Attwood v. Purcell
Citation | 402 F. Supp. 231 |
Decision Date | 08 September 1975 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 75-17 Phx. WPC. |
Parties | Mary N. ATTWOOD and Joan F. Poston, Plaintiffs, v. Joseph PURCELL, Individually and as the City Attorney of the City of Phoenix, Arizona, and Lawrence Wetzel, Individually and as the Chief of Police of Phoenix, Arizona, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
Richard J. Hertzberg, Phoenix, Ariz., for plaintiffs.
Richard A. Garcia, Asst. City Atty., Phoenix, Ariz., for defendants.
Before ELY, Circuit Judge, and EAST and COPPLE, District Judges.
This action was brought pursuant to jurisdiction vested in this court by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), (4) and 28 U.S.C. § 2284(3). A three-judge court was convened in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2284(1).
Plaintiffs have been and wish to continue to be performing "topless" dancers whose services are engaged by adult film theaters to provide live entertainment between films. The dancers perform upon a stage and do not mingle with the audience. These theaters limit their clientele to paying adults and minors are excluded. The theaters do not advertise the performances as "nude" or "topless" dancing. Ample warning is provided so that the audience is aware of the nature of the film entertainment that the theaters offer. Such theaters are engaged solely in entertainment and not in the sale or service of alcoholic beverages1 or food.
Officers of the Phoenix Police Department's Special Investigations Bureau (Vice Enforcement Unit) enter these theaters and observe the dancing performed therein. If a dancer merely bares her breasts the officer will take no further action; however, if the baring of the breasts is combined with what the officer subjectively conceives to be suggestive conduct the dancer will be arrested2 for violating A.R.S. § 13-531.3 The statute provides:
"A person is guilty of a misdemeanor who wilfully and lewdly exposes his person or the private parts thereof in any public place or in a place where there are present other persons to be offended or annoyed thereby."
The department intends to reinstitute the enforcement of the statute unless prevented by the ruling of this court. It intends pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-1403 (2) ( ) to continue the use of arrest4 and "booking" of the dancers as their standard operating procedure in such cases.
As a result of the previous conduct of the defendants and their stated purpose to continue the enforcement of A.R.S. § 13-531, the plaintiffs have sought both declaratory and injunctive relief claiming the statute on its face and as applied is unconstitutional. Failing to obtain such relief, the plaintiffs request an injunction requiring that the officers obtain the presence of the plaintiffs for criminal proceedings by use of summons instead of immediate arrest pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-1403(2).
The defendants urge that the instant case is a proper one for abstention. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). We disagree. Neither plaintiff is a party to a presently pending civil or criminal action (in regards to this matter) in the state of Arizona. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974). If this court fails to act in their favour each of the plaintiffs will again be subject to arrest if they pursue their profession within the City of Phoenix.5 The threat of prosecution and not bad faith prosecution or harassment is the standard to be applied by this court. See Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 95 S.Ct. 1691, 44 L.Ed. 2d 274 (1975). Under these circumstances we see no reason for not invoking the jurisdiction of this court.
The constitutional considerations that guide this court involve the characterization of nude or topless dancing. We are of the opinion that such dancing can be protected expression under the First Amendment.
Judge Charles D. Roush of the Superior Court of Maricopa County, in a well-reasoned, unreported and unappealed decision, Generosity v. City of Scottsdale6, a copy of which has been filed herein, observed:
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reached the same conclusion in Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 501 F.2d 18, 21 n. 3 (2nd Cir. 1974) (Aff'd 422 U.S. 922, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975). The court noted:
". . . while the entertainment afforded by a nude ballet at Lincoln Center to those who can pay the price may differ vastly in content (as viewed by the judges) or in quality (as viewed by critics), it may not differ in substance from the dance viewed by the person who, having worked overtime for the necessary wherewithal, wants some `entertainment' with his beer or shot of rye."
Other courts have resolved the issue in the same manner.8
The constitutional protection afforded to this mode of expression was noted by the Supreme Court in California v. La Rue, 409 U.S. 109, 93 S.Ct. 390, 34 L.Ed. 2d 342 (1972). This position was reiterated by the court in Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932, 95 S.Ct. 2561 2568, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975). The court stated:
"Although the customary `bar room' type of nude dancing may involve only the barest minimum of protected expression we recognized in California v. LaRue (citation omitted), that this form of entertainment might be entitled to First and Fourteenth Amendment protection under some circumstances."
We feel that the conclusion is inescapable: nude dancing can be a protected form of expression under the First Amendment and as such is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Our consideration of A.R. S. § 13-531 therefore must of necessity be guided by the constitutional standards applied to state control over such expression.
We are of the opinion that A.R.S. § 13-531 is unconstitutional due both to its vagueness and overbreadth.
The reason for such specificity is two-fold. First, the individual who may wish to perform an expressive act must be put on notice of when he or she will lose the protection of the First Amendment. Secondly, the censor or magistrate must be provided with clear guidance as to what may or may not be controlled under the statute. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973), Miller v. California, supra, and Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957).
The Court has struck down as lacking the required specificity statutes which have used terms such as "sexual promiscuity" (Interstate Circuit Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 88 S.Ct. 1298, 20 L.Ed.2d 225 (1968)) and "would appeal to lust" (Rabeck v. New York, 391 U.S. 462, 88 S.Ct. 1716, 20 L.Ed.2d 741 (1968)). We think that the terms "wilfully and lewdly" are hardly more definite than those which have been struck down. In United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8 mm Film, 413 U.S. 123, 130 n. 7, 93 S.Ct. 2665, 2670 n. 7, 37 L. Ed.2d 500 (1973), the court noted:
The state courts have...
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