ATU LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF STATE v. State
| Decision Date | 14 February 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 70829-1.,70829-1. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | ATU LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF WASHINGTON STATE; and Washington State Transit Association, Respondents, v. STATE of Washington, Appellant, Benton County; Bobbi Gagner, auditor of Benton County; Franklin County; Zona Lenhart, auditor of Franklin County; Clallam County; Ken Foster, auditor of Clallam County; Snohomish County; Bob Terwilliger, auditor of Snohomish County; Clark County; Greg Kimsey, auditor of Clark County; Cowlitz County; Kristina K. Swanson, auditor of Cowlitz County; Grant County; Bill Varney, auditor of Grant County; Grays Harbor County; Vern Spatz, auditor of Grays Harbor County; Thurston County; Sam S. Reed, auditor of Thurston County; Island County; Suzanne Sinclair, auditor of Island County; Jefferson County; Donna M. Eldridge, auditor of Jefferson County; Kitsap County; Karen Flynn, auditor of Kitsap County; Chelan County; Evelyn Arnold, auditor of Chelan County; Douglas County; Thad Duvall, auditor of Douglas County; Mason County; Al Brotche, auditor of Mason County; King County; Don Eklund, auditor of King County; Pacific County; Ida Taylor, auditor of Pacific County; Pierce County; Cathy Pearsall-Stipek, auditor of Pierce County; Whitman County; David G. Repp, auditor of Whitman County; Skagit County; Kathy Hill, auditor of Skagit County; Spokane County; Vicky Dalton, auditor of Spokane County; Lewis County; Gary E. Zandell, auditor of Lewis County; Walla Walla County; Karen Martin, auditor of Walla Walla County; Whatcom County; Shirley Forslof, auditor of Whatcom County; Yakima County; Doug Cochran, auditor of Yakima County; all political subdivisions of the State of Washington, Respondents. |
Christine Gregoire, Attorney General, Jeffrey David Goltz and Jerald R. Anderson, Assts., Olympia, for Appellants.
Steven Lowe, Franklin County Prosecutor, Darin R. Campbell, Deputy, Pasco; Christopher Shea, Clallam County Prosecutor, Christopher Melly, Deputy, Port Angeles; Jim Krider, Snohomish County Prosecutor, Gordon W. Sivley, Deputy, Everett; Ed Holm, Thurston County Prosecutor, David V. Klumpp, Deputy, Olympia; Gregory Banks, Island County Prosecutor, David L. Jamieson, Jr., Deputy, Coupeville; Arthur D. Curtis, Clark County Prosecutor, Curtis G. Wyrick, Deputy, Vancouver; Susan I. Baur, Cowlitz County Prosecutor, Ronald S. Marshall, Deputy, Kelso; John Knodell, Grant County Prosecutor, Stephen J. Hallstrom, Deputy, Ephrata; H. Steward Menefee, Grays Harbor County Prosecutor, Jennifer L. Wieland, Deputy, Montesano; Jueliel Dalzell, Jefferson County Prosecutor, David W. Alvarez, Deputy, Port Townsend; Russell Hauge, Kitsap County Prosecutor, Alan L. Miles, Deputy, Cassandra Noble, Port Orchard; Gary P. Burleson, Mason County Prosecutor, Michael E. Clift, Deputy, Shelton; Michael Smith, Pacific County Prosecutor, South Bend; James H. Kaufman, Whitman County Prosecutor, Ronald D. Shirley, Deputy, Colfax; Steven Tucker, Spokane County Prosecutor, James P. Emacio, Deputy, Spokane; James Nagle, Walla Walla County Prosecutor, Walla Walla; Jeffrey Sullivan, Yakima County Prosecutor, Ronald S. Zirkle, Deputy, Yakima; Gary Riesen, Chelan County Prosecutor, Wenatchee; Steven M. Clem, Douglas County Prosecutor, Waterville; Norm Maleng, King County Prosecutor, Jessica L. Hardung, Deputy, Janine E. Joly, Deputy, Seattle; Gerald Horne, Pierce County Prosecutor, Roger J. Miener, Deputy, Tacoma; Thomas Verge, Skagit County Prosecutor, Hilary A. Thomas, Deputy, Mount Vernon; Jeremy Randolph, Lewis County Prosecutor, Chehalis; David McEachran, Whatcom Couty Prosecutor, Randall J. Watts, Deputy, Bellingham; Langabeer, Tull & Cuillier, Richard L. Langabeer, Mark J. Lee, Bellingham, for Respondents.
We revisit the aftermath of Initiative 695 (I-695).1 When that measure was held unconstitutional, the legislature passed Senate Bill 6865 (SB 6865),2 repealing the state motor vehicle excise tax (MVET) and setting license tab fees at $30. We now address whether SB 6865 repealed RCW 35.58.273—a municipal tax historically collected with the MVET—by implication.
Plaintiffs-Respondents Amalgamated Transit Union Legislative Council of Washington State (ATU) and Washington State Transit Association together represent transit workers' labor unions and 26 Washington transit agencies. They filed this action in Thurston County Superior Court seeking a declaratory judgment that SB 6865 did not repeal the special excise tax levied under RCW 35.58.273, and that the state continues to have the duty to collect it. The auditors of a number of counties, defendants below and respondents here, sought a declaration that if the special excise tax is not repealed, it is the state's responsibility to collect it. The trial court declared that the special excise tax was not repealed, and that the state has the duty to collect it. Defendant-Appellant State of Washington sought direct review in this court, asserting that the special excise tax was impliedly repealed by SB 6865, and that, if not, either municipal authorities or the county auditors, not the state, must collect it. We affirm the trial court.
Before 1-695, the state imposed the statewide MVET at the rate of 2.2 percent on the value of a motor vehicle. Former RCW 82.44.020(1) (1998), repealed by Laws of 2000, 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 1, § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2000. 1-695 repealed this tax, and replaced it with a flat fee for license tabs of $30. After 1-695 was held to be unconstitutional, the legislature enacted SB 6865 in its stead. SB 6865 repealed RCW 82.44.020, the MVET, and certain other code sections (though not nearly as many as 1-695), and set the license tab fee at $30.3
The legislature had also given municipalities the authority to levy a special excise tax on the value of motor vehicles at a rate not to exceed .725 percent. RCW 35.58.273. The special excise tax may be levied to fund local public transit projects. For purposes of the special excise tax, "municipality" includes counties, municipal corporations, and various public transit areas whose boundaries do not necessarily follow city, county, or even zip code boundaries. See RCW 35.58.272.4 Twenty-six local authorities in Washington have levied the special excise tax.
However, the legislature provided that the special excise tax would be credited against the MVET. RCW 35.58.273. This meant that a taxpayer living in a municipality that had levied the special excise tax was allowed to credit that tax against her MVET tax liability. All Washington motor vehicle owners therefore paid the same total tax, 2.2 percent, irrespective of whether they lived in municipalities levying the special excise tax. The effect of levying the special excise tax was that the municipalities were permitted to keep a portion of the state's MVET revenues. In the ordinances imposing the special excise tax, some municipalities particularly observed that the decision to levy the tax did not increase the tax burden on their constituents. Another effect of the MVET credit was that the special excise tax did not have to be collected separately. The state had only to share a portion of its MVET revenues with those municipalities levying the special excise tax. The special excise tax is therefore "due and payable" to the Department of Licensing (DOL). RCW 35.58.276; RCW 82.44.060. The special excise tax was never itemized on a taxpayer's registration form, nor were its funds kept in separate accounts. The legislature simply provided in RCW 82.44.150 for the state treasurer to remit a portion of MVET revenues to the appropriate municipalities if they levy the special excise tax. RCW 82.44.150(1) directs DOL to advise the state treasurer of the proper amount; RCW 82.44.150(2)-(3) authorize the deposits; and RCW 82.44.150(4)-(6) provide for reporting by the municipalities receiving the deposits and for ensuring that they have the transit programs in place required for levying the special excise tax.
This method was approximate. When a municipality levied the special excise tax, motor vehicle owners residing in the municipality were not separately identified for having some of their MVET remitted to the municipality. Instead, DOL had to use the formula in RCW 82.44.150(1). DOL multiplied the total MVET revenues from a county by the ratio of the population of the municipality to the population of the county. Thus, a portion of the MVET collected in a county was deemed to be collected from a given municipality based on population, not based on the actual residence of motor vehicle owners. The state treasurer would use these population based figures to establish the total MVET collected from each municipality, and then remit the fraction of the MVET equal to the special excise tax imposed by the municipality.
The duty to make this calculation naturally fell to DOL, since DOL was responsible for calculating the total MVET due from each vehicle owner in the state. Collecting the MVET required DOL to establish the value of a motor vehicle. It accomplished this with the Vehicle Field System, a computer program created, owned, and maintained by DOL. The amount of tax due from a vehicle owner was calculated by the Vehicle Headquarters System, another DOL computer program.
The MVET and the special excise tax were historically collected by DOL in cooperation with the county auditors.5 DOL had a contract with each county auditor to act as DOL's agent for collecting the MVET. Although the auditors received checks and distributed license tabs, the checks were payable to DOL, and DOL provided the registration forms and tabs. The contracts state that "DOL has the general responsibility... for the collection of vehicle and vessel licensing fees, excise taxes and other fees and taxes." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 28, 55.
1-695 threw the entire scheme into disarray. It repealed the MVET itself, RCW 82.44.020...
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