Aucoin v. Larpenter

• Decision Date: 16 April 2021
• Docket Number: 2020 CA 0792
• Citation: Aucoin v. Larpenter, 324 So.3d 626 (La. App. 2021)
• Parties: Craig AUCOIN v. Sheriff Jerry J. LARPENTER, Ex Officio as the Terrebonne Parish Sheriff, Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government Through the Parish President Gordon E. Dove, and Richard "Petie" Neal
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana

324 So.3d 626

Craig AUCOIN

v.Sheriff Jerry J. LARPENTER, Ex Officio as the Terrebonne Parish Sheriff, Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government Through the Parish President Gordon E. Dove, and Richard "Petie" Neal

2020 CA 0792

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

Judgment Rendered: APRIL 16, 2021

Donna U. Grodner, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant, Craig Aucoin

Richard E. McCormack, Gus A. Fritchie, III, New Orleans, Louisiana And W. Seth Dodd, William F. Dodd, Houma, Louisiana, Counsels for Defendant/Appellee, Jerry J. Larpenter

Brian J. Marceaux, Julius P. Hebert, Jr., Houma, Louisiana, Counsel for Defendants/Appellees, Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government and Richard "Petie" Neal

BEFORE: GUIDRY, McCLENDON, AND LANIER, JJ.

McCLENDON, J.

The trial court granted summary judgment finding that defendants were immune from liability for plaintiff's claims pursuant to statute. Plaintiff appealed. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 22, 2017, Craig Aucoin was incarcerated at the Terrebonne Parish Criminal Justice Complex (TPCJC). Aucoin and nine other inmates were assigned to sleep on mattresses placed over "boats"¹ on the floor of the "B-100" dormitory. Aucoin was asleep on his mattress and boat, which were located along the edge of the second story tier of the dormitory, against the balcony railing. The bottom rail was approximately five to six inches above the landing, so that the top of Aucoin's mattress, when placed over the boat, was higher than the bottom rail. At 3:23 a.m., Aucoin rolled over the bottom rail of the balcony and fell from the second story. He struck a metal table and then fell several more feet before landing on the ground floor on his stomach, sustaining injuries.

On January 12, 2018, Aucoin filed a petition for damages, naming as defendants Sheriff Jerry Larpenter, as the administrator of the TPCJC; Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government (TPCG), as the employer of the health care providers working at TPCJC; and Richard "Petie" Neal, EMT, as medical administrator of the TPCJC and employee of TPCG. In his petition, Aucoin alleged that he sustained numerous injuries in his fall that affected his back, shoulder, hip, leg, and head, and caused serious emotional distress and suffering; that he was denied certain medical care he requested; that he was provided inadequate medical care that was noncompliant with physician's orders, which exacerbated his injuries² ; that he was confined to a wheelchair as a result of his injuries and was therefore vulnerable to attack by other inmates in the general population; and that the defendants had exhibited wanton or reckless disregard, or malice or willfulness to cause injury, and violated his constitutional rights as an inmate confined to prison. Aucoin also asserted that he had completed multiple medical grievances at the time suit was filed.

TPCG and Neal (collectively, "appellees") filed an answer in response to Aucoin's petition on March 5, 2018. On November 12, 2019, appellees filed a motion seeking summary judgment on the issue of liability. Specifically, appellees asserted that they were entitled to immunity under LSA-RS. 15:703, LSA-R.S. 9:2798.1, and LSA-R.S. 40:1131.3 and argued that their provision of medical treatment to Aucoin was not grossly negligent. Thus, appellees sought summary judgment finding that they were entitled to immunity, that the medical treatment provided to Aucoin was not grossly negligent, and that they were not liable to Aucoin for any injuries or damages he may have suffered as a result of his fall. In support of their motion for summary judgment, appellees attached the following exhibits: exhibit 1, Aucoin's petition for damages; exhibit 2, Aucoin's TPCJC medical records; exhibit 3, July 22, 2017 TPCJC incident report regarding Aucoin's fall; exhibit 4, Aucoin's responses to discovery requests propounded by TPCG and Neal; exhibit 5, Aucoin's deposition; exhibit 6, Neal's affidavit; exhibit 7, the expert opinion of R. Demaree Inglese, M.D.; exhibit 8, Dr. Inglese's supplemental expert report; exhibit 9, Dr. Inglese's curriculum vitae; and exhibit 10, Dr. Inglese's affidavit.

In opposition to appellees’ motion for summary judgment, Aucoin argued that appellees were barred from claiming immunity pursuant to LSA-R.S. 9:2798.1 because it "does not apply to negligence cases." Aucoin also claimed that appellees waived the right to assert the defense of immunity under LSA-R.S. 15:703 or LSA-R.S. 40:1131.13, or "Any defense related to a lack of gross negligence," because appellees failed to raise these defenses in their answer to Aucoin's petition. Aucoin attached a response to appellees’ statement of material facts, in which he identified thirty-one of appellees’ statements of fact as "Not relevant to the MSJ." Aucoin did not attach any other exhibits in support of his opposition to appellees’ motion for summary judgment. Aucoin also filed three motions in limine in response to appellees’ motion for summary judgment, which appellees opposed.³

In response to Aucoin's opposition to summary judgment, appellees filed a reply memorandum and a motion to file a supplemental and amending answer. Appellees’ reply memorandum maintained that Aucoin's characterization of their statements of material facts as "Not relevant to the MSJ" did not constitute a denial of those facts, and therefore the facts at issue must be deemed admitted. Appellees’ reply also contended that Aucoin failed to object to any of the exhibits attached to their motion for summary judgment in a timely opposition or reply memorandum, and thus, all of appellees exhibits must be considered by the trial court. Appellees’ motion to file a supplemental and amending answer pointed out that their original answer specifically asserted immunity under LSA-R.S. 9:2798.1, as well as "all statutory or jurisprudential immunity available to them under the law." Appellees also argued that gross negligence was not an affirmative defense required to be pled in an answer, but rather was Aucoin's burden of proof. However, appellees sought leave of court to amend their answer to affirmatively plead the defenses and immunities provided pursuant to LSA-R.S. 9.2798.1, LSA-RS. 15:703, and LSA-R.S. 40:1131.3. The trial court executed a written order permitting the supplemental and amending answer to be filed as prayed for on December 18, 2019.⁴

Aucoin also filed a motion to strike appellees’ motion for summary judgment and memorandum in support, arguing that it had not been served in compliance with law. In opposition, appellees argued that they had timely requested service on Aucoin, but the Sheriff's Office had failed to timely serve it. Thus, appellees suggested a continuance may be appropriate. Aucoin filed a reply memorandum in support of his motion to strike appellants’ motion for summary judgment on December 27, 2019. On December 20, 2019, the trial court ordered the continuance of appellees’ motion for summary judgment, together with all other pending motions, to January 29, 2020.

Thus, on January 29, 2020, the following motions were before the court: Aucoin's three motions in limine; appellees’ motion to file a supplemental and amending answer; appellees’ motion for summary judgment; and a motion for summary judgment filed by Sheriff Larpenter, seeking dismissal of Aucoin's claims against him. The trial court granted both motions for summary judgment in open court, and stated that it was adopting the defendants’ memorandums in support as reasons for judgment. In the trial courts oral reasons, with respect to appellees’ motion for summary judgment specifically, the trial court stated, "I do believe the immunity statutes apply." The trial court further ruled that all other matters set for hearing were moot. Thereafter, the trial court executed a written judgment in conformity with its oral ruling granting Sheriff Larpenter's motion for summary judgment on February 28, 2020. Likewise, the trial court executed a written judgment in conformity with its oral ruling granting appellees’ motion for summary judgment on March 5, 2020.

On June 3, 2020, Aucoin filed a motion for and notice of appeal that improperly sought appellate review of both the February 28, 2020 judgment in favor of Larpenter, and the March 5, 2020 judgment in favor of appellees in one appeal. This Court noticed the lodging of the appeal of the March 5, 2020 judgment in favor of appellees on August 31, 2020. Thus, we consider the March 5, 2020 judgment granting the motion for summary judgment filed by appellees herein.⁵

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used when there is no genuine issue of material fact for all or part of the relief prayed for by a litigant. Murphy v. Savannah, 2018-0991 (La. 5/8/19), 282 So.3d 1034, 1038. After an opportunity for adequate discovery, a motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3). The only documents that may be filed in support of or in opposition to the motion are pleadings, memoranda, affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, certified medical records, written stipulations, and admissions. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(A)(4). However, the court shall consider any documents filed in support of or in opposition to the motion for summary judgment to which no objection is made. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(D)(2).

The burden of proof on a motion for summary judgment rests with the mover. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1). When the moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, he must support his motion for summary judgment with credible evidence that would entitle him to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial. Hines v. Garrett, 2004-0806 (La. 6/25/04), 876 So.2d 764, 766 (per curiam). Such an...