Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Zhang

• Citation: 440 Md. 128,100 A.3d 1112
• Decision Date: 27 August 2014
• Docket Number: Misc. Docket AG No. 11,Sept. Term, 2013.
• Parties: ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. Runan ZHANG.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland

440 Md. 128

100 A.3d 1112

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND

v.Runan ZHANG.

Misc. Docket AG No. 11, Sept. Term, 2013.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

July 21, 2014

Reconsideration Denied Aug. 27, 2014

Disbarment ordered.

McDonald, J., filed an opinion concurring and dissenting in which Adkins, J., joined. Lydia E. Lawless, Assistant Bar Counsel (Glenn M. Grossman, Bar Counsel, Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland) for Petitioner.

Joseph A. Hennessey, Esq. (Beins, Goldberg & Hennessey, LLP of Chevy Chase, MD) for Respondent.

ARGUED BEFORE: BARBERA, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, ADKINS, McDONALD and WATTS, JJ.WATTS, J.

This attorney discipline proceeding concerns a Maryland lawyer who, among other things: (1) represented her niece in an annulment/divorce matter in Virginia even though she was not licensed to practice law in Virginia and even though a conflict of interest existed due to the lawyer's representation of her niece's husband in an immigration matter; (2) provided incompetent representation and advanced a ground for annulment without conducting adequate research or speaking to her niece; (3) authorized co-counsel to sign settlement agreements on behalf of her niece despite failing to advise her niece of the agreements and to obtain her consent; (4) misrepresented her niece's ability to communicate in English and her consent to the terms of the settlement agreements; (5) held herself out as specializing in immigration and corporate law; and (6) concealed her role in her niece's representation from the trial court.

Runan Zhang (“Zhang”), Respondent, a member of the Bar of Maryland, represented her niece, Yuxuan Zhang (“Wife”), in Wife's annulment and subsequent divorce case, in the Prince William County Circuit Court in Virginia (“the Virginia Court”), against Daji Song (“Husband”), whom Zhang represented in an immigration matter. Husband filed a complaint against Zhang with the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (“the Commission”), Petitioner.

On April 15, 2013, on the Commission's behalf, Bar Counsel filed in this Court a “Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action” against Zhang, charging her with violating Maryland Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) 1.1 (Competence), 1.2 (Scope of Representation), 1.4 (Communication), 1.7 (Conflict of Interest: General Rule), 3.7 (Lawyer as Witness), 4.1 (Truthfulness in Statements to Others), 8.4(c) (Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit, or Misrepresentation), 8.4(d) (Conduct That Is Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice), and 8.4(a) (Violating the MLRPC). On May 28, 2013, Bar Counsel filed in this Court an “Amended Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action” to add charges that Zhang violated MLRPC 1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation), 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions), 5.5 (Unauthorized Practice of Law), and 7.4 (Communication of Fields of Practice), as well as the corresponding Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct (“VRPC”) and District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct (“DCRPC”).¹

On April 17, 2013, this Court designated the Honorable Michael John Algeo (“the hearing judge”) of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County to hear this attorney discipline proceeding. On August 29, 2013, the hearing judge conducted a hearing. On October 24, 2013, the hearing judge filed in this Court findings of fact and conclusions of law, concluding that Zhang violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.4(a), 1.7(a), 1.16(a), 3.1, 3.7(a), 4.1(a), 5.5(a), 7.4(a), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(a).²

On May 6, 2014, we heard oral argument. For the below reasons, we disbar Zhang.

On the morning of February 18, 2011, Metcalf appeared in the Virginia Court to argue in opposition to the second demurrer. Metcalf had not read the e-mail that Zhang had sent the previous evening, and thus was not aware that any settlement discussions had occurred between Zhang and Lu. Approximately fifteen minutes before the hearing, Zhang advised Metcalf that Husband was “impotent” and that, the previous night, Zhang and Lu had reached an agreement under which Wife would pursue an annulment based on Husband's medical condition. Metcalf questioned Zhang about how Husband's medical condition was discovered at such a late date, and inquired about the details of the negotiations. Zhang assured Metcalf that Wife had participated in the negotiations and that she had communicated with Wife and Lu late into the evening until the agreement was reached. Wife had not, however, participated in the settlement discussions that occurred on February 17, 2011. In actuality, it was not until February 19, 2011, that Zhang, for the first time, discussed the terms of the agreement with Wife.

On February 18, 2011, before the hearing began, Demsky, Metcalf, and Zhang negotiated the final terms of the settlement agreement (“the February Agreement”), which, in pertinent part, provided that Husband would pay Wife $2,000 as full and complete settlement of all claims, and that Husband “agrees that the annulment is uncontested, he will not object, defend, or contest any Complaint for Annulment based upon [his] being impotent[.]”

Prior to execution of the February Agreement, Zhang told Metcalf that: (1) she (Zhang) had discussed the terms of the February Agreement with Wife; (2) Wife understood and agreed to the terms; and (3) Wife authorized Metcalf to sign the February Agreement on her behalf. Metcalf was concerned about the implications of signing the February Agreement without speaking with Wife, and repeatedly asked Zhang whether Wife had agreed to the February Agreement's terms. Zhang repeatedly responded that Wife had agreed to the terms and authorized Metcalf to sign the February Agreement. In reliance on Zhang's representations, Metcalf signed the February Agreement on Wife's behalf.

On February 18, 2011, Demsky and Metcalf submitted to the Virginia Court a proposed consent order reflecting the February Agreement's terms. The Honorable Lon E. Ferris signed the proposed consent order.

On February 19, 2011, for the first time, Zhang spoke with Wife about the February Agreement. Wife immediately advised Zhang that Husband was not, in fact, “impotent.” Instead of informing Metcalf at that time that the February Agreement had been signed without Wife's authorization, Zhang attempted to negotiate additional terms binding Husband to the February Agreement. On February 25, 2011, for the first time, Zhang admitted to Metcalf that she had not discussed the terms of the February Agreement with Wife prior to its execution and that Wife had advised her that Husband did not have the alleged medical condition.

On March 1, 2011, Wife directly contacted Metcalf for the first time, sending an email in which she wrote, in fluent English, that: (1) she had not been advised of the terms of the February Agreement before its execution; (2) Husband was not “impotent”; and (3) she did not consent to or authorize the execution of the February Agreement. Between March 1 and March 3, 2011, Zhang and Metcalf researched Virginia law and drafted a motion to set aside the February Agreement.

On March 3, 2011, Zhang filed in the Virginia Court a motion to set aside the February Agreement and consent order. The Virginia Court scheduled a hearing on the motion for March 18, 2011. Between March 3 and March 18, 2011, Zhang worked with Metcalf, as co-counsel, to prepare for the hearing. As part of that preparation, Zhang drafted notes and an argument for Metcalf. The notes that Zhang prepared contained multiple misrepresentations, including that: (1) Wife had given Metcalf “general authorization” to settle the case; (2) Husband had “demanded to get the settlement done in court on February 18, 2011”; and (3) there had been a “miscommunication” between Metcalf and Wife “due to language difficulties.” As a means of shielding herself from her misconduct ( i.e., her misrepresentation to Metcalf that Wife authorized her to sign the February Agreement), Zhang attempted to persuade Metcalf to make these misrepresentations to the Virginia Court in support of the motion to set aside the February Agreement.

On March 18, 2011, Zhang, Metcalf, and Demsky appeared in the Virginia Court for the hearing on the motion to set aside. Metcalf advised the Virginia Court that Zhang had assured her that Wife knew of and agreed to the February Agreement's terms. The Virginia Court vacated the February 18, 2011 consent order, and stated that an attempted fraud had been perpetrated on the Virginia Court and that there was no good faith basis for the “impotency” claim.

On April 7, 2011, Husband filed in the Virginia Court a counter-complaint for divorce. In response to interrogatories that Husband propounded, Wife identified Zhang as a potential witness related to the immigration representation and allegations of events that occurred before and during the marriage.

On August 18, 2011, the Virginia Court denied Wife's complaint for annulment. At some point afterward, Husband and Wife were granted a divorce based on mutual separation.

In short, the hearing judge found as follows concerning Zhang's role in the representation of Wife:

Beginning in November 2010 and continuing at all relevant times thereto, [Zhang] represented Wife in her pursuit of an annulment and divorce in Prince William County, Virginia. Although [Zhang] did not enter her appearance in the [Virginia Court], there is no question that she was acting as an attorney as she provided legal counsel, advice, and representation to Wife as co-counsel to [ ] Metcalf [ ]. [Zhang] provided legal advice, drafted pleadings and motions, assisted in preparation for hearings, conducted legal research, and participated in settlement negotiations on behalf of Wife. [Zhang] also stated to [Lu] that she represented Wife. The Court finds [Zhang]'s argument that she was not acting as an attorney and only as a “concerned family member” to be without merit.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In an...