Attruia v. Attruia

Decision Date23 June 1953
Citation98 A.2d 532,140 Conn. 73
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesATTRUIA v. ATTRUIA. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

James F. Rosen, New Haven, with whom, on the brief, was Richard Belford, New Haven, for appellant (plaintiff).

Harold E. Drew, Derby, with whom were Richard H. Spencer, New Haven, and, on the brief, Charles A. Watrous, New Haven, for appellee (defendant).

Before BROWN, C. J., and BALDWIN, INGLIS, O'SULLIVAN and CORNELL, * JJ.

BALDWIN, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff brought an action under § 3796 of the General Statutes to recover wages for overtime work claimed to be due him from the defendant by virtue of chapter 180 of the General Statutes, known as the Minimum Wage Act. The defendant answered denying liability under the act and alleging that part of the plaintiff's claim was barred by the Statute of Limitations, and he counterclaimed for a debt of $103.21. The plaintiff admitted this debt to the defendant. The court rendered judgment for the defendant on the complaint, and on the counterclaim to recover $131.95 damages. The view which the court took of the case made it unnecessary to consider the defense of the Statute of Limitations. The plaintiff has appealed.

The appeal raises questions of the interpretation of the Minimum Wage Act and the order issued pursuant thereto establishing minimum fair wage rates for adult males employed in mercantile trade. These questions have not heretofore been before this court. The act provides generally that the labor commissioner, on his own motion or on the petition of fifty or more residents of the state, may investigate the wages being paid in any occupation to ascertain whether any substantial number of persons is receiving less than a fair wage as defined by the act. Cum.Sup.1951, §§ 829b, 830b. If it is determined that less than a fair wage is being paid, a wage board is appointed to report on the establishment of minimum fair wage rates. §§ 830b, 831b. The commissioner, if he accepts the report, must publish it, together with such administrative regulations as he deems appropriate, and give notice of a public hearing. After the hearing, the commissioner must approve or disapprove the report. If he approves it, he is required to make an order defining minimum fair wage rates in the occupation concerned. § 832b.

The commissioner had established minimum fair wage rates for adult males employed in mercantile trade, effective March 18, 1946, as follows: 'Full time * * * Not less than $22.00 per week for 36-44 hours. Part time * * * Not less than 55 cents per hour for working time of less than 36 hours weekly.' The order contained these definitions pertinent to the issues of the instant case: 'The term full time employee means a person employed to work 36-44 hours per week, whether as a regular employee for a fixed or indeterminate time or as an extra employee for particular weeks. In a week in which a legal holiday occurs, 36 hours shall constitute a full week's work. * * * The term part time employee means a person who works less than 36 hour per week, whether as a regular employee or as an extra employee for a particular period.' Concerning overtime, the order stated: 'Time worked by an employee in excess of 44 hours per week shall be paid for, at least at one and one-quarter the employee's regular hourly rate (except [as to] employees engaged in [an] executive capacity and receiving not less than * * * $50.00 a week).' As to the matter of computing the hourly rates, the order contained this language: 'The hourly rate of a full time employee shall be computed by dividing the employee's weekly wage by 44 hours unless the employee' regular work week is less, then to establish the hourly rate, divide by the number of hours in the regular work week.' The act provides that any employee who receives less than the minimum fair wage prescribed may recover from his employer, in a civil action, the difference between the minimum and what he has actually received. General Statutes § 3796. It is to be noted that the claim in the instant case arises under the act as it was prior to the 1951 amendments and under an order issued by the commissioner pursuant to the terms of that act.

The finding of the trial court, which is not subject to correction, may be summarized as follows: The defendant owned a market in Seymour where he sold groceries, meats, fruits and vegetables at retail. He was subject to the Minimum Wage Act. On May 15, 1947, he entered into an agreement with his brother, the plaintiff, an adult male, under which the plaintiff was to work in the defendant's market each week on Monday, Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday from 7 a. m. to 7 p. m.; on Wednesday from 7 a. m. to 1 p. m.; and on Friday from 7 a. m. to 9 p. m. He was to have one hour for lunch each day excepting Wednesday. The total hours to be worked each week were 63, for which the plaintiff was to receive, and did receive, $50 weekly. The defendant also paid the plaintiff's social security tax. The plaintiff was to have certain food supplies at cost and food for his lunch. He received these benefits, but the court made no finding as to their value. Before going to work for the defendant, the plaintiff was employed with the Rockbestos Company at an hourly rate of $1.07 for a 40-hour week, for which he received gross pay of $42.80. His employment with the defendant began on May 16, 1947, and continued to December 19, 1949. During this time he never worked more than 63 hours in any one week. The trial court found that the minimum wage rate established by the commissioner's order was $.50 an hour for the first 44 hours and $.625 an hour for each hour in excess of 44. It found further that the plaintiff was not a full-time employee as defined in the order but an employee engaged under a contract of employment to work longer hours for a fixed weekly wage. The hourly rate the plaintiff was paid was computed at $.738 for the first 44 hours and $.9225 for the 19 hours of overtime. The court concluded, therefore, that the minimum hourly rates paid the plaintiff for regular time and overtime were more than the minimum rates established by the order. In this connection we call attention to an amendment of the act in 1951, subsequent to the period for which the plaintiff makes claim, which established a minimum rate of 75 cents an hour. Cum.Sup.1951, § 830b.

The Minimum Wage Act is not a wage and hour law. It purports to do no more than establish a minimum hourly wage in those occupations that are subject to its terms. In Swiss Cleaners, Inc. v. Danaher, 129 Conn. 338, 342, 27 A.2d 806, 808, we held that the 'purpose of [the] act is to enable a minimum wage scale to be adopted and to be put into effect as regards any 'sweat shop occupation,' defined as 'an industry, trade, business or occupation which pays to its employees an unfair and oppressive scale of wage in which persons are gainfully employed." The...

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8 cases
  • Krasnow v. Krasnow
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • August 4, 1953
    ...the rulings on evidence which the plaintiff challenges are not properly presented by the finding. Practice Book § 405; Attruia v. Attruia, 140 Conn. 73, 79, 98 A.2d 532. That aside, the plaintiff, claiming that he was acting for the welfare of his son, offered evidence concerning circumstan......
  • West v. Egan
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • June 7, 1955
    ...511, 514, 52 A.2d 702. The primary purpose of the minimum wage law is to require the payment of fair and just wages. Attruia v. Attruia, 140 Conn. 73, 77, 98 A.2d 532. Like our workmen's compensation and unemployment compensation laws, the minimum wage law should receive a liberal construct......
  • Martyn v. Donlin
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • January 3, 1961
    ...in this case gives us nothing with which to review these rulings. Krasnow v. Krasnow, 140 Conn. 254, 260, 99 A.2d 104; Attruia v. Atturia, 140 Conn. 73, 79, 98 A.2d 532. Donlin was asked several questions relative to his reasons for pursuing Martyn's car, his intent in so doing and his inte......
  • Maurice v. Chester Housing Associates, Limited Partnership
    • United States
    • Connecticut Superior Court
    • July 31, 2017
    ...her case, and it was unnecessary for the jury to consider any special defenses. Attruia v. Attruia, 18 Conn.Supp. 156, 161 (1952), aff'd, 140 Conn. 73, 98 A.2d 532 (1953) C Plaintiff argues that the court erred in not accepting plaintiff's witness, Mark Tebbets, as an expert in snow removal......
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