Atterburg v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.
Citation | 425 F. Supp. 841 |
Decision Date | 03 February 1977 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 1514-73. |
Parties | Clifford ATTERBURG et al., Plaintiffs, v. ANCHOR MOTOR FREIGHT, INC., a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware, Defendant. |
Court | United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. District of New Jersey |
Jamieson, McCardell, Moore, Peskin & Spicer, by Richard A. Ragsdale, Trenton, N. J., Goldfarb & Reznick, by Bernard S. Goldfarb, Cleveland, Ohio, for defendant.
This matter comes before the Court upon defendant's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs,1 who are employed by the defendant, Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. as truck drivers, seek to recover both minimum wages and overtime compensation. Plaintiffs contend that the defendant violated the minimum wage provisions of section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended, (hereinafter cited as FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), in that it failed to compensate them for certain working time. Plaintiffs further allege that the defendant violated various collective bargaining agreements by failing to pay them for overtime work in accordance with the terms of said agreements.2
Defendant asserts that the plaintiffs are bound, according to the terms of the collective bargaining agreements, to utilize the grievance/arbitration procedure provided for in the agreements. Thus, it is stated that the failure of the plaintiffs to follow this procedure entitles defendant to summary judgment. It is also contended that decisions that have already been rendered regarding disputes that were processed through the grievance machinery, are final and binding. Finally, it is asserted that plaintiffs, as a matter of law, have no minimum wage claim.
There are six contracts which govern the relationship of the parties to this action. There are two National Master Automobile Transporters Agreements (National Agreements), one in effect from June 1, 1970 through August 31, 1973 and the other in effect from September 1, 1973 through May 31, 1976; two Eastern Conference Area Truckaway, Driveaway, Yard and Shop Supplements (Area Supplements), covering the same time periods as the National Agreements; and two Local Riders to the Eastern Conference Supplement (Local Riders), also in effect for approximately the same time periods.
The National Agreements contain detailed provisions regarding grievance and arbitration procedure. Although some of plaintiffs' complaints have been processed through at least some levels of the grievance machinery, the majority of plaintiffs' claims have not been submitted pursuant to the grievance/arbitration procedure contained in the contracts.
This case raises a variety of interesting legal issues. It is well settled, however, that "arbitration is a matter of contact and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit." United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1353, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960). Accord, Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 414 U.S. 368, 374, 94 S.Ct. 629, 38 L.Ed.2d 583 (1974). Thus, before these issues can be addressed, it is incumbent upon the Court to resolve the threshold question of whether the plaintiffs' claims are arbitrable grievances within the meaning of the applicable contracts. See, Hussey Metal Division of Cooper Range Co. v. Lectromelt Furnace Division, McGraw-Edison Co., 471 F.2d 556, 557-58 (3d Cir. 1972).
Defendant points to Article 7, section 8 of the National Agreements, which provides:
These provisions appear to be quite broad in scope and application. Plaintiffs, however, make reference to Article 7, Section 1 of the National Agreements which reads as follows:
Although any doubts as to the meaning of the contract must be resolved in favor of arbitration, United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., supra, 363 U.S. at 583, 80 S.Ct. 1347, these provisions appear to broadly exempt, from the grievance machinery, the type of claims asserted by the plaintiffs. Thus, at least with regard to the disputes which previously have not been processed pursuant to the grievance/arbitration machinery, it is held that plaintiffs' claims are not arbitrable.
It should be noted that defendant contends that a variety of the alleged fact situations fail to give rise to a cause of action under either of plaintiffs' two theories of relief, but rather are simply disputes regarding certain terms of the contracts. Although this contention eventually may be found to be the case, the Court is not willing, at the present time, to sift through the numerous claims to determine which do and which do not give rise to such cause of actions. It is sufficient, at this time, to note that many of the claims do appear to state such cause of actions and that the contractual exemptions from the grievance/arbitration provisions appear to be coextensive with both the facts which give rise to a cause of action pursuant to the minimum wage provisions of the FLSA and a cause of action based upon failure to pay overtime compensation in accordance with the applicable collective bargaining agreements, the only two grounds upon which plaintiffs seek relief.
It must now be determined whether disputes, which have been resolved by the use of the grievance machinery, can be the basis of a cause of action when it has been determined that the disputes are not arbitrable.
Ficek v. Southern Pacific Co., supra at 657. Thus, it appears that any resolution regarding claims which were processed pursuant to the grievance/arbitration procedure are final and binding.
Satterwhite v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., supra at 452.6
The determination that plaintiffs' prior submission of disputes to arbitration preclude them from bringing an action based upon these disputes, pursuant to the FLSA, does not finally resolve the issue regarding the effect of such prior submission. The remaining question, on this issue, which must be resolved is whether plaintiffs' union breached its duty of fair representation, or whether the defendant employer repudiated the contract, thus entitling plaintiffs to bring an action based upon the claims previously submitted to arbitration.7
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