Attorney General v. Board of County Canvassers

• Decision Date: 27 January 1887
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: ATTORNEY GENERAL v. BOARD OF COUNTY CANVASSERS.

31 N.W. 539

64 Mich. 607

ATTORNEY GENERAL v. BOARD OF COUNTY CANVASSERS.

Supreme Court of Michigan

January 27, 1887

Mandamus.

Cyrus T. Crandall and H.O. Fairchild, for relator.

R.C Flannigan and W.P. Healy, for respondent.

CAMPBELL C.J.

By act No. 35 of the Laws of 1885, (Laws 1885, p. 32,) under which the county of Iron was organized, it was provided that the temporary county-seat should be at Iron River until the permanent county-seat should be fixed as in said act provided. The act further required that the permanent county-seat should be determined by vote at the next general state election, which would occur in 1886, when the qualified voters were to cast their ballots for such place as they should designate, and the place receiving the highest number of votes should be the permanent county-seat. These votes were to be canvassed by a board, consisting of persons appointed on the day of election by the several boards of township inspectors, who were to meet at Iron River on the second Tuesday succeeding the election, and canvass them. It was made the duty of the secretary of said board to "file a certificate of the number of votes cast for each location voted for, for said county-seat, and a certificate of the place designated and selected by said votes, signed and certified by himself as secretary, and countersigned by the chairman, with the secretary of state, and with the township clerks of the several townships of said county."

This board met and organized, and adjourned without canvassing the votes. A mandamus is now asked to compel them to meet and make the canvass. The return does not deny that they met and adjourned without day; and claims that, having done so, they have gone out of office, and have no further functions. They further claim that no legal votes were cast; the only intelligible ground for this claim being the alleged invalidity of the statute. They also claim that no legal ballots were cast for the place which received the majority of all the votes cast at the election, which were for "Crystal Falls," because there is such a township of large dimensions, and no definite place named within it. They also claim that no notice was given of the general election, and that separate boxes were provided for county-seat ballots; and they undertake to set up various other reasons, resting on alleged frauds and irregularities in the election at different precincts.

Before considering the statute as regards its legal validity, it is proper to refer to the various methods attempted by respondents to avoid the performance of their legal duties. This statute defines who shall be canvassers, and respondents are the canvassers provided for. It requires them to organize with chairman and secretary, which they also have done. It then imposes upon them the single and specific duty of canvassing the votes certified by the election officers, and certifying the number of votes cast for each location, and the place designated. They are not a judicial or quasi judicial body. They are not a permanent body with administrative functions. They are created for a single occasion and for a single object. They have no means given them to inquire, and no right to inquire, beyond the returns of the local election boards. They have no right to raise outside issues to decide themselves, or to ask us to decide. When they have figured up the returns exactly as handed over to them, they have completed their task, and exhausted their powers. Until they have done so, they have no right to dissolve their meeting. They can only get out of their office by completing its work. It would be worse than absurd to allow a board of canvassers to defeat the popular will, and destroy an election, by refusing or neglecting to do what the law requires them to do. They may bring themselves within the punishment of the law by such misconduct, but they cannot destroy the vote.

We do not very well see what they have to do with inquiring whether the ballot-boxes were separate or single, nor is it their function to inquire into the geographical character of the vote. But we have no doubt that a separate ballot-box was lawful, and more convenient than any other. This is expressly provided for on votes to remove county-seats. How.St. 491. Neither is there any difficulty in holding that the vote for "Crystal Falls" means the settlement of that name. The law does not require the county-seat to be on a particular village or city lot or square, although there have been some instances of that kind; and it cannot be presumed that, as between a large territory and a fixed settlement the location was meant to be at large and not definite.

The statute makes the time and occasion of this election imperative. It is required to be at the next general state election. Where such a direction is given, it cannot be...