constantly on the increase. It is well settled that while the legislature may not delegate its power to make laws, in enacting a law complete in itself, it may authorize an administrative agency or board 'to fill up the details' by prescribing rules and regulations for the complete operation and enforcement of the law within its expressed general purpose. Davis v. Query, 209 S.E. 41, 39 S.E.2d 117; State v. Taylor, 223 S.C. 526, 77 S.E.2d 195, and cases therein cited. 'However, it is necessary that the statute declare a legislative policy, establish primary standards for carrying it out, or lay down an intelligible principle to which the administrative officer or body must conform, with a proper regard for the protection of the public interests and with such degree of certainty as the nature of the case permits, and enjoin a procedure under which, by appeal or otherwise, both public interests and private rights shall have due consideration.' State v. Stoddard, 126 Conn. 623, 13 A.2d 586, 588.
In Cole v. Manning, 240 S.C. 260, 125 S.E.2d 621, we find: '* * * 'it is apparent, from consideration of the numerous cases on the subject, that the degree of authority that may lawfully be delegated to an administrative agency must in large measure depend upon such circumstances, including the legislative policy as declared in the statute, the objective to be accomplished, and the nature of the agency's filed of operation.
"It is well settled that it is not always necessary that statutes and ordinances prescribe a specific rule of action. On the other hand, some situations require the vesting of some discretion in public officials, as, for instance, where it is difficult or impracticable to lay down a definite, comprehensive rule or the discretion relates to the administration of a police regulation and is necessary to protect the public morals, health, safety and general welfare.' 11 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, Section 234, at page 948.'
In 2 Am.Jur. (2d), Administrative Law, Sections 191 and 192, pp. 22 and 23, it is said that Hodge v. Pollock, 223 S.C. 342, 75 S.E.2d 752.
In the Harbin case, supra, 226 S.C. 585, 86 S.E.2d 466, the legislation provided that the Highway Department exercise its discretionary power 'for cause satisfactory' whereas...
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