Atlas Powder Co. v. Benson

• Citation: 287 F. 797
• Decision Date: 09 March 1923
• Docket Number: 2942.
• Parties: ATLAS POWDER CO. v. BENSON.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)

287 F. 797

ATLAS POWDER CO. v. BENSON.

No. 2942.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

March 9, 1923

Robert H. Schenck, of Morristown, N.J., Thomas J. Laffey, of Wilmington, Del., and King & Vogt, of Morristown, N.J., for plaintiff in error.

William A. Dolan, of Newton, N.J. (Joseph Coult, Jr., of Newark N.J., of counsel), for defendant in error.

Before WOOLLEY, Circuit Judge, and WITMER and GIBSON, District Judges.

WOOLLEY Circuit Judge.

An explosion occurred in the plant of the Atlas Powder Company at a place where nitroglycerine and an absorbent material were being mixed as the final operation in the manufacture of dynamite. A building belonging to Bernard Benson, situate about five-eighths of a mile away, was damaged. Benson brought this suit in a state court-- later removed to the District Court-- charging the Atlas Powder Company by one count of the complaint with negligence in the operation of its plant and by another count with maintaining a nuisance. On issues raised by a general traverse the case went to trial. The plaintiff had a verdict and the case is here on the defendant's writ of error.

The only question raised by this writ is whether there was sufficient evidence of negligent operation or the maintenance of a nuisance to take the case to the jury.

At the trial, ownership of the respective properties and operation of the plant by the defendant being admitted, the plaintiff on the issue of negligence proved the occurrence of the explosion and consequent damages, and rested. The defendant moved for a nonsuit on the ground that the plaintiff had not proved by affirmative and positive evidence that the explosion was due to its negligence. This was true; but the court denied the motion on the ground that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of negligence by invoking the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Later, on a motion for a directed verdict, and again on this writ, the defendant took the position that this principle of law is not applicable to a case arising out of an explosion where the cause of the explosion is wholly unknown; in other words, that in ordinary course the doctrine does not apply to the explosives industry.

We recognize that high explosives have become a commercial necessity and serve important public interests. Great industries are dependent upon their use and Congress has regarded them as legitimate articles of commerce by providing for their transportation. We realize also the dangers inherently incident to their manufacture and the difficulties of guarding against them. Yet these dangers and difficulties great as they are, did not relieve the defendant from the duty of exercising care and caution in operating its plant according to the rule, and did not absolve it from liability for failing to do so. Nor was the defendant, by reason of the dangers and problems of manufacturing explosives, excepted from the rules of evidence, by which the performance of its duty of care and caution and its failure to perform that duty are ascertained and determined. Therefore we are of opinion that if the requisite characteristics of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur were present in this case the doctrine was properly invoked and applied.

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has at times been regarded as affording a presumption of negligence in conflict with the general rule that negligence is never presumed but must be affirmatively proved. This is a mistake, for the doctrine is strictly evidentiary and supplies in given circumstances not a presumption of negligence but evidence of negligence on which recovery can be based. It was thus defined by Erle, J in Scott v. London Docks Co., 2 Hurl. & C. 596:

'When the thing is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.'

This definition has been termed a legal classic (1 Thomp. Negl Sec. 15; 20 R.C.L. 187), and was adopted by the Supreme Court in San Juan Light & Transit Co. v. Requena, 224 U.S. 89, 99, 32 Sup.Ct. 399, 56 L.Ed. 680. In order effectively to invoke this principle of law it is essential that it shall appear from the circumstances that the transaction in which the accident occurred was in the exclusive management of the defendant, and all the elements of the occurrence within its control, and that the result...