Atwater v. Chester
| Decision Date | 20 September 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 12–1920.,12–1920. |
| Citation | 730 F.3d 58 |
| Parties | Thomas A. ATWATER, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Mitchell D. CHESTER, as he is the Commissioner of Elementary and Secondary Education of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; Manchester–Essex Regional School District, Defendants, Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
H. Reed Witherby, with whom Garrick F. Cole and Smith Duggan Buell & Rufo LLP were on brief, for appellant.
Amy Spector, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Martha Coakley, Attorney General, was on brief, for appellee Mitchell D. Chester.
Geoffrey R. Bok, with whom Stoneman, Chandler & Miller LLP was on brief, for appellee Manchester–Essex Regional School District.
Before LYNCH, Chief Judge, LIPEZ and THOMPSON, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Thomas Atwater sought review of his dismissal from his teaching position in the Manchester–Essex Regional School District (“School District”), first in Massachusetts state court and then in Massachusetts federal district court. Concluding that Atwater's claims were barred by res judicata, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees, the School District and the Massachusetts Commissioner of Elementary and Secondary Education (“Commissioner”). Atwater now appeals the grant of summary judgment, presenting a number of reasons why res judicata does not bar his federal claims from adjudication in federal court. Finding none persuasive, we affirm.
Atwater was a teacher with “professional status” in the School District until March 2005, when he was informed by letter of the District Superintendent's intention to dismiss him from his employment for inappropriate sexual conduct toward a student.1 The particular instances giving rise to Atwater's dismissal are not necessary for our determination, and so we do not review them in detail here. Atwater invoked his right under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 42 to seek review of the Superintendent's action by filing a petition for arbitration with the Commissioner. Pursuant to the procedures required by section 42, the Commissioner coordinated the selection of a private arbitrator to resolve Atwater's challenge to his dismissal.2 After a five-day arbitration, the arbitrator issued a ninety-nine page decision affirming Atwater's dismissal for conduct unbecoming of a teacher and finding that the Superintendent and the School District did not violate section 42 in dismissing him.
On August 4, 2006, Atwater filed suit in Massachusetts Superior Court challenging the discharge of his employment and seeking to vacate the arbitrator's decision. Over three weeks later, on August 30, Atwater filed this complaint in federal court. Three counts advanced supposed state-law violations: the arbitrator failed to employ the statutory standard in determining his petition (count 1), which meant she exceeded her statutory authority under section 42 (count 2), and, acting on behalf of the Commissioner, she exhibited bias and prejudice against him (count 3). Three counts advanced supposed federal-law violations: “ineffective administrative supervision,” transgressing his right to “procedural due process” (count 4); improper “delegation of a governmental function” (count 5); and improper “insulation of determination by private individual from meaningful judicial review,” transgressing some sort of generalized “due process” right (count 6). In footnotes to his federal-court complaint, Atwater, citing England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 84 S.Ct. 461, 11 L.Ed.2d 440 (1964), asserted that he included the state claims “for completeness” but did not submit them for the federal court's adjudication.
The very next day, August 31, Atwater amended his state-court complaint so that it contained exactly the same six claims as his federal-court complaint. And he noted that he had included the federal claims only “for completeness” and not for the state court's adjudication, again citing to England. Along with his amended complaint, Atwater submitted to the state court a “Notice of Reservation of Federal Claims,” apprising that court that he had sued the same defendants in federal court on the same grounds. He again stated that he included the federal claims only “to inform” the state court and “for completeness,” and he purported to reserve the claims for adjudication in federal court, once more referencing England. He also noted his intent to seek a stay of the action in federal court pending the state court's determination on his state-law claims and after the conclusion of any additional proceedings.
In answering the amended state-court complaint, the Commissioner and the School District objected to Atwater's attempt to reserve his federal claims, stating that he had improperly sought an “England reservation” of the federal claims in counts four, five, and six. The Commissioner specifically noted that the federal court had not yet remitted Atwater to state court on abstention grounds, and the School District added that his claims should be dismissed for improper claim splitting. The Commissioner and the School District made the very same points in answering the federal-court complaint.
In a joint scheduling conference statement, the parties, citing Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941), moved the federal court to stay further proceedings pending the outcome of the “related” state-court case. Resolving that case first “will affect substantially the constitutional issues” before the federal court, the parties wrote, so “a stay based on Pullman abstention principles is appropriate.” But the parties stressed that, by joining this motion, neither the Commissioner nor the School District “waive[d] their objections to [Atwater's] contention that he has effectively reserved his federal constitutional claims for this [c]ourt's consideration.” The district court responded by entering an “order of closure for statistical purposes,” dismissing the federal-court case without prejudice to the parties' “moving to restore [the case] to the docket if any further action is required upon completion and termination of any state court proceedings....”
Atwater proceeded with his state-law claims in state court. On cross motions for summary judgment, the state-trial court rejected Atwater's state-law claims and affirmed the arbitrator's decision. In a footnote appearing on the opening page of its decision, the state-trial court wrote that Atwater had also alleged three federal-law claims in his state-court complaint but had “expressly reserved” them “for adjudication” in federal court. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) upheld the entry of summary judgment for the Commissioner and the School District, with a footnote in the opinion's background section saying:
Atwater also raised three Federal claims, including Federal due process claims, which he has reserved for adjudication by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Thus, these claims are not before us.
After the conclusion of his state-court case, Atwater filed a motion to reopen his federal-court case, seeking to adjudicate his federal claims. Neither the Commissioner nor the School District opposed the restoration of the case. But both took pains to again emphasize their view that Atwater's purported England reservation was a nonstarter.
The Commissioner and the School District moved for summary judgment, arguing that the state court's judgment was res judicata in the federal proceeding and that his attempted England reservation failed. Atwater opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment himself, asserting that res-judicata principles did not bar his federal claims and that his England reservation was effective. Rejecting Atwater's arguments, the district court held that his supposed “England reservation” was ineffective and that his federal claims could have been litigated in the previous state-court case and so were barred under res judicata. Consequently, the district court denied his motion and granted summary judgment to the Commissioner and the School District. This appeal followed, over which we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
The parties—who agree on little else—correctly agree that res judicata bars Atwater's federal-law claims unless an exception applies. 3 Atwater insists that three exceptions are in play. He first argues that his England reservation lets him escape the preclusive effect of the state-court judgment. Alternatively, he argues that the state courts expressly reserved his right to pursue his federal-law claims in federal court and that we must respect what they did. And finally, he argues that, regardless of ordinary res-judicata rules, the equities require that we let his federal case go forward.
We first set out the summary-judgment standard and then deal with each argument in turn.
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Atwater. See Alvarado v. Donahoe, 687 F.3d 453, 458 (1st Cir.2012). Summary judgment is called for when there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Gerald v. Univ. of P.R., 707 F.3d 7, 16 (1st Cir.2013) (quoting Martínez–Burgos v. Guayama Corp., 656 F.3d 7, 11 (1st Cir.2011)); seeFed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “The presence of cross-motions for summary judgment neither dilutes nor distorts this standard of review.” Mandel v. Boston Phoenix, Inc., 456 F.3d 198, 205 (1st Cir.2006).
Thanks to the Supreme Court's England decision, parties forced by a federal judge to litigate their state-law claims in state court can return to federal court and have...
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