Att'y Griev. Comm'n of MD v. James

Decision Date01 September 1997
Docket NumberNo. 73,73
Citation735 A.2d 1027,355 Md. 465
Parties(Md.1999) Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Richard Allen James Misc. Docket AG
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Argued before Bell, C.J., Eldridge, Rodowsky, Raker, Wilner, Cathell, Karwacki, Robert L.(retired, specially assigned), JJ.

Rodowsky, Judge.

Richard Allen James (James) was admitted to the bar of this Court in June 1971. He is also admitted to practice in the District of Columbia and maintains an office there. This is the fourth time that he has appeared before us as the respondent in an attorney disciplinary matter. In 1984, we suspended James from the practice of law for a minimum of two years. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. James, 300 Md. 297, 477 A.2d 1185 (1984) (James I). Nine years later, in Attorney Grievance Commission v. James, 333 Md. 174, 634 A.2d 48 (1993) (James II), this Court suspended James for one year, from January 12, 1994, to January 12, 1995. The misconduct established in James II involved the use of deception to circumvent a statutorily mandated procedure for processing, through the Division of Parole and Probation, checks for restitution payments. Id. at 183, 634 A.2d at 52.

Shortly before January 12, 1995, James filed with Bar Counsel the affidavit required by then Maryland Rule BV13 a 2.1 Following an investigation, Bar Counsel responded that James "'has violated the terms of his suspension by engaging in the practice of law during the period of this suspension.'" Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. James, 340 Md. 318, 320-21, 666 A.2d 1246, 1247 (1995) (James III). At the time of his suspension James had maintained an office for the practice of law in Greenbelt, Prince George's County, and we referred the matter to Judge Graydon S. McKee, III of the circuit court for that county for an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 321, 666 A.2d at 1247. Judge McKee found that James had engaged in conduct constituting the practice of law between January 1994 and January 1995. We overruled exceptions to Judge McKee's findings. "Inasmuch as James never served the one year suspension imposed in James II we order[ed] that James serve the suspension of one year for the violations that he committed, as determined in James II." Id. at 333, 666 A.2d at 1253.

The one-year period of the suspension reimposed in James III expired November 12, 1996. James, however, never filed an affidavit that he "has complied in all respects with the term of the suspension" reimposed in James III. As a result, James has been suspended continuously since January 12, 1994, to date.

In James III this Court carefully noted that

"[o]ur disposition deals only with the sanction imposed for the misconduct in James II. Whether any disciplinary proceedings should be undertaken concerning the activities of James, or of any other or others, during the time when James should have honored the order of suspension filed in James II is a matter for Bar Counsel to determine in the first instance."

Id.

In January 1998, the Attorney Grievance Commission (the Commission) petitioned this Court for disciplinary action against James, alleging that he had continued to practice law after having been suspended as of January 12, 1994, in James II. Essentially, the petition alleged the facts that had been found by Judge McKee in James III, from which this Court concluded that James had never served the one year suspension beginning January 12, 1994. The petition additionally alleged that James had represented William Wrubleski (Wrubleski) and Rasheed Jackson (Jackson) during the James II suspension period of 1994-1995. James was charged, inter alia, with violating Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5 (Unauthorized Practice of Law). We transmitted the matter to Judge James J. Lombardi of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County for hearing.

At the hearing Judge Lombardi accepted as established the facts on which this Court in James III had based the reimposition of the James II suspension and took testimony related to James's representation of Wrubleski and Jackson. James produced evidence that he was an alcoholic and that his alcoholism had substantially impaired his judgment, resulting in his failure to comply with his suspension. James further produced evidence that, since July 1996, he had been sober.

Judge Lombardi filed his report with this Court in August 1998. He concluded that the conduct on which the Commission's allegations were based had been conclusively established in James III. Judge Lombardi also found that it was undisputed that James practiced law while suspended by representing Wrubleski and Jackson. He focused his analysis on James's evidence in mitigation, concluding that "it is more likely than not that [James] was affected by his alcoholism in continuing to practice law during his period of suspension."

While the hearing in this Court on the report was pending, Bar Counsel moved to remand the matter to Judge Lombardi to hear additional evidence bearing on mitigation. James opposed the remand, arguing that no evidence on new allegations had been presented to an Inquiry Panel or to the Review Board and could not be considered by Judge Lombardi in the first instance. This Court granted the remand, and, in effect, deferred ruling on James's procedural objection until our decision on all issues.

At the hearing on remand, Bar Counsel called Bernice Roane, who testified that James had assisted her from his office in Greenbelt on three legal matters. First, she stated that James drew up wills for her and her husband in September 1997. The Roanes had first met James by happenstance while they were in the lobby of his building for the purpose of having wills prepared by another attorney whom they did not know, at which time James offered to draw up the wills for them. James gave Mrs. Roane his card identifying himself as an attorney and listing only the Greenbelt office address and telephone number. At his office the Roanes paid James $250 for the two wills. Both wills are dated September 9, 1997, were executed in James's office, and were witnessed by James and his secretary.

Second, after Mrs. Roane's husband died in January 1998, James assisted her at his Greenbelt office with certain annuities left by her husband. She paid James $2,000 for these services.

Third, in November 1997 James assisted her in filing the will of her recently deceased aunt in the District of Columbia. James charged her $500, but later returned the fee.

James testified that he had sent Mr. Roane some professional cards in the late 1980s or early 1990s on other matters. He said that he prepared the Roanes' wills at his D.C. office and only met the clients in Greenbelt out of consideration for Mr. Roane's age and poor health, and that he worked on the annuities out of his D.C. office. Judge Lombardi found "that Mr. James practiced law in Maryland pursuant to the testimony of Mrs. Roane."

In his findings of fact on remand, Judge Lombardi related James's conduct, as described by Mrs. Roane and beginning well after James had stopped drinking, to the report previously submitted to this Court.

The judge stated that he had been "very impressed" with testimony presented during the July 1998 hearing that James's "alcoholism was directly related to his impaired judgment in continuing to practice law." Nevertheless, "[t]his [new evidence] changes that." Because James had been sober since July 1996, Judge Lombardi found "that this practice of law during this '97-'98 period is not affected by his alcoholism," thereby seriously undermining the prior mitigation testimony. Consequently, Judge Lombardi withdrew his earlier finding that James "was affected by his alcoholism in continuing to practice law during his period of suspension." He found "that the respondent engaged in the unlawful practice of law from August 1997 through April 1998."

James has taken seven exceptions to Judge Lombardi's report. We shall consider each exception individually, stating additional facts as necessary to the consideration of the issue.

I

James excepts to the introduction of Mrs. Roane's evidence at the hearing on remand without that evidence first having been submitted to an Inquiry Panel. He considers the Roane evidence to constitute charges of additional violations of Rule 5.5 by him, so that the evidence should have been presented first to an Inquiry Panel as required by Rule 16-706 a.

Rule 16-706 provides, in relevant part:

"a.Bar Counsel. 1. Filing and investigation. Every complaint that an attorney has committed an act of misconduct or that he is incompetent shall be filed with and recorded by the Bar Counsel. The Bar Counsel shall investigate each complaint.

....

"4.Reference to Inquiry Panel. Unless a complaint is dismissed or an Inquiry Panel proceeding has been dispensed with pursuant to Rule 16-706, the Bar Counsel shall refer the complaint to an Inquiry Panel and give notice of the complaint to the attorney against whom the complaint has been made. The notice shall inform the attorney of the nature of the complaint made. In unusual or extraordinary circumstances, the Bar Counsel, in his discretion, may defer giving notice to the attorney for a reasonable time.

"b.Inquiry Panel proceeding not required. 1. When not required. An Inquiry Panel proceeding is not required in a case where either:

"(a)Both the attorney complained against and the Bar Counsel waive an Inquiry Panel proceeding in writing; or

"(b)The complaint is either (i) that there has been a final judgment of conviction as defined by Rule 16-710 e 1 of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; or (ii) that the attorney has been adjudged guilty of misconduct by a judicial tribunal in a disciplinary proceeding as defined by Rule 16-710 e 1 and that the adjudication of misconduct has become final."

In the motion for remand Bar Counsel...

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