Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp., 84-CV-1040.

• Decision Date: 15 May 1986
• Docket Number: No. 84-CV-1040.,84-CV-1040.
• Citation: 635 F. Supp. 284
• Parties: ATLANTIC STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION, Plaintiff, v. AL TECH SPECIALTY STEEL CORPORATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

635 F. Supp. 284

ATLANTIC STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION, Plaintiff, v. AL TECH SPECIALTY STEEL CORPORATION, Defendant.

No. 84-CV-1040.

United States District Court, N.D. New York.

May 15, 1986.

Allen, Lippes & Shonn, Buffalo, N.Y. (Richard J. Lippes, of counsel) and Davoli, McMahon & Kublick, Syracuse, N.Y. (Jan Kublick, of counsel), for plaintiff.

Harris, Beach, Wilcox, Rubin & Levey, Rochester, N.Y. (Paul R. Braunsdorf, of counsel), for defendant.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

McCURN, District Judge.

On July 30, 1984, plaintiff Atlantic States Legal Foundation filed a citizen suit against defendant Al Tech Specialty Steel Corporation alleging numerous violations of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251, et seq. (Clean Water Act), that occurred between July of 1977 and May of 1983. Currently pending before the court are cross-motions for summary judgment. The plaintiff is seeking judgment only as to liability and requests that, should judgment be entered in its favor, a hearing be held on appropriate relief. The court has jurisdiction of the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Defendant Al Tech operates a steel products manufacturing facility in Watervliet, New York, and at the times in question, was discharging pollutants into the Kromma Kill, a small creek that flows into the Hudson River, pursuant to a water-based permit that was issued to it by the Environmental Protection Agency. Plaintiff Atlantic States contends that the defendant was discharging pollutants into the Kromma Kill at levels in excess of that permitted by the permit under which it was operating. The defendant does not unequivocally deny this contention. As stated on Page 3 of the Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment:

As with many businesses trying to use state-of-the-art equipment needed to comply with the permit requirements, Al Tech had difficulty meeting its permit standards. In the late 1970's and early 1980's, Al Tech had instances in which its level of pollutants exceeded the standards set by its permits.

Because the plaintiff became aware that the defendant was exceeding its permit limitations through reports that the defendant itself was required to submit to the E.P.A., it is difficult, if not impossible, for the defendant to challenge the plaintiff's factual contentions. The defendant does, however, raise a number of legal defenses to the plaintiff's charges, and these will now be addressed in order.

DISCUSSION

33 U.S.C. § 1365, the primary statute upon which this action is based, provides in relevant part:

§ 1365. Citizen Suits

(a) Authorization; jurisdiction

Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf —

(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment of the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or

(B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation, or

(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator.

The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an effluent standard or limitation, or such an order, or to order the Administrator to perform such act or duty, as the case may be, and to apply any appropriate civil penalties under section 1319(d) of this title.

(b) Notice

No action may be commenced —

(1) under subsection (a)(1) of this section —

(A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of the alleged violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State in which the alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the standard, limitation, or order, or....

The defendant initially maintains that citizen suits may only be brought to seek redress for violations that were in existence at the time the complaint was filed, and not for violations that occurred previous to that time. The defendant relies primarily for support on the Fifth Circuit's decision in Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Company, 756 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1985), where the court held, based on its interpretation of the statutory language, that a citizen complaint filed pursuant to the Clean Water Act must allege a violation occurring at the time the complaint is filed. The defendant relies secondarily on dicta in the case of City of Evansville, Indiana v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir.1979).

However, these decisions, and especially Hamker, have not been followed and have been found by several courts to defy logic and reason under the statute. See Sierra Club v. Aluminum Company of America, 585 F.Supp. 842 (N.D.N.Y.1984); Connecticut Fund for the Environment v. The Job Plating Company, Inc., 623 F.Supp. 207 (D.Conn.1985); Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, 611 F.Supp. 1542 (E.D.Va.1985). The court holds that the plaintiff does have standing to sue for past violations of the Clean Water Act. To hold otherwise would serve to emasculate the statute and place plaintiffs in a position that would render them almost powerless to bring citizen suits.

The defendant's second contention is that the plaintiff does not have standing to bring this action because none of its members have used, use, or desire to use the Kromma Kill. The defendant cites the Second Circuit's decision in Sierra Club v. SCM Corporation, 747 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1984) in support of its position. In that case, the defendant was allegedly discharging excessive pollutants into a tributary of a body of water called Wolcott Creek. In affirming the district court's dismissal of the complaint, the circuit court found that, outside of the fact that some of the members of the Sierra Club lived within a seventy-mile radius of the tributary and one lived in the Town of Wolcott, there was no showing that any club members used the tributary or would be affected by its pollution.

The defendant's assertion that members of the plaintiff would have had to use the Kromma Kill in order to have standing to sue is without merit. In SCM, the court made clear that a person who is affected by the pollution in question has standing to sue. The plaintiff has alleged that several of its members use the Hudson River near the point where the Kromma Kill flows into it, and that excessive pollution in the Kromma Kill flows directly into the Hudson. This allegation is sufficient to confer standing on the plaintiff. Clearly, its members are affected by excessive pollution in the Kromma Kill, even if they do not use that body of water itself.

The defendant next asserts that most of the plaintiff's claims are time-barred. The defendant contends that the federal five-year statute of limitations applicable to civil penalty actions, 28 U.S.C. § 2462, is applicable here. The plaintiff argues that there is no statute of limitations for this type of action and cites several cases from the federal court in the district of New Jersey in support of its position. The court agrees with the defendant that a five-year statute of limitations should apply in cases such as the one sub judice and notes that several courts have so held. See Connecticut Fund for the Environment, 623 F.Supp. at 211-13; Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 608 F.Supp. 440 (D.Md. 1985); Friends of the Earth v. Facet Enterprises, Inc., 618 F.Supp. 532 (W.D.N.Y. 1984).

Notwithstanding the five-year statute of limitations, the plaintiff makes two points, with which the court agrees, that prevent most, if not all, of its claims from being time-barred. The plaintiff's first point is that the statute of limitations did not begin to run when the violations actually occurred, but when the reports that documented those violations were filed with the E.P.A. It would have been practically impossible for the plaintiff to have discovered the alleged violations of the defendant on its own. It is only when reports are filed with the E.P.A. that the public becomes aware that violations have occurred. To hold that the statute begins to run when violations actually occur, as opposed to when they are discovered, would impede, if not foreclose, the remedial benefits of the statute. See generally Barrett v. United States, 689 F.2d 324 (2d Cir.1982); Dubose v. Kansas City Southern Railway Company, 729 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir.1984); Nichols v. Hughes, 721 F.2d 657 (9th Cir.1983).

Pursuant to § 1365(b)(1)(A), a citizen suit cannot be commenced before sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of the alleged violation(s) to the Administrator, the State, and the alleged violator. The plaintiffs second point is that the date the notice is given should toll the statute of limitations, since the plaintiff could not bring suit within the next sixty days due to the prohibition of the statute. It has been held that if prior resort to an administrative body is a prerequisite to judicial review, the running of the statute of limitations period should be tolled during the administrative proceeding. Nichols, 721 F.2d at 660. The court concludes that similar...