Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Patterson

Decision Date24 October 2011
Docket Number2010.,Sept. Term,Misc. Docket AG No. 22
PartiesATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLANDv.Roland N. PATTERSON, Jr.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Raymond A. Hein, Deputy Bar Counsel (Glenn M. Grossman, Bar Counsel, Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland), for Petitioner.Edward J. Smith, Jr., Baltimore, Maryland, for Respondent.Submitted to BELL, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, MURPHY, ADKINS and BARBERA, JJ.BARBERA, J.

The Attorney Grievance Commission (Petitioner), acting through Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action against Respondent, attorney Roland N. Patterson. The petition addresses Respondent's conduct in three matters: his management of an interest on lawyer trust account (“IOLTA” or “trust account”); an appeal in a landlord-tenant case in which he represented Denver Moten; and a tort claim in which he represented Rachelle Lewis and her son.

Pursuant to Md. Rule 16–752, we designated the Honorable Susan Souder of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County to hear the matter and make findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Md. Rule 16–757. Judge Souder conducted a hearing on January 19, 2011, and dictated her findings of fact and conclusions of law into the record. The transcribed findings and conclusions were adopted in an Order dated February 4, 2011. Judge Souder found by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated Maryland Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct (“MRPC”) 1.1 (competence), 1.3 (diligence), 1.4 (communication), 1.5(a) and (b) (fees), 1.15(a) and (d) (safekeeping of client property), 1.16(d) (declining or terminating representation), 3.2 (expediting litigation), 8.1(b) (cooperation with bar counsel), and Md. Rules 16–606.1 and 16–609(c) governing attorney trust accounts.

I.

Judge Souder made the following factual findings and conclusions of law:

With respect to Bar Counsel's complaint regarding the general lack of record keeping, it is clear that the respondent maintained a Maryland IOLTA trust account ending in 7646 at the Bank of America.

On November 1st of 2008, he wrote check 1089 in the amount of $5,140.06. The purpose for which Mr. Patterson wrote check 1089 was to close his IOLTA account ending in 7646, as had been recommended to him.

I take judicial notice that November 1st of 2008 was a Saturday. On November 3rd of 2008, Mr. Patterson wrote check 1090 in the amount of $500 on the same account, the account ending 7646.

I take judicial notice of the fact that November 3rd, 2008 was Monday.

Mr. Patterson has testified that he was in the bank when he wrote the check. So, presumably, it was before the bank's normal closing time.

It may be possible that Mr. Patterson was told by a bank teller that his new IOLTA account at the Bank of America ending in 1742 did not have funds available for him to write a check. I say it may be possible, because it seems possible that the check that he had written on Saturday had not yet been processed or cleared by the Bank of America. Nevertheless, after being told that Mr. Patterson could not write a check on his account ending in 1742, he then wrote a check on 7646.

Again, he may have been told by a bank teller that there were funds available in the account ending in 7646, but that teller would have no way of knowing that on Saturday Mr. Patterson had written a check to close the account.

Mr. Patterson, however, did know that he had written a check in the amount of $5,140.06 to close the account, and I find that Mr. Patterson knew that the funds were not available in the account ending in 7646 at the time he wrote the check.

As a result, at the time Mr. Patterson wrote the check drawn to the trust account ending in 7646, made out to his law firm for $500, that resulted in an overdraft in his IOLTA trust account.

I make all of my findings by clear and convincing evidence.

I do find that Mr. Patterson engaged in a transaction that is prohibited by Rule 16–609(c), which states that, “No funds from an attorney trust account should be dispersed if the dispersement would create a negative balance.”

With regard to client matters in the aggregate, in addition, it is clear from the records that have been introduced and admitted into evidence that Mr. Patterson failed to create a record for his IOLTA account that chronologically showed all deposits and dispersements, and by doing so he violated Maryland Rule 16–606.1.

It is clear that Mr. Patterson's records did not show for each deposit the date of the deposit, the amount of the deposit, the identity of the client for whom the funds were deposited and the purpose of the deposit, again in violation of 16–606.1(a)(2)(A).

In addition, with respect to Mr. Patterson's trust account, he did not maintain a record that showed with respect to dispersements the purpose for which funds were intended, the amount of the dispersement, the payee and the check number, again, in violation of Rule 16–606.1(a)(3)(A).

Insofar as Rule 1.15 refers to this obligation for attorneys to comply with Title 16, Chapter 600 of the Maryland Rules, create and maintain records in accordance with those rules, Mr. Patterson has failed to do so. And so he's in violation of Rule 1.15.

The suggestion that the Attorney Grievance Commission had an obligation to tell Mr. Patterson to read some rules because the records he was submitting were not in compliance with the rules is not well taken because Mr. Patterson is obligated to read the rules and comply with them himself.

He has testified that he was under an attorney monitor agreement. That being the case, it is difficult to understand why Mr. Patterson would not have become an expert in the rules regarding trust accounts by reading them repeatedly until he was sure that he was in full compliance with their provisions.

He has not testified that he read the rules or reviewed the rules, consulted the rules or the cases under the rules, and based on what he has argued here, I could not find that he had bothered to consult the rules. He seems to have relied entirely on his monitor to make sure that he was in compliance. That is not Maryland law.

I found Mr. Moten to be a very credible witness.1 With respect to the District Court appeal for which Mr. Moten retained Mr. Patterson, Mr. Patterson accepted a retainer in December 2008 in the amount of $2500. The exhibits are clear that he received two money orders at first in the amounts of $1000.00 and $400, and then, subsequently, received two additional money orders in the amount of $1000.00 and $100.00, such that by December 31st, 2008, he had been paid [in] full the retainer of $2500 that he requested.

But it does not appear that Mr. Patterson understood the need or urgency of entering his appearance in the matter so that he would be sent a notice by the Court as to the hearing date.

The testimony is undisputed that it was Mr. Moten who kept himself apprised of the hearing date or the status of the matter, and he advised Mr. Patterson of the February 27, 2009, trial date.

Even when Mr. Patterson was advised of this February 27, 2009, hearing date for this de novo appeal, Mr. Patterson still did not enter his appearance. He didn't seek to continue the matter or postpone it because he hadn't had time to get ready. He issued no subpoenas. It doesn't appear that he ever received what had been filed by the District Court, which would have provided him with information as to the names of the witnesses for BGE, who had testified, and their addresses. All that information appears in the exhibits which have been admitted in this Court.

Mr. Patterson apparently had a conversation or he testifies that he had a conversation with Evan Goldman[, evidently, counsel for Bulldog Development,] with respect to the filing of Suggestion of Bankruptcy. The two Defendants in the District Court appeal case were Bulldog Development, LLC, and Devora Sofer. Now, it may be that somehow the Suggestion of Bankruptcy about which Mr. Goldman was talking was relevant to one of those two Defendants, but there is no evidence before this Court that any Suggestion of Bankruptcy with respect to either of those Defendants was ever filed or, in fact, that there ever was a bankruptcy involving either of those Defendants.

Let me see Plaintiff's Exhibit 7 [the case history from the District Court], Mr. Clerk.

There is as a result of the Suggestion of Bankruptcy that was filed in March of 2009, so it doesn't appear that there was a bankruptcy on February 27th of 2009.

As a result of the Suggestion of Bankruptcy that was filed, the case was stayed as to Jason Dennis. What relationship he has to this matter is not clear. Mr. Patterson hasn't explained it, what exactly Mr. Dennis' role is in Bulldog Development, LLC.

There is also some paper in the Court file, Plaintiff's Exhibit 7, that there is a debtor by the name of Live Oak Development, LLC. What that has to do with this case, again, I don't know.

But Bar Counsel is right, that in this particular case we don't have any records of any bankruptcy filed by Bulldog Development, LLC, or Devora Sofer.

What happened on February 27th, 2009, is that a default judgment was entered against the two Defendants. The judgment was in the amount of zero. It is not clear to me that even as of today that Mr. Patterson understands what that meant. It certainly did not mean that there was an opportunity to come back to Court and necessarily present some evidence. Not a mandatory, not a matter of right.

The Court file reflects that at some point a judge did vacate the judgment. The case was set for an inquisition, for an opportunity to present damages, and as a result of the fact there was no competent evidence of damages being presented, the judgment remained at zero in this matter.

I did not find Mr. Patterson's testimony credible in many respects during this proceeding. I had the opportunity to...

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