Attorney General of Maryland v. Dickson

• Decision Date: 28 June 1989
• Docket Number: Civ. No. PN-86-1128.
• Citation: 717 F. Supp. 1090
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
• Parties: ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND and State of Maryland v. Walter Robert DICKSON, et al.

717 F. Supp. 1090

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND and State of Maryland v. Walter Robert DICKSON, et al.

Civ. No. PN-86-1128.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

June 28, 1989.

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COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen. of Maryland, and Peter V. Berns, Asst. Atty. Gen. of Maryland, for plaintiffs.

Daniel F. Goldstein and Andrew D. Freeman, Brown & Goldstein, Baltimore, Md., for defendants Walter Robert Dickson and Douglas Craig Dickson.

Stanley M. Dietz, Poolesville, Md., for defendant Haynes Lee Locklear.

Joseph P. Lamari, Rockville, Md., for defendant Carl R. Wells, Individually and doing business as S & W Auto Sales.

Robert A. Rohrbaugh, Rockville, Md., for defendant Marcus Garvey Guy.

OPINION

NIEMEYER, District Judge.

This case presents multiple questions relating to liability and damages arising from the "rolling-back" of the odometers of 355 used automobiles. The Attorney General of Maryland and the State of Maryland have sued Walter Robert Dickson and Haynes Lee Locklear for violations of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq. ("federal odometer Act"), and the Maryland Consumer Protection Act, Comm. Law Art., § 13-101 et seq., Md.Code. They contend that from 1981 through 1985 Dickson and Locklear, along with others, were involved in a scheme to roll back odometers of used cars and thereafter misrepresent their true mileage to purchasers.

The Attorney General and the State of Maryland have filed a motion for summary judgment on all counts of the complaint, seeking injunctive relief, civil fines, attorneys fees, and, on behalf of consumers, treble damages and restitution. Dickson filed a response in which he contends (1) that plaintiffs' proof fails to establish defendants' liability for altering the odometers of all 355 vehicles in question and fails to show the requisite intent to defraud; (2) that plaintiffs' claims are barred in whole or in part by applicable statutes of limitations; (3) that plaintiffs do not have the right to enforce the relevant statutes against all the transactions in question; and (4) that the damages claimed are excessive and duplicative. Dickson also filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. Locklear has failed to file any response to plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.

Following a lengthy hearing on the pending motions, the parties submitted further exhibits, affidavits and memoranda. The decisions now made are based on the total record, including the record made by the parties in connection with earlier filed motions for summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1985, defendants Dickson, Locklear and others were indicted by a federal grand jury in Maryland and charged in a 34-count indictment with carrying out a scheme to defraud by rolling back the odometers of high-mileage vehicles and selling them with inaccurate lower odometer readings.

On March 11, 1986, Dickson pleaded guilty to Count VII of the indictment, which included allegations that from December 1981 through July 1985 Dickson had been involved in a scheme to defraud consumers by selling them vehicles with rolled-back odometers. Locklear, on the other hand, went to trial and was convicted on May 10, 1986, of fifteen counts of the indictment, which likewise charged him with scheming to defraud consumers by selling "rolled-back" vehicles. Locklear's conviction was affirmed on appeal. United States v. Locklear, 829 F.2d 1314 (4th Cir. 1987).

The complaint in this case, which was filed on April 9, 1986, and later amended, names Dickson, his son Douglas Craig Dickson, Locklear, Carl R. Wells (individually and doing business as S & W Auto Sales), and Marcus Garvey Guy as defendants and co-conspirators. In Counts I and III, respectively, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants altered the odometers of more than 300 motor vehicles in violation of § 1984 of the federal odometer Act and made false disclosures of the odometer readings of these vehicles in violation of § 1988. In Counts II and IV plaintiffs allege that the defendants conspired to violate §§ 1984 and 1988. Finally, in Count V plaintiffs allege that the defendants engaged in deceptive trade practices in violation of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act.

Under the federal odometer Act, plaintiffs pray for permanent injunctive relief to prevent future violations and, on behalf of the purchasers of the cars, demand treble damages and attorneys' fees. Under the Maryland Consumer Protection Act, plaintiffs seek restitution and civil penalties.

Judge Joseph Howard, to whom this case was originally assigned, entered a partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against Dickson on the issue of liability. The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the defendants Carl Wells and Marcus Guy, and the case proceeded to trial before a jury on the issue of liability alone against Douglas Craig Dickson and Locklear. The jury found in favor of Douglas Craig Dickson on all counts and in favor of Locklear on Counts III, IV and V. They found against Locklear on Counts I and II, which allege that he altered the odometer of over 300 used automobiles and engaged in a conspiracy to alter those odometers. No finding was made by either Judge Howard or the jury with regard to the identity and precise number of automobiles involved.

Thus only Dickson and Locklear remain as defendants, Dickson on all counts and Locklear on Counts I and II. The plaintiffs seek to impose liability and damages on both of these defendants for 355 automobiles identified in the papers supporting the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. Because defendant Locklear has elected not to respond to plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, the arguments that are attributed to the defendants have been raised only by Dickson.

II. NEXUS OF 355 VEHICLES TO THE CONSPIRACY

Dickson first argues that plaintiffs have failed to prove that he is liable for the violations alleged in connection with the 355 cars listed in plaintiffs' exhibits to their summary judgment motion. He suggests that Judge Howard's ruling on the issue of liability was based on his guilty plea to Count VII of the indictment (a single count of mail fraud), and that there has been no adjudication of his liability with respect to any car other than the one mentioned in that count.

Dickson's argument highlights the logistical difficulties presented by plaintiffs' instant motion. Judge Howard's ruling on plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability established Dickson's participation in a conspiracy and his liability for violations of the federal odometer Act and the Maryland Consumer Protection Act. It did not establish, however, which vehicles were involved in the conspiracy and on how many occasions the statutes were violated. It must therefore still be determined whether the 355 vehicles listed in Exhibit 8A to the plaintiffs' motion have been sufficiently linked to the defendants.

Both defendants have been found liable for conspiring to violate the federal odometer Act. Judge Howard entered summary judgment on the issue of liability against Dickson and a jury found that Locklear violated 15 U.S.C. § 1984 (which prohibits the alteration of odometers) and that he participated in a conspiracy to violate that section. It is well established that members of a conspiracy are jointly and severally liable for the actions committed by their co-conspirators during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 253-54, 60 S.Ct. 811, 858, 84 L.Ed. 1129 (1940); Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 481 (D.C.Cir.1983); Duval v. Midwest Auto City, Inc., 425 F.Supp. 1381, 1386, 1388 (D.Neb.1977), aff'd, 578 F.2d 721 (8th Cir.1978) (holding conspirators who violated federal odometer law jointly and severally liable for the acts of their co-conspirators). Therefore, both Dickson and Locklear will be held liable for violations of the federal odometer Act committed by members of their conspiracy during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy.

Dickson's argument that Judge Howard's partial summary judgment ruling on the issue of liability was limited to the single violation listed in Count VII of the indictment, and did not include a finding of involvement in a conspiracy, will not be sustained for two reasons.

First, the motion which Judge Howard granted was based on the entire complaint, which included allegations of Dickson's involvement in a conspiracy responsible for rolling back the odometers of over 300 vehicles. Plaintiffs had submitted carefully prepared documentation establishing Dickson's involvement in the conspiracy, and Dickson failed to challenge this documentation.

Second, Dickson's admissions made during his plea to Count VII of the indictment, upon which Judge Howard relied, encompassed more than the one vehicle referred to in that count. The first paragraph of Count VII of the indictment realleged the allegations in Count I dealing with Dickson's involvement in a scheme to defraud consumers by selling them vehicles with rolled-back odometers. Judge James Miller, who received Dickson's guilty plea, made it clear that these allegations were incorporated in Count VII and that defendant's guilty plea included a plea of guilty to these allegations. When granting plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, Judge Howard made it clear that he was treating Dickson's guilty plea as an admission of his involvement in a conspiracy to defraud:

Dickson pled guilty to Count seven of an indictment ... which charged him with violation of 18 U.S.C., Section 1341. This count expressly incorporated allegations of the defendant's direct and substantial involvement in an odometer rollback scheme. Defendant's voluntary guilty plea as to this count is treated as an admission by this Court.

After having requested the defendant to

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