Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. United States, Civ. A. No. 1811.

• Decision Date: 18 April 1962
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 1811.
• Citation: 205 F. Supp. 360
• Parties: ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES of America et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia

205 F. Supp. 360

ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES of America et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 1811.

United States District Court M. D. Georgia, Macon Division.

April 18, 1962.

Albert B. Russ, Jr., Jacksonville, Fla., for Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.

C. E. Martin, Atlanta, Ga., for Georgia R. Co.

C. Baxter Jones, Macon, Ga., Homer S. Carpenter, Washington, D. C., for Harlan County Coal Operators Assn.

Leonard S. Goodman, Interstate Commerce Commission, Washington, D. C., for Interstate Commerce Commission.

Truett Smith, Asst. U. S. Atty., Macon, Ga., for United States.

Charles J. Bloch, Macon, Ga., Henry J. Karison, Washington, D. C., R. Granville Curry, Washington, D. C., for Southern Ry. Co. and Georgia Southern & Florida Ry. Co.

Before BELL, Circuit Judge, and BOOTLE and MORGAN, District Judges.

GRIFFIN B. BELL, Circuit Judge.

This is an action brought under 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1336, 1398, and 2321-2325 by plaintiffs, Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, and Georgia Rail Road & Banking Company, operated as Georgia Railroad by its lessees, Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company and Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company against the United States to annul and set aside a report and order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, entered on May 19, 1961, in the proceeding entitled Routing, Coal from Origins on Louisville & N. R., 313 I.C.C. 752, and an order of September 13, 1961 denying a petition for reconsideration.¹

The report and order found certain tariffs or schedules of the Southern Railway Company and its subsidiary, Georgia Southern and Florida Railway Company, to be reasonable, just and consistent with the public interest. These tariffs cancelled through routes embracing the Georgia Railroad and the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, as intermediate carriers between Atlanta and Macon or Cordele, Georgia, thereby eliminating them from participation in the lowest competitive joint rates on coal moving from origin mines on the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company to certain stations on Southern's subsidiary, the Georgia Southern and Florida Railway Company. This report and order was entered on further hearing after the remand order of this Court in Southern Railway Co. v. United States, D.C., 167 F.Supp. 747 which concerned the report and order of the Commission dated March 19, 1957, in the titled proceeding. 300 I.C.C. 125. The Commission proceeding was under Investigation and Suspension Docket No. 6538. The hearing there and the report and order here also embraces Suspension Docket No. 33128 of the Commission.

Following the remand order plaintiffs successfully sought to reopen the proceeding for further hearing. The Commission also vacated its previous order requiring Southern to cancel its tariff or schedule restrictions closing the Georgia Railroad and Coast Line routes. The order was continued in effect as to the through route of the Central of Georgia Railway Company with the result that Southern was not permitted to file schedules cancelling it. The original controversy was thereby narrowed to the cancellation of only two through routes when Southern filed new schedules eliminating these routes of the Georgia and Coast Line. Plaintiffs protested the schedules and requested their suspension pending the hearing in the reopened proceeding. The Commission declined to suspend, but entered an order of investigation. Docket No. 33128, supra. The schedules became effective as published.

The Examiner, after hearing, found the schedules cancelling these routes to be just and reasonable and not otherwise unlawful, and the Commission by its Division 2 then entered the report and order which is the subject matter of this proceeding.

This court stated in its prior decision:

"For many years there has been in effect a joint rate on coal originating on the lines of the L. & N. and N. C. & St. L. hereinafter sometimes collectively called L. & N. and the several roads covering the following four routes:

"(1) Louisville & Nashville to Atlanta; Southern to Macon; Georgia Southern to destination.

"(2) Louisville & Nashville to Atlanta; Georgia Railroad to Macon; Georgia Southern to destination.

"(3) Louisville & Nashville to Atlanta; Central of Georgia to Macon; Georgia Southern to destination.

"(4) Louisville & Nashville to Atlanta; Atlantic Coast Line to Cordele; Georgia Southern to destination.

"The Georgia Southern is a subsidiary of the Southern Railway Company and is operated as an integral part of the Southern system. Thus, in each of the above routes, final delivery is made by the Southern.

"The Commission made findings to the effect that, from the common gateway, Atlanta, the distances to Warner Robins, Georgia, called by the Commission in its brief here, `a representative destination' are for the several numbered routes: (1) 104 miles; (2) 219 miles; (3) 119 miles; (4) 220 miles. Each of them requires an interchange of cars at Atlanta, and each of them, except No. (1), requires a second interchange at Macon in routes (2) and (3), and at Cordele in route (4). In the case of No. (4), Coast Line from Atlanta and Georgia Southern to Warner Robins, there is a back-haul of approximately 48 miles."

This prior decision resulted from a review of a finding by the Commission that the cancellation of the bridge routes would not be consistent with the public interest on the routes designated as (2), (3), and (4) in that they were not unduly circuitous, because shipper testimony favored their continuance, and because the needs of commerce generally and of the national defense required their maintenance. This order was set aside and the case remanded with the observation that Southern had carried the initial burden of proving that the cancellation of routes (2) and (4) was just and reasonable and consistent with the public interest in view of the extent of circuity involved considered in the light of resulting economic loss.

The remand was for the stated reason that there were no basic findings by the Commission by which countervailing considerations which might counteract the prima facie case made by Southern might be measured. The court noted that among other considerations which might properly be weighed for this purpose were the need for competing lines in the particular coal traffic involved, the need for interchanges between the carriers involved for continued efficient transportation of this traffic or in general, the effect on such interchange and on the economic position of the other carriers of the elimination of these joint routes for coal, and the effect of such elimination on the carriers concerned in relation to their ability to furnish adequate service if and when needed for national defense.²

The substantial and controlling question now before us is whether the decision of the Commission that cancellation of the routes in issue is just, reasonable, consistent with the public interest; or stated differently, warranted in the law, and supported by adequate findings based on substantial evidence.

We note in the beginning that our function is exhausted if we find a rational basis for the conclusions of the Commission. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States, 1934, 292 U.S. 282, 54 S.Ct. 692, 78 L.Ed. 1260. We may not substitute our view concerning what should be done for the judgment of the Commission if that judgment has support in the record and the applicable law. United States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, Inc., 1946, 327 U.S. 515, 536, 66 S.Ct. 687, 90 L.Ed. 821. As this court stated in the prior litigation:

"* * * Undoubtedly the Interstate Commerce Act charges the Commission with the

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