Attorney Grievance Com'n of Maryland v. Parsons

• Decision Date: 01 September 1986
• Docket Number: Nos. 34,s. 34
• Citation: 310 Md. 132,527 A.2d 325
• Parties: ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. Charles Clinton PARSONS & William Reback. Misc. (Subtitle BV)& 35,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 132

310 Md. 132

527 A.2d 325

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. Charles Clinton PARSONS & William Reback.

Misc. (Subtitle BV) Nos. 34 & 35, Sept. Term, 1986.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

July 2, 1987.

Melvin Hirshman, Bar Counsel and Walter D. Murphy, Jr., Asst. Bar Counsel for the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, for petitioner.

Charles Clinton Parsons, Washington, D.C., for respondent.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., ELDRIDGE, COLE, RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE and ADKINS, JJ., and JAMES F. COUCH, Jr., Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals of Maryland (retired), Specially Assigned.

COUCH, Judge.

The Attorney Grievance Commission, acting through Bar Counsel, filed petitions for disciplinary action against Charles C. Parsons and William Reback, ¹ alleging violation of Disciplinary Rules 1-102(A)(4), (5), and (6), ² 6-101(A)(3), ³ and 7-102(A)(5). ⁴ We referred the matter, pursuant to Maryland Rule BV 9 b, to Judge Bruce C. Williams of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. After conducting a hearing, Judge Williams made the following findings with respect to each petition:

"FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

"This case grew out of the final en banc Opinion and Order of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in the case of In Re: William Reback and Charles C. Parsons, case number 83-1289 in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals issued on July 31, 1986. [ See In re Reback, 513 A.2d 226 (D.C.1986) (en banc) ]. By that Opinion and Order, Mr. Reback and Mr. Parsons were suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months, effective August 30, 1986. This case is now before this Court on reciprocal discipline.

"Maryland Rule BV10(e)(1) states, in pertinent part:

'...A final adjudication in a disciplinary proceeding by a judicial tribunal or a disciplinary agency appointed by or acting at the direction of a judicial tribunal that an attorney has been guilty of misconduct is conclusive proof of the misconduct in the hearing of charges pursuant to this Rule.'

See Attorney Grievance Commission v. James, 300 Md. 297, 477 A.2d 1185 (1984), Attorney Grievance Commission v. Thorup, 300 Md. 189, 477 A.2d 754 (1984), Attorney Grievance Commission v. Rosen, 301 Md. 37, 481 A.2d 799 (1984), and Attorney Grievance Commission v. Moore, 301 Md. 169, 482 A.2d 497 (1984).

"The adjudication of misconduct in these cases by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals is final, the Respondent[s] having chosen not to file a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States.

"In late May, 1980, Mrs. Rosemary Lewis, met with William Reback concerning her domestic case. Within a matter of days, thereafter, she retained the firm of Reback and Parsons to pursue her claim for divorce and agreed to pay a $500 fee for their legal services plus certain estimated costs. Although Mr. Reback was the only attorney in that firm to whom Mrs. Lewis ever spoke, Charles C. Parsons, Esquire, took responsibility for the case. On June 9, 1980 Mrs. Lewis signed and verified her complaint for divorce. Charles C. Parsons, Esquire, then signed and filed that complaint for divorce in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia on June 12, 1980 and a summons was issued, directed to the defendant in that action. The summons was not served and neither Mr. Parsons nor Mr. Reback took any further action in that case.

"On November 12, 1980, the Superior Court for the District of Columbia issued a warning notice pursuant to Superior Court Domestic Relations Rule 41(f) which provides that a case that is not at issue within six (6) months after its filing date shall be dismissed after notice to the attorneys. Apparently, as a result of a defect in the firm's case-handling procedures, neither Mr. Reback nor Mr. Parsons saw that notice. The case was then dismissed without their knowledge on December 17, 1980.

"In March, 1981, Mr. Reback received a telephone call from Mrs. Lewis' brother, a Mr. Jordan, inquiring about the status of his sister's case. Mr. Reback and Mr. Parsons then learned that the case had been dismissed, when they looked at their office file. Neither Mr. Reback nor Mr. Parsons told Mrs. Lewis or her brother of the dismissal at that time. Instead, they prepared a second complaint, identical in substance to the first complaint.

"The second complaint purported to be verified by Mrs. Lewis. Instead of obtaining Mrs. Lewis' signature, however, Mr. Reback signed Mrs. Lewis' name to the complaint in the presence of Mr. Parsons. One of the two lawyers, or a secretary acting at their direction, then had the complaint notarized. Whoever took the complaint to the Notary necessarily represented that the signature was genuine. Mr. Parsons filed the complaint in Court on March 27, 1981, knowing that the signature of Mrs. Lewis was false.

"Mr. Reback and Mr. Parsons then assigned the case to an associate, Dana Dembro. They told the associate to come to them if he had questions. Other than giving him that instruction, they did not supervise him. He had trouble obtaining the required proofs of publication of notice to Lewis' husband. After another warning from the Court pursuant to Superior Court Domestic Relations Rule 41(f) issued on August 28, 1981, the case was dismissed pursuant to that rule on September 30, 1981. On October 9, 1981, Mr. Dembrow filed a Motion to Reinstate the case which was granted on October 13, 1981.

"In March, 1982, Mrs. Lewis discovered that the first complaint had been dismissed and a second one filed over her falsified signature. Mrs. Lewis then asked Mr. Reback and Mr. Parsons to withdraw as her attorneys which they did. They returned to her all fees which she had paid them. Mrs. Lewis proceeded in the second case with new counsel and a divorce was ultimately granted in that proceeding on October 21, 1982.

"In approximately August, 1982, Petitions instituting formal disciplinary proceedings in the District of Columbia were filed against Mr. Parsons and Mr. Reback. A hearing was held on those Petitions on November 24, 1982 before the three member Hearing Committee Number 4 of the Board on Professional Responsibility for the District of Columbia Bar (D.C. Bar Docket Nos. 370-81 and 68-82). Mr. Reback and Mr. Parsons were present at that hearing, represented by counsel, testified and cooperated fully. They expressed remorse for their actions."

As to Parsons, the trial court concluded:

"CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

"1. By his neglect of both of Mrs. Lewis' cases, [Parsons] violated Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(5) and 6-101(A)(3).

"2. By knowingly causing Mrs. Lewis' false signature on the second complaint for divorce, to be notarized and filing that complaint in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia, without the consent or knowledge of Mrs. Lewis, [Parsons] violated Disciplinary Rules 1-102(A)(4)(5) and 7-102(A)(5)."

As to Reback, Judge Williams concluded:

"CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

"1. By his neglect of both of Mrs. Lewis' cases, [Reback] violated Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(5) and 6-101(A)(3).

"2. As a result of his falsifying Mrs. Lewis' signature on the second complaint for divorce, causing it to be notarized and filed in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia, without the consent or knowledge of Mrs Lewis, [Reback] violated Disciplinary Rules 1-102(A)(4)(5) and 7-102(A)(5)."

The respondents have not excepted to any of Judge Williams's findings of fact or conclusions of law and we adopt them. Attorney Grievance Commission v. Maxwell, 307 Md. 600, 516 A.2d 570 (1986). The only issue before us is the discipline to be imposed. Relying on the sanction imposed in the District of Columbia, Bar Counsel recommends a six month suspension. Opposing this recommendation, the respondents contend that they were denied due process of law in the District of Columbia disciplinary proceedings, and therefore this Court should reject as "fatally flawed" the sanction imposed in that jurisdiction. They recommend a sanction no greater than censure. ⁵

Relying on In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968), respondents contend that "they suffered imposition of a severe six-month suspension [in the District of Columbia] based upon the Board [on Professional Responsibility's] and the Court [of Appeals's] conclusion that Respondents' misconduct was tantamount to criminal forgery and uttering, a criminal charge with which they were never confronted in the Petition [Instituting Formal Disciplinary Proceedings] against them nor before the Hearing Committee." ⁶ According to respondents, had they been notified in the Petition or before the Committee that the criminal charges would form the basis of their sanctions, "they could have demonstrated at the Hearing Committee by way of defense that the criminal allegations must fail because: 1) there was no 'specific intent to injure' their client; and 2) their client 'ratified' the second complaint they filed on her behalf by using it to obtain her divorce."

In Ruffalo, the Supreme Court overturned the decision of a federal appellate court to disbar Ruffalo, without a de novo hearing, from practicing before that court. The appellate decision was based upon an earlier order of disbarment from the Ohio Supreme Court following proof of Ruffalo's professional misconduct. In the Supreme Court, Ruffalo argued that this finding of misconduct was not based upon the original charges brought in the state court, but was based upon an additional charge later added by amendment as a result of his testimony during the hearing on the initial disbarment charges. Sustaining this contention, the Supreme Court ruled that:

"even though the attorney was granted a continuance in order to have time to prepare a response to the new charge, he was, nevertheless, deprived of procedural due process since the added charge arose from testimony, both his own and that of another witness, given...