Atty. Gen. v. Jenkins

• Decision Date: 31 January 1946
• Docket Number: No. 211.,211.
• Citation: 45 A.2d 844
• Parties: VAN RIPER, Atty. Gen., et al. v. JENKINS et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

45 A.2d 844

VAN RIPER, Atty. Gen., et al.

v.JENKINS et al.

No. 211.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Jan. 31, 1946.

Appeal from Court of Chancery.

Bill of complaint by Harry A. Jenkins and another against William McGovern, Sheriff of the County of Hudson, to restrain defendant from taking complainant's fingerprints and photograph in advance of conviction and from forwarding the prints and pictures to others. From an order, 43 A.2d 526, denying the application by Walter D. Van Riper, attorney general of the state of New Jersey, and acting prosecutor of the Pleas of Hudson County and by Charles H. Schoeffel, superintendent of the police of the state, for leave to intervene as defendants, petitioners appeal.

Reversed.

Mark Townsend, of Jersey City, and Walter D. Van Riper, of Newark (Mark Townsend, of Jersey City, of counsel), for appellants.

Thomas H. Brown, of Jersey City, for respondents.

BROGAN, Chief, Justice.

An order to show cause was allowed in the Court of Chancery which contained a temporary restraint against the Sheriff of Hudson County and other peace officers described generally, not by name or precise rank, from taking the fingerprints and photographs of the complainants as required by statute, R.S. 53:1-15 et seq., N.J.S.A. On the return day of that order the Attorney General of New Jersey, quatalis, applied in open court for leave to intervene in this cause. Leave was denied. He then requested the court to permit him to appear amicus curiae. This was allowed. We presume he submitted a brief.

Thereafter the Attorney General, on notice to complainants' solicitors, filed a formal petition for leave to intervene as defendant in his own behalf as well as in behalf of the Superintendent of State Police. This application, after argument, was likewise denied. The defeated petitioners appeal.

The question before us arose out of these events: Harry A. Jenkins and Edward J. Mescall, Chief and Deputy of the Union City Police Department respectively, had been indicted in the Hudson County district; before arraignment and plea they filed a bill in our Court of Chancery praying that the Sheriff of Hudson County be enjoined from fingerprinting them and taking their photos and from forwarding the prints and the pictures to the Superintendent of State Police, as ordained by the statute, supra, in advance of conviction under the indictment. Upon the filing of the bill the ad interim injunction was allowed ex parte. The show cause order restrained the Sheriff of the county and his deputies and subordinates as well as Chiefs of police and members of the State Police from ‘taking the fingerprints and photographs of the complainants * * * and from forwarding the same to the State Police’, etc. At the foot of the order provision was made for the dissolution or modification of the restraint on notice. This was the posture of the matter on the return day of that order when the Attorney General first sought to intervene. When later he filed the formal petition, as stated above, the situation was unchanged. This matter has not proceeded to final hearing, the present appeal being from an order interlocutory in character. At least one phase of the main question is now under consideration by this court in another case, i.e., McGovern v. Van Riper, et al., N.J.Err.& App., 45 A.2d 842.

The Vice-Chancellor entertained the view that the Attorney General had no interest in the controversy and his formal application to intervene was denied. This, we think, was erroneous.

The petition of the Attorney General was made in his representative capacity. As such he is the chief officer of the state and is concerned with certain of the legal affairs of the entire community. In this instance his was the duty to vindicate, in his capacity of principal law officer of the state, the statutes under attack. These statutes manifestly, since the time of their enactment, P.L.1930, ch. 65, N.J.S.A. 53:1-12 et seq., became ancillary to the administration of our criminal law, a matter of supreme importance to the people. Certainly the sovereign state is concerned when its laws of this character are challenged. The state has entrusted to its Attorney General the management of its legal affairs and the validity of this statute is a matter of cardinal importance and interest to the state. In England the Attorney General is a necessary party to all proceedings affecting the crown (3 Enc. Brit. 63) and enjoys high prerogative rights (State ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham, 83 Wis. 90, 53 N.W. 35, 17 L.R.A. 145, 35 Am.St.Rep. 27, compare Attorney General v. Delaware & B. B. R. Co. 38 N.J.L. 282; 3 Bl.Com. 27). The duty of an Attorney General is essentially a public one. Among other things, he is called upon to advise those who administer the government of the state and in the absence of judicial decision his opinions become the guide for such executives. He is a constitutional officer, Art. 7, Sec. 2, Par. 3; see also Par. XII, Const.1776 N.J.S.A. although nothing more is...