Aucoin v. Kennedy

• Decision Date: 26 July 2004
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A. 03-1649.,CIV.A. 03-1649.
• Citation: 355 F.Supp.2d 830
• Parties: Diana AUCOIN v. Milton KENNEDY, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

355 F.Supp.2d 830

Diana AUCOIN v.Milton KENNEDY, et al.

No. CIV.A. 03-1649.

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana.

July 26, 2004.

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Karen Delcambre McCarthy, Lanny R. Zatzkis, Zatzkis, McCarthy & Associates, LLC, New Orleans, for Diana Aucoinplaintiff.

Henry D.H. Olinde, Jr., Faye Dysart Morrison, Scott Edward Mercer, Simoneaux Carleton Dunlap & Olinde, LLC, Baton Rouge, Vincent J. Lobello, Vincent J. Lobello, Attorney at Law, Slidell, Timothy George Schafer, Rachel Smith Kellogg, Schafer & Schafer, New Orleans, for Milton Kennedy, in his individual and official capacity, Steve Farris, in his individual and official capacity, St. Tammany Parish Fire Protection DistrictNo. 1, American Alternative Insurance Company, incorrectly sued as Alternative American Insurance Company, defendants.

ORDER AND REASONS

LEMMON, District Judge.

DefendantsAmerican Alternative Insurance Corporation, Milton Kennedy, Steve Farris, and St. Tammany Fire Protection DistrictNo. 1 have moved to dismiss plaintiffDiana Aucoin's suit under Rules 12(b)(1)and12(b)(6)(Documents 11, 13 and 15).IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1) Defendants' motions to dismiss Aucoin's claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act are GRANTED.

2) Defendants' motions to dismiss Aucoin's claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) against the Fire District that occurred prior to September 21, 2001, Aucoin's ADEA claims against Kennedy and Farris individually, and Aucoin's claim for punitive damages under the ADEA are GRANTED.Defendants' motions to dismiss Aucoin's claims against the Fire District under the ADEA arising on or after September 21, 2001 for failure to exhaust administrative remedies are DENIED.

3) Defendants' motions to dismiss Aucoin's claim for punitive damages under Title VII, all Title VII claims arising prior to September 21, 2001, and all Title VII claims outside of the scope of Aucoin's EEOC Charges are GRANTED.Aucoin's Title VII claim in this case is limited to the allegation that Aucoin "performed work in the position of Administrative Assistant requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility under similar working conditions, and that she was paid less than male and/or younger males in comparable positions."

4) Defendants' motions to dismiss Aucoin's claim for punitive damages under the Equal Pay Act (EPA) and her claims against Kennedy and Farris under the EPA are GRANTED.

5) Defendants' motions to dismiss Aucoin's claim for gender discrimination and age discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are DENIED.Defendants' motions to dismiss Aucoin's § 1983 claims for disability discrimination, punitive damages, due process, and retaliation (as to Kennedy and Farris), as well as all § 1983 claims arising prior to June 10, 2002, are GRANTED.

6) Defendants' motions to dismiss Aucoin's claim of intentional misrepresentation under Louisiana law is DENIED.Defendants' motions to dismiss Aucoin's claim of negligent misrepresentation under Louisiana law is GRANTED.

7) Defendants' motions to dismiss(1) Aucoin's claim for punitive damages under Louisiana antidiscrimination laws, and (2) Aucoin's discrimination claims under Louisiana antidiscrimination law that are outside the scope of her EEOC complaint are GRANTED.Aucoin's state antidiscrimination law claim in this case is limited to the allegation that Aucoin "performed work in the position of Administrative Assistant requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility under similar working conditions, and that she was paid less than male and/or younger males in comparable positions."

8) Defendants' motions to dismiss Aucoin's conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) is GRANTED.Defendants' motions to dismiss Aucoin's conspiracy claim under Louisiana law are DENIED.

9) Defendants' motions to dismiss Aucoin's invasion of privacy claim under Louisiana law are GRANTED.

A.Background.

1.Aucoin's allegations.

Diana Aucoin began working for the St. Tammany Fire Protection DistrictNo. 1 in 1989 as a bookkeeper.Aucoin alleges that the Fire District discriminated against her based on sex and/or age because Charles Abney, Gary Hathorn, and Cheryl Gross, younger individuals with fewer years of experience, were given comparatively higher rates of pay.Aucoin further alleges that she was transferred to a less desirable job location, along with other older workers.Aucoin alleges that defendants initiated a criminal investigation of her activities in connection with a salary increase, although they did not investigate other individuals involved in the increase who were younger; and that she was asked to repay allegedly overpaid salary even though Abney and Gross were not asked to do so.Aucoin claims she was singled out to assist Kennedy in his campaign against two fire commissioners, even though younger and male individuals were not forced to help him.Aucoin went on sick leave on January 9, 2003, and has not worked since that date.She alleges that while on sick leave, defendants have treated her differently than other male workers who have taken sick leave.Additionally, she alleges that defendants have retaliated against her for assisting others who have discrimination claims against defendants by placing her on "house arrest" during her convalescence, and by suing her in connection with her salary increase.

2.Allegations before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

On July 18, 2002, Aucoin submitted a Charge of Discrimination to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission(EEOC), charging that defendants had discriminated against her based on sex and had violated the Equal Pay Act.On December 20, 2002, Aucoin wrote a letter to John Berendsen at the EEOC stating that she wished to amend her Charge to include age discrimination.On June 9, 2003, she wrote to the EEOC to amend her claim also "to include disability based discrimination and harassment."On June 11, 2003, the EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue letter "under Title VII and/or the [Americans with Disabilities Act]."

On February 12, 2004, Aucoin submitted an additional Charge of Discrimination to the EEOC, alleging defendants had discriminated against her based on age and disability.That same day, the EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue letter "under Title VII and/or the ADA" as well as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.¹

3.Aucoin's suit.

Aucoin filed suit on June 10, 2003 against the Fire District; Steve Farris, its Chairman; Milton Kennedy, a fire chief employed by the Fire District; and their insurer.Aucoin alleges the following claims: (1)defendants violated Title VII, the ADA, the ADEA, and42 U.S.C. § 1983 by discriminating against her on the basis of age, sex, and disability; (2)defendants intentionally and/or negligently misrepresented the Fire District's sick leave policy and their intent to correct certain salary disparities; (3)defendants violated Louisiana antidiscrimination laws;

(4)defendants conspired against her; and (5)defendants defamed her and invaded her privacy.Defendants have moved to dismiss Aucoin's claims under Rules 12(b)(1)and12(b)(6).

B.Analysis.

1.Count One.

a. Claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Defendants argue that Aucoin's claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) because Aucoin has not alleged that she has a cognizable ADA disability.

The ADA provides that the term "disability" means, "with respect to an individual," either (1)"a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;"(2) a "record of such an impairment," or (3)"being regarded as having such an impairment."42 U.S.C. § 12102.Plaintiff's complaint does not specifically allege the nature of her disability, but generally alleges that defendants subjected her to continual harassment and excessive stress, which caused her to go on extended sick leave.²Aucoin's opposition memorandum states only that defendants' harassment caused her to suffer from "an anxiety reaction" that her physician attributed to "job-related stress."³

The Fifth Circuit addressed a similar claim in Aldrup v. Caldera,274 F.3d 282(5th Cir.2001).The Aldrupplaintiff alleged that he suffered from depression caused by the stress and anxiety of having to work with certain of defendants' employees, and that his condition constituted a disability under the ADA.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant, noting that "Aldrup alleges that he suffers from the disability of depression caused by `the stress and anxiety of having to work with certain employees at the [Houston Station].'This claim, if supported by the record, would merely tend to show that he was unable to perform any job at one specific location, and is not evidence of Aldrup's general inability to perform a broad class of jobs."Id. at 286-87.In Wheelock v. Philip Morris, USA, Inc.,No. 95-0999, 1997 WL 45292(E.D.La.Feb. 5, 1997), plaintiff also argued that defendant's harassment caused job-related stress and depression that constituted a disability under the ADA.The court disagreed, noting that "an inability to work at a particular position does not render an individual `disabled' under the ADA.This situational type of depression does not interfere with plaintiff caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, or working at another job."Id. at 1997 WL 45292 *7.

In analyzing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court"accepts as true all well-pleaded facts, and view them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party."Word of Faith World Outreach Center Church, Inc. v. Sawyer,90 F.3d 118, 121(5th Cir.1996), cert. denied,520 U.S. 1117, 117 S.Ct. 1248, 137 L.Ed.2d 329(1997)."Unless it appears `beyond a doubt that the...