Attorney Grievance Com'n of Md. v. Richardson

• Decision Date: 01 September 1997
• Docket Number: No. 25,25
• Citation: 712 A.2d 525,350 Md. 354
• Parties: ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. T. Carlton RICHARDSON. Mis. AG,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 354

350 Md. 354

712 A.2d 525

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. T. Carlton RICHARDSON.

Mis. AG No. 25, Sept. Term, 1997.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

July 1, 1998.

Reconsideration Denied Aug. 21, 1998.

Melvin Hirshman, Bar Counsel, and Gail Kessler, Asst. Bar Counsel, for the Attorney Grievance Com'n of Maryland, for Petitioner.

T. Carlton Richardson, Washington, DC, Appellee.

Argued before BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, CHASANOW, RAKER, WILNER and CATHELL, JJ.

BELL, Chief Judge.

The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (the "Commission" or the "petitioner"), through Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary Action against T. Carlton Richardson, the respondent, alleging misconduct arising out of disciplinary proceedings in Florida. Specifically, the petition alleges, and the respondent acknowledges, that he has been the subject of two disciplinary proceedings in the Supreme Court of Florida, both of which resulted in his being suspended from the practice of law in that State for ninety-one and sixty days respectively. In the first proceeding, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the referee's determination that the respondent had charged a clearly excessive attorney's fee, and it imposed a harsher sanction than was recommended. In the second, the court affirmed the determination that the respondent filed a manifestly frivolous and malicious lawsuit. The petition in the instant case also states, and again the respondent does not dispute, that the respondent was the subject of a reciprocal discipline proceeding, with respect to the first Florida proceeding, in the District of Columbia, resulting in the same term of suspension in the District of Columbia as was imposed in Florida. ¹ In this reciprocal discipline proceeding, the petitioner sought a determination by this Court that the respondent, by the acts found in the Florida proceedings, violated the following Rules of the MARYLAND RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT : 1.5² (Fees); ³ 1.8 (Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions); ⁴ 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions); ⁵ and 8.4 (Misconduct).

We referred the matter to the Honorable Clayton Greene, Jr. of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County to make findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-711(a). ⁶ Following a hearing, at which testimony and exhibits were received, Judge Greene concluded that the respondent had not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not engage in the misconduct as determined by the Supreme Court of Florida. After setting out as background the respondent's bar memberships ⁷ and reviewing briefly the Florida and District of Columbia disciplinary proceedings, the court made findings and drew conclusions, as follows:

"Petitioner submitted two final judgments from the Supreme Court of Florida concerning the attorney grievance proceedings involving the Respondent. In these two final judgments, the Supreme Court of Florida found that Respondent engaged in professional misconduct. Pursuant to Rule 16-710,[ ⁸] Petitioner requested the Court accept the final judgment as conclusive proof of misconduct."

* * * *

"Respondent offered his own testimony in an attempt to mitigate. Respondent testified that he served a total of twenty months of suspension in the District of Columbia for his misconduct and that he acknowledged his unethical conduct. Respondent stated that he resigned from the Florida Bar but is now eligible for readmission. Respondent testified that since the incident in Florida which gave rise to these proceedings, he has attended an ethics course in billing, attended several continuing legal education courses, tried to improve his operations, become a sole practitioner, learned how to deal with client fee disputes, increased his sensitivity towards his clients and has learned from his mistakes.

"In response, Petitioner argued that Respondent has not altered his billing practices since his sanctioned conduct in Florida. In support of this, Petitioner submitted the Respondent's schedule of fees and costs from April 1, 1993. Petitioner argued that while respondent testified that the schedule of the fees was a description of his new billing practices, Respondent also testified that he employed the same billing practice when dealing with the Joneses in Florida. Therefore, Petitioner argued, Respondent has not changed his billing practices.

"Respondent argued that this Court should not accept Florida's findings because Florida requires a different standard of proof for charges of excessive fees and frivolous lawsuits. Respondent also argued that Florida's proceedings should be rejected because he was denied substantive due process; there were irregularities in the Florida proceedings, and Petitioner did not prove the elements of the misconduct.

"The Court rejects Respondent's argument that the differing standards of proof warrant a rejection of Florida's final judgment. The Maryland Rules and appellate decisions of this state make no distinction between the final determinations by judicial tribunals in states requiring different standards of proof, and this Court only looks to see if the final adjudication in a disciplinary proceeding was made by a judicial tribunal. Attorney Grievance Commission v. Miller, 310 Md. 163 (1987).

"The Court finds that Florida's final judgments are conclusive proof of Respondent's misconduct. Petitioner submitted the Supreme Court of Florida's decisions of April 19, 1990 ... and October 31, 1991 ... and the Court finds this is clear and convincing evidence of final judgments by a judicial tribunal. See Miller, 310 Md. at 163 . As Respondent's submitted evidence does [not] explain why the Florida decision should not be accepted, Respondent has not established any factual matters by a preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, the Court accepts the Supreme Court of Florida's final adjudication as conclusive proof of Respondent's misconduct and accepts the facts found by the Supreme Court of Florida.

"FINDINGS OF FACT

"I. Excessive Fees "1. On March 31, 1983, Respondent was retained by Mr. and Mrs. Roosevelt Jones to probate the estate of Leula King in Tampa, Florida.

"2. The Joneses agreed to pay the Respondent a $500.00 origination fee and 10 per cent of the estate's gross value. The parties agreed that the origination fee would be applied towards the total fee.

"3. Leula King had died approximately fifty years earlier and had no outstanding debts. The estate was not complex and consisted of a piece of real property valued at approximately $22,000.00.

"4. Between February 24, 1984 and July 5, 1985, Respondent prepared the necessary documents for probate and charged the Joneses $10,550.99.

"5. A portion of the Joneses' legal fees represented a monthly cover charge which Respondent imposed on all his clients to offer his pro bono services.

"6. Respondent charged the Joneses a minimum of twenty minutes per telephone call, even if there was no answer, and charged the Joneses forty five minutes per page for documents he prepared.

"7. Respondent advised and assisted the Joneses to obtain a $13,000.00 loan from Community Federal Savings and Loan Association of Tampa. A substantial portion of the loan was used to satisfy the Respondent's fees.

"8. The Honorable Dennis Alvarez of the Hillsborough County Circuit Court, Probate Division, heard expert testimony and determined that $2,500.00 was a reasonable attorney fee in the probate case and that $150.29 was the amount of the costs. On remand, Judge Alvarez determined that the Joneses had paid $10,550.99 for the King estate and ordered Respondent to reimburse $7,970.00 to the King estate. Further, Judge Alvarez required Respondent to reimburse the King estate $6,500.00 for the expense the estate incurred in defending itself regarding the excessive attorney's fees before the Probate Court and the Second District Court of Appeals and $1,000.00 for fees incurred in the two proceedings before the Supreme Court of Florida.

"9. The Joneses had also retained Respondent to prepare their wills.

"10. The Joneses combined income at the time was less than $14,000.00 and their gross estate was worth no more than $75,000.00.

"11. Respondent charged the Joneses $85.00 for the initial consultation, a $750.00 origination fee, and a minimum attorney's fee of $1,250.00. The Joneses paid Respondent $1,444.93 for his services to prepare the wills. Respondent also sent the Joneses an invoice for $1,273.97 for general services which included a finder's fee associated with assisting Mrs. Jones in obtaining the loan to pay his attorney's fees.

"12. Through expert testimony in Florida, it was determined that $2, 500.00 was a generous fee for the probate of the King estate, $400.00 was a generous fee for the work performed on the Joneses' wills and $200.00 or $300.00 was sufficient for the general services that Respondent performed.

II. Frivolous Claim

"1. Respondent represented the personal representative of an estate in a probate proceeding in the Circuit of Florida. Judge Alvarez determined that attorney's fees charged by Respondent were excessive and ordered him to reimburse the estate.

"2. Respondent appealed Judge Alvarez's decision to the Second District Court of Appeal. Respondent argued that Judge Alvarez lacked jurisdiction to order the refund of excessive compensation because the payment had been rendered by the personal representative personally, rather than from the estate.

"3. The Second District Court of Appeal found Respondent's argument to be without merit, and remanded the matter to the Probate Court to correct the amount of the reimbursement. Review by the Supreme Court of Florida was denied.

"4. After recalculation of the reimbursement by the Probate Court, Respondent attempted to file an appeal which was dismissed as being untimely filed.

"5. Respondent, on two occasions, filed writs of mandamus to the Supreme Court of Florida...